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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND NICHE OVERLAP: 
 
THE DYNAMICS OF SURGERY CENTER ENTRY AND EXIT 
 
 
Michael G. Housman 
 
 
Lawton R. Burns 
 
 
 
The literature on organizational niche suggests that competition between firms that have 
overlapping niches tends to elevate exit risks.  Thus, firms tend to enter markets that are 
relatively uncrowded in order to minimize direct competition with other firms.  Although 
this research has focused on organizational “micro-niches,” it has not been applied to 
organizational populations occupying different “macro-niches” and possessing different 
organizational forms.  We apply niche overlap theory to the market for outpatient surgical 
procedures in order to compare the entry and exit patterns of firms in a mature population 
of general hospitals to those of firms within a growing population of ambulatory surgery 
centers (ASCs).  By manipulating patient-level datasets from the state of Florida, we 
were able to measure competition, market demand, and firm entry/exit with a high level 
of precision.  We broke down our explanatory variables by facility type (ASC vs. 
hospital), and utilized Cox proportional hazard and negative binomial models to evaluate 
the impact of niche density on market entry/exit among ASCs and hospitals. 
 
  vi
Although hospitals tend to exit markets with high levels of ASC density, ASCs appear to 
be unaffected by the presence of nearby hospitals.  This finding confirms the presence of 
asymmetric competition between these two organizational forms since specialized 
organizational forms representing “focused factories” are unaffected by generalist forms 
while generalists are hurt by the presence of competing specialists.  We also find that 
hospitals display low entry rates in markets with overlapping ASCs while ASCs display 
high entry rates in markets with overlapping ASCs.  These results are consistent with the 
notion that firms in growing populations tend to seek out crowded markets as they 
compete to occupy the most desirable market segments while firms in mature populations 
avoid direct competition as they compete on the basis of efficiency.  Taken together, our 
results extend niche overlap theory to settings in which two different organizational 
forms compete and demonstrate that several key predictions are actually reversed in the 
case of these industries. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mature industries often show a dramatic increase in the number of firms as a 
result of the founding of organizations that are different from incumbent firms.  
Organizational populations within the book publishing, music recording, newspaper 
publishing, and banking industries show a dramatic resurgence in numbers after having 
experienced a protracted period of decline or stability (Carroll, 1985; Freeman & Lomi, 
1994; Powell, 1985).  These new entrants often occupy different niches than existing 
organizations since they frequently cater to specific markets and possess more specialized 
organizational forms (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Rao & Singh, 1999, 2001; Scott, 1995).  
It is important to develop an understanding of firm entry into new market segments of 
mature industries, and the ways in which these entrants compete with incumbent firms, 
because of the prominent role that these entrants play in the renewal and growth of such 
industries (Abernathy & Clark, 1985). 
The concept of the organizational niche has evolved significantly over time.  
Though organizational niche was originally linked to environmental conditions, several 
alternative explanations have been developed to explain the nature of competition 
between organizations occupying different niches (Hannan & Freeman, 1977).  For 
example, resource partitioning theory focuses on the “macro-niches” occupied by 
different organizational forms; it suggests that competition among large generalists to 
occupy the center of a market frees up resources in the market periphery that can be 
exploited by small specialists (Carroll, 1985).  Niche overlap theory, on the other hand, 
focuses on the “micro-niches” of organizations possessing a similar organizational form; 
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it argues that firm entry/exit rates depend on the concentration of organizations with 
overlapping and non-overlapping niches (Baum & Singh, 1994a, 1994b). 
These models offer complementary views of population macro-niches and 
organizational micro-niches, which presents some opportunity to synthesize these two 
perspectives.  Studies of organizational macro-niches derive predictions regarding the 
density of specialist and generalist organizational forms but ignore the extent to which 
the niches of these organizations overlap.  Meanwhile, niche overlap theory predicts firm 
entry and exit as a function of the density within organizational micro-niches but does not 
explore the effect of niche overlap and non-overlap between specialist and generalist 
organizations.  Although we understand the effect of niche overlap and non-overlap 
density on firm entry among a mature population of generalists, we do not yet know how 
they affect entry patterns within a growing population of specialists, nor do we know 
whether there exist cross-density effects between firms with specialist and generalist 
organizational forms. 
Yet there are reasons to believe that competition between specialists and 
generalists is asymmetric.  Firms within a growing population of specialists benefit from 
the organizational legitimacy posed by comparable generalists and may learn from 
structures, strategies, and routines of these incumbent firms.  These specialists are often 
considered “focused factories” because they possess certain cost advantages that allow 
them to compete successfully with generalists (Herzlinger, 1997; Skinner, 1974).  
Meanwhile, generalists may be adversely affected by this competition for scarce 
resources.  Likewise, there are reasons to believe that these entry patterns differ across 
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different phases of organizational evolution because growing industries are characterized 
by high levels of technological uncertainty and information asymmetry.  While we know 
that firms within a mature organizational population tend to avoid competition with firms 
occupying similar organizational niches, it is reasonable to think that firms within a 
growing organizational population ignore the effects of market crowding because they 
compete to occupy the most desirable market segments.  Alternatively, they may enter 
these crowded markets in order to benefit from the legitimacy posed by similar 
organizations. 
The market for outpatient surgery represents a unique setting in which to 
synthesize these ideas.  There are obvious applications of these theories to the market for 
outpatient surgery because surgical specialties can be considered micro-niches and 
outpatient facilities compete with one another insofar as they serve overlapping niches.  
In fact, this view of surgical specialties as organizational niches reflects a broader shift to 
service line competition within health care (Berenson, Bodenheimer, & Pham, 2006).    
This setting also presents an opportunity to study competition between organizational 
populations occupying different macro-niches since surgery centers represent a more 
specialized organizational form than hospitals.  These specialized organizations represent 
focused factories in that they operate more efficiently and maintain lower costs than 
generalists competing within these same markets.   
Yet the setting is also interesting from the perspective of health services research 
because the recent growth among specialized health care providers has caused a variety 
of health care services to migrate away from the general hospital and may signify a shift 
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to service line competition within the competitive landscape (Berenson et al., 2006; 
Berliner, 2008).  Specialty hospitals and surgery centers represent the most prominent 
example but similarly specialized facilities are beginning to emerge for a variety of other 
services, which include lithotripsy, cardiac catheterization, diagnostic imaging, and 
radiation therapy.  It has been suggested that the emergence of these specialized providers 
and uncoupling of these services from the general hospital may push hospitals to a 
peripheral role as the provider of ever-diminishing acute inpatient services (Robinson, 
1994).  However, we know very little about how these specialized providers compete 
with general hospitals for services and procedures. 
The state of Florida requires that health care facilities – both hospitals and surgery 
centers – report data on all inpatient and outpatient procedures that they perform.  By 
coding this patient data with Clinical Classification Software (CCS), and generating 
quarterly procedure counts by facility IDs and patient county codes, we are able to 
measure competition, market demand, and firm entry/exit with a considerably higher 
level of precision than previous work in this area.  We are also able to assemble a variety 
of facility and market-level controls by cross-tabulating these procedures counts with 
additional fields (e.g., payer type, physician ID, etc.) from the patient datasets.  We 
validate the entry and exit dates produced by our panel dataset with licensure data from 
the state of Florida in order to properly code an entry or exit event when the facility has 
indeed entered or exited the market for outpatient procedures. 
For our exit models, we use the facility as our unit of observation and model each 
facility’s likelihood of exit as a function of niche overlap and non-overlap density as well 
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as facility controls.  We estimate our exit models through the use of Cox proportional 
hazard models and validate our results by running parametric models with an exponential 
distribution.  For our entry models, our unit of observation is the county-specialty and we 
model the quarterly number of facility entries as a function of niche overlap and non-
overlap density as well as market controls.  We estimate our entry models by utilizing 
negative binomial models and go on to validate our results through the use of Poisson 
regression.  We estimate our entry/exit models separately for ASCs and hospitals, and 
break the variables down by facility type (ASC vs. hospital) and geographic location 
(local vs. diffuse) to observe any differential effects. 
We find evidence to suggest that competition between hospitals and ASCs is 
indeed asymmetric.  Hospitals exhibit higher exit rates in markets where there are ASCs 
and hospitals with overlapping niches.  Meanwhile, ASCs appear to be unaffected by the 
presence of overlapping hospitals; they display higher exit rates only when there are 
ASCs with overlapping niches.  We also find evidence to suggest that ASCs enjoy 
legitimacy benefits from the presence of nearby ASCs with non-overlapping niches while 
hospitals appear to be unaffected by non-overlap density.  Our findings support the notion 
that ASCs possess a competitive advantage over hospitals in that they function like 
focused factories and are relatively unaffected by competition with hospitals for 
outpatient procedures.  Meanwhile, hospitals do indeed suffer from competition with 
ASCs and this finding has significant implications for the status of the health care safety 
net as well as patient access to care. 
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We also find that firms in growing organizational populations exhibit different 
entry patterns than firms in relatively mature populations.  Hospitals exist within a fairly 
stable organizational population and they display low entry rates in markets with 
relatively high overlap density among hospitals and ASCs.  Meanwhile, the number of 
ASCs grows rapidly during the study period and we find that they display high entry rates 
in markets with overlapping ASCs.  There are several plausible explanations for this 
finding but the fact that we find no effect for non-overlap density among ASCs suggests 
that it is not caused by the legitimacy effects described by density dependence theory.  
Rather, our results are consistent with the notion that ASCs tend to enter crowded 
markets, either because they are relatively desirable or perhaps because they simply 
choose to follow other firms.  Although our methods do not permit us to test the causal 
mechanisms behind this behavior, this question remains an avenue for future research. 
These findings represent a significant contribution to the literature on 
organizational theory in that this study represents the first attempt to tie together theories 
on the macro-niche and the micro-niche.  Although we understand them independently, 
there is no other research that examines how different organizational forms compete 
within the same niches.  Interestingly, we find that there are significant departures from 
traditional theory under these circumstances.  The findings represent a contribution not 
only to the literature on macro-organizational behavior but also to health services 
research.  Surgery centers represent a broader class of specialized organizations that have 
begun to encroach on the competitive position previously occupied by general hospitals.  
These findings gain additional significance in light of the fact that we frequently expect 
 7 
hospitals to fulfill a separate mission as the provider of community benefits.  Future 
research should apply these methods to other specialized health care providers as well as 
non-health settings. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides an 
overview of the market for ambulatory surgery, describes the growth of surgery centers, 
and summarizes previous research on specialized health care providers.  Section III 
outlines the broad theoretical frameworks that we draw from and the hypotheses that we 
derive from these frameworks.  Section IV explains how these frameworks apply to the 
market for ambulatory surgery, and specifically to surgery centers.  Section V describes 
the specific context and data that we use to test our hypotheses.  Sections VI and VII 
outline how we use these datasets to assemble our dependent and independent variables, 
respectively.  Section VIII discusses our empirical models and describes the econometric 
techniques that we used to estimate each model.  Section IX presents the descriptive 
statistics generated from our data while Section X lays out the results from our more 
advanced empirical models.  Section XI discusses the implications of these results and 
interprets their significance not only within the context of organizational theory but also 
in terms of health services research.  Section XII goes on to issue conclusions based on 
these findings and suggests avenues for future research. 
II. THE MARKET FOR AMBULATORY SURGERY 
A. Inpatient vs. Outpatient Surgery 
The market for ambulatory surgery was created initially and has grown rapidly as 
a result of technological innovation.  Advances in medical technology have significantly 
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decreased hospital length of stay, which has produced an accelerating movement from 
inpatient models to outpatient models of patient care (Becker & Biala, 2000).  Figure 1 
presents how average length of stay has changed over the course of the past two decades. 
Figure 1: Average Inpatient Length of Stay in Hospitals (1980 – 2007) 
 
While average length of stay has decreased over time from 7.2 to 5.5 days per patient, the 
length of stay for certain procedures have decreased even more dramatically.  Surgeries 
that once were performed in an 8-hour span and required several days of recovery can 
now be performed within 90 minutes and permit the patient to return home on the day 
that he or she was admitted. 
For example, many arthroscopic procedures now are performed through the use of 
a small fiber-optic camera – called an endoscope – which can be inserted in the joint 
through a small incision that has an approximate size of 1/8 inch long.  The advantage of 
arthroscopy over traditional, open surgery is that the joint does not have to be opened up 
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fully.  Instead, only two small incisions are made – one for the arthroscope and one for 
the surgical instruments.  This reduces recovery time and increases the rate of surgical 
success by causing less trauma to the connective tissue.  Meanwhile, rapid advances in 
anesthesia during the past two decades have allowed outpatient surgery to be more 
feasible by minimizing post-operative side effects such as nausea and drowsiness, thereby 
avoiding overnight hospitalization (Pandit, 1999). 
As a result, an increasing proportion of surgeries can now be performed on an 
outpatient basis if the patient does not benefit from an overnight stay in the hospital.  
Figure 2 presents the breakdown of inpatient and outpatient surgeries over the past two 
decades. 
Figure 2: Inpatient vs. Outpatient Surgery Volume, 1981-2005 
 
Not only is the sheer number of procedures performed in outpatient settings rising, so too 
is their complexity.  In the late-1970’s, outpatient procedures were limited – simple 
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breast biopsies, cataract removals, etc.  Since that time, the types of procedures 
performed on an outpatient basis have expanded greatly to include complex orthopedic, 
gastroenterological and gynecological surgeries.  Innovation in medical technology along 
with less invasive surgical techniques and advances in anesthesia have made it possible 
for more procedures to be performed in outpatient settings where recovery time is limited 
(American Hospital Association, 2006). 
B. Ambulatory Surgery Centers 
This changing mix of inpatient versus outpatient care has had a significant impact 
on the competitive landscape within the health care industry.  Prior to the 1990’s, over 
75% of outpatient surgical procedures occurred within hospital-based settings.  But over 
the course of the past two decades, surgery centers have begun to encroach on their 
competitive position and have expanded their share of the market over time.  Figure 3 
presents this trend. 
Figure 3: Percent of Outpatient Surgeries by Facility Type, 1981-2005 
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Freestanding Facilities 
(ASCs) 
Hospital-based 
Facilities 
Source:  Verispan’s Surgery Center Profiling Solution, 2004. *2005 values are estimates. 
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Over time, a growing share of these outpatient surgeries is being handled by physician 
offices and freestanding facilities (e.g., surgery centers).  In fact, these two types of 
facilities now handle over 50% of all outpatient procedures.  Although physician offices 
have begun to capture an increasing proportion of outpatient procedures, our study 
focuses primarily on surgery centers because they are much more closely regulated in the 
U.S.  The fact that there are much less stringent licensing and accreditation requirements 
for physician offices means that there is considerably less data available on their numbers 
and locations. 
As they have gained market share, the number of surgery centers in the U.S. has 
grown at an astounding rate.  From 1982 to 1992, the number of surgery centers 
increased over 600 percent, from 239 to 1,530 facilities.  From 1992 to 2002, the number 
of surgery centers more than doubled from 1,530 to an estimated 3,570 facilities (Baker, 
2002).  Given that the total number of community hospitals in the U.S. declined from 
5,830 to 4,919 between 1980 and 2004, this phenomenon is even more striking.  Figure 4 
displays this recent growth. 
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Figure 4: Number of Freestanding Ambulatory Care Surgery Centers 
(1996, 1998, and 2000 – 2007) 
 
This growth is even more pronounced among surgery centers that have focused 
opthamologic, gastroenterologic, and orthopedic surgeries, which have benefited from the 
development of laser, endoscopic, and arthroscopic surgical instruments (Durant, 1989).  
Meanwhile, rapid advances in anesthesiology have benefited all surgical specialties.  
Figure 5 presents the breakdown of all ASC procedures by specialty. 
Source: Verispan’s Surgery Center Profiling Solution, 2007.
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Figure 5: Mix of Surgical Specialties by Procedure Volume 
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Source: Verispan Outpatient Surgery Center Market Report (2006)1 
Opthamologic, gastroenterologic, and orthopedic specialties represent approximately 
60% of all ASC procedures. 
Surgery centers serve as an excellent example of specialized firms because there 
are clear limits on the range of services they can provide.  They cannot perform a surgical 
procedure when, prior to surgery, an overnight hospital stay is anticipated.  General 
hospitals, on the other hand, are typically capable of handling this narrow range of 
procedures along with a wide array of other inpatient services.  Moreover, individual 
surgery centers may perform surgeries in a variety of specialties or dedicate their services 
to one specialty.  In fact, 53% of all surgery centers specialize in a single specialty while 
                                                 
1 Verispan data is generated from annual surveys of all U.S. outpatient surgery centers. 
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47% provide services in multiple specialties (Verispan, 2006).  While all surgery centers 
do represent some form of specialist insofar as they are only equipped to handle 
outpatient procedures, some surgery centers choose to be less specialized by providing a 
variety of different services within multiple specialties while others opt to be more 
specialized by focusing on just one surgical specialty or procedure.  In fact, 53% of all 
surgery centers specialize in a single specialty while 47% provide services in multiple 
specialties (Verispan, 2006).  Figure 6 represents the distribution of single-specialty 
surgery centers by specialty. 
Figure 6: Single-Specialty Surgery Centers - Percentage Breakdown 
Opthamology, 25%
Gastroenterology, 24%
Plastic Surgery, 20%
Podiatry, 6%
Orthopedics, 6%
Other, 19%
 
Source: Verispan Outpatient Surgery Center Market Report (2006) 
Comparing the distribution of single-specialty surgery centers to the distribution of all 
surgical procedures in figure 5, some specialties account for relatively few procedures but 
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the majority of single-specialty centers (e.g., plastic surgery) while others account for a 
large number of procedures but considerably fewer single-specialty centers (e.g., 
gastroenterology). 
C. Previous Research 
Surgery centers represent only one example of specialized health care providers 
that have caused a variety of health care services to migrate away from the general 
hospital (Berliner, 2008).  In fact, the growth of these specialists may signify a shift to 
service line competition within the competitive landscape.  Although specialty hospitals 
and surgery centers represent the most prominent example, similarly specialized facilities 
are beginning to emerge for a variety of other services: 
In the outpatient setting, specialty-service-line orientation and 
organization are much simpler, reflecting the long-standing specialization 
of physicians. Although ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) provide a 
venue for a range of surgical procedures, other new physician-owned 
entities are dedicated to particular clinical services. Typical new 
ambulatory facilities that follow the specialty-service-line orientation are 
dedicated to gastrointestinal (GI) endoscopy, diagnostic imaging, sleep 
disorders, peripheral vascular disease (“varicose vein centers”), cosmetic 
surgery, radiation therapy, and cancer chemotherapy (Berenson et al., 
2006). 
 
It has been suggested that the emergence of these specialized providers and uncoupling of 
these services from the general hospital may push hospitals to a peripheral role as the 
provider of ever-diminishing acute inpatient services (Robinson, 1994).  Yet we know 
very little about how these specialized providers compete with general hospitals for 
services and procedures. 
There is surprisingly little research on specialization in health care.  Specialty 
hospitals have received the bulk of this attention because they are viewed as more of a 
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competitive threat to general hospitals.  Critics have claimed that specialty hospitals tend 
to concentrate on the most profitable procedures and serve healthier patients (Iglehart, 
2005).   They argue that siphoning off the most favorable selection of patients hurts the 
ability of general hospitals to cross-subsidize less profitable patients and thereby fulfill 
their broad mission to serve all of a community’s needs.  In fact, the rapid growth among 
specialty hospitals in the 1990’s led Congress in 2003 to enact an 18-month moratorium 
on the construction of new specialty hospitals in order to gather evidence regarding 
whether they treated healthier patients and provided lower quality care (Iglehart, 2005). 
During the time that this moratorium was in place, a number of studies were 
conducted on the differences between specialty hospitals and general hospitals.  Several 
studies found that specialty hospitals tend to treat patients that are healthier than general 
hospitals (Barro, Huckman, & Kessler, 2006; Cram, Rosenthal, & Vaughan-Sarrazin, 
2005; U.S. Government Accounting Office, 2003).  Other studies found that when 
controlling for these patient characteristics, specialty hospitals produce outcomes that are 
equal to or better than general hospitals (Cram et al., 2005; Dobson, 2003; Fahlman et al., 
2006a; Greenwald et al., 2006).  Regarding their competitive effects, there is evidence to 
suggest that entry by specialty hospitals not only improves the efficiency of markets and 
lowers the cost of care but may even improve the profit margins of nearby general 
hospitals (Barro et al., 2006; Greenwald et al., 2006; Schneider et al., 2007).  Yet there 
are still outstanding questions regarding the effect of specialty hospital entry upon the 
ability of non-profit hospitals to provide community benefits. 
 17 
Although we have learned a great deal about specialty hospitals within the past 
few years, we know virtually nothing about surgery centers.  This is surprising in light of 
a recent report by the GAO which suggests, based on surveys of community general 
hospitals, that the most significant competitive challenge may come from ASCs (U.S. 
Government Accounting Office, 2006).  In fact, this relative disparity in the research 
literature is particularly surprising in light of the fact that surgery centers are far more 
common than specialty hospitals and have grown at an even more rapid pace.  There are 
currently over 6,091 surgery centers nationally whereas there are just over 100 specialty 
hospitals operating in the US.  In 2006, there were approximately 69 community 
hospitals for every specialty hospital in the US.  Meanwhile, the ratio of hospitals to 
surgery centers has dropped to 1.3 and it is projected to reach 1:1 by 2010. 
This growth is likely to accelerate as a result of CMS’s recent expansion to the 
approved list of procedures that can safely be performed in a surgery center (Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2006b).  Previously, covered procedures were not 
permitted to exceed 90 minutes in length and could not require more than four hours 
recovery or convalescent time.  Beginning in 2008, all surgical procedures, other than 
those that pose a significant safety risk or generally require an overnight stay, are 
included in the approved list (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2006b).  As a 
result of this proposed expansion, more than 3,300 new surgery center procedures are 
covered by Medicare, and payment rates have expanded from the current range of $333 
to $1,339, to a new range of $3.68 to $16,146.  Although Congress enacted a moratorium 
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on the construction of new specialty hospitals in 2003, CMS actually expanded the range 
of procedures that could be performed by a surgery center in 2008. 
A few studies are beginning to emerge that offer a more balanced treatment of 
surgery centers.  For example, one study assessed the quality of care provided in specialty 
hospitals compared to general hospitals and the quality of care in surgery centers as 
opposed to hospital outpatient departments (Fahlman, Kletke, Wentworth, & Gabel, 
2006b).  It found that both specialty hospitals and surgery centers had lower risk-adjusted 
rates of negative outcomes for all procedures.  Another study compared quality outcomes 
in freestanding surgery centers and hospital-based outpatient departments in Florida from 
1997 to 2004 (Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brooks, & Brown, 2006).  It found that there are 
differences in quality outcomes; surgery centers perform better than hospital outpatient 
departments in certain procedures but hospital outpatient departments prevail in other 
procedures. 
Several other studies have focused upon the effect of physician ownership upon 
referral patterns to these facilities.  For example, Winter (2003) found that outpatient 
departments treat beneficiaries who are more medically complex, which might partially 
explain why ASCs incur lower costs when providing similar procedures (Winter, 2003).  
Along these lines, Gabel et al (2008) found that physicians at physician-owned facilities 
are more likely than other physicians to refer well-insured patients to their facilities and 
route Medicaid patients to hospital outpatient clinics (Gabel et al., 2008).  Setting aside 
these patient characteristics, Strope et al (2009) used Florida data to evaluate the 
relationship between ownership and use of surgical centers for urinary procedures (Strope 
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et al., 2009).  They found that ownership is associated with the increasing use of ASCs 
and that new owners seem to alter their procedure mix to include a greater share of 
financially lucrative procedures.  Lynk and Longley (2002) presented a case study of a 
physician-owned surgery center that opened near a major general hospital, and found that 
outpatient surgeries performed in the hospital dropped significantly after the surgery 
center opened (Lynk & Longley, 2002). 
Several other studies have focused on related competitive issues by exploring the 
effect of surgery center entry on the procedure volume and financial standing of nearby 
hospitals.  Several studies have found that entry by ASCs is associated with a decline in 
hospital outpatient surgeries and no significant change in inpatient surgeries (Bian & 
Morrisey, 2007; Plotzke, 2008).  Carey, Burgess, and Young (2009) found that entry by 
ASCs exerted a downward pressure on both revenues and costs in general hospitals but 
that these effects offset each other and caused no significant change in hospital profit 
margins (Carey, Burgess, & Young, 2009).  Another study by Bian and Morrisey (2006) 
showed that there tend to be more surgery centers in metropolitan statistical areas where 
there are fewer general hospitals (Bian & Morrisey, 2006).  However, they failed to 
distinguish between facilities with overlapping and non-overlapping niches, and they did 
not consider whether this outcome results from facility entry or exit. 
D. Research Question 
The majority of this limited body of research tends to focus on specialization’s 
impact on costs, access, and quality rather than examining this trend from the perspective 
of organizational theory, which typically focuses on its causes rather than its effects.  The 
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phenomenon that we are interested in is the rise of a new organizational form, ambulatory 
surgery centers, and the interactions between ASCs and other extant organizational 
forms, not only competition, but other more complex patterns such as mutualism and 
cooperation.  There is a large body of management literature that studies the 
organizational niche and explores firm dynamics within these niches.  We apply these 
theories to a relevant setting – the market for outpatient surgery – in order to answer the 
following question: how do surgery centers influence market entry and exit by hospitals 
and vice versa? 
The answer to this question may offer some additional value over what a typical 
economic approach might yield.  Rather than focusing on firm profit and cost functions, 
we attempt to understand the micro-dynamics of competition within this industry by 
drawing from the literature on organizational theory and strategy.  This approach 
elucidates the role of less transparent market forces like legitimacy, uncertainty, 
information asymmetries, and isomorphism in affecting firm entry and exit.  A great deal 
of management literature has explored the role of these non-economic forces in shaping 
industries and influencing firm behavior.  By the same token, economics has examined 
organizational specialization within the context of multi-product firms and economies of 
scope (Panzar & Willig, 1977, 1981).  Meanwhile, the literature on industrial 
organization focuses primarily on industry structure and product differentiation 
(Hotelling, 1929; Salop, 1979). Yet the propensity of organizations to be specialists or 
generalists is merely a function of scope economies or product differentiation; not 
everything is captured by prices and costs.  The concept of the organizational niche – 
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developed primarily within the management literature – offers a behavioral view of 
competition and another lens through which to view this phenomenon. 
Our study complements the existing body of research on surgery centers.  
Although previous health services research has assessed the effect of surgery center entry 
on hospital volume, costs, and revenues, we take a different approach by focusing instead 
on how surgery centers affect hospital entry and exit.  Admittedly, firm exit is just one 
measure of organizational performance.  In fact, it is typically considered to be a lower-
bound on performance because organizations that are successful relatively early in their 
lifespan may build up a stock of capital that buffers them from selection pressures and 
permits them to be unsuccessful for an extensive period of time before they are forced to 
exit the market (Levinthal, 1991).  Other metrics like firm profits or revenues may be 
more immediate indicators of performance but data on firm profitability is notoriously 
difficult to retrieve from companies that are not publicly traded.  Given the setting, firm 
exit is an excellent indicator of firm performance since the vast majority of US hospitals 
and a sizeable minority of ASCs are non-profit entities; it is unclear whether traditional 
economic assumptions like profit maximization hold in the case of these organizations 
(Pauly, 1987).  It seems more reasonable to assume that they view market exit at an 
adverse outcome. 
These findings may also have some interesting policy implications.  As we’ve 
already discussed, there is a great deal of policy debate over whether the emergence of 
surgery centers promotes competition and efficiency within the health care marketplace 
or merely threatens hospitals and hurts their ability to provide uncompensated care 
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(Altman, Shactman, & Eilat, 2006).  In fact, a total of 26 states have enacted some form 
of certificate-of-need (CON) legislation that limits the growth of surgery centers by 
requiring that facilities justify the community’s need for their services before entering a 
given market (American Hospital Association, 2006; Berliner, 2008).  Meanwhile, the 
federal government in 2008 expanded the list of procedures eligible for reimbursement 
within a surgery center, which stems in no small part from its desire to achieve greater 
cost containment in the years ahead (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2006b).  
Any findings regarding the impact of surgery centers on hospital entry and exit may pose 
significant policy implications as to whether their growth should be promoted or deterred 
by various government entities. 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
A. Organizational Niche 
The literature on organizational niche emerged originally in order to explain why 
some organizations choose to be specialists while others choose to be generalists.  
However, the concept of the organizational niche has evolved significantly over time.  
Hannan and Freeman (1977) originally linked organizational niche to environmental 
conditions (Hannan & Freeman, 1977).  They theorized that specialists tend to do better 
in environments that are stable and fare poorly in turbulent environments because they 
have difficulties outlasting the unfavorable periods.  Meanwhile, generalists tend to fare 
better when environmental variation is high because of their ability to diversify this risk 
across different product lines.  Hannan and Freeman tested empirically the effects of 
various forms of environmental variation on the life chances of organizational 
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populations with varying degrees of specialization within the semiconductor and 
restaurant industries and found limited support for their ideas within these settings 
(Freeman & Hannan, 1983; Hannan et al., 1989). 
Over time, several alternative models emerged to explain the nature of 
competition between organizations occupying different niches that were less closely 
related to environmental risk than they were to the concentration of organizations within 
markets comprised of heterogeneous resources.  These resources can consist of the 
customers that demand a certain good or the practitioners capable of satisfying this 
demand.  They view the organizational niche as a location in multi-dimensional space 
defined by the resources in the environment.  Organizations initially attempt to find a 
viable position within their market by selecting the markets that they will enter and 
competing against incumbent firms within these organizational niches.  Specialist 
organizations choose relatively homogenous targets while generalist organizations choose 
targets composed of heterogeneous segments. 
However, these theories differ in their level of analysis.  Whereas the niche is a 
concept well known in organizational ecology, the usual focus is on the niches of 
populations (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1989).  The organizational populations 
occupying these macro-niches represent entirely different organizational forms insofar as 
their goals, authority relations, technologies, and client markets differ from one another 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Rao & Singh, 1999, 2001; Scott, 1995).  For example, 
resource partitioning theory suggests that competition among large generalist 
organizations to occupy the center of a market frees up resources in the market periphery 
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(Carroll, 1985).  In concentrated markets with a few large generalists, small specialists 
can exploit these peripheral resources without competing directly with large generalists.  
Resource partitioning theory has been used to explain the rapid growth of specialized 
organizational forms like microbreweries and brewpubs within the brewing industry as 
well as the farm winery within the California wine industry (Carroll & Swaminathan, 
2000; Delacroix & Solt, 1988; Swaminathan, 1995, 1998). 
Less commonly studied is the organizational micro-niche, which refers to 
variation in productive capacities and resource requirements at the organization level.  
These firms possess the same organizational form but choose to participate in different 
product markets.  Niche overlap theory attempts to fill this gap by explaining market 
entry and exit as a function of firm density within these organizational niches.  It suggests 
that competition with firms that have overlapping niches – which is termed “niche 
overlap density” – elevates exit risks and leads to lower entry rates among firms.  
Meanwhile, the presence of firms with non-overlapping niches – termed “niche non-
overlap density” – reduces exit risks and leads to higher entry rates among firms.  Several 
studies of niche overlap theory defined the organizational niche of child day care centers 
as the ages of the children that they were licensed to enroll (e.g., infant, toddler, etc.), and 
studied how center competed with one another within these niches (Baum & Singh, 
1994a, 1994b). 
What has been largely ignored in the literature on organizational niche is the fact 
that organizational populations encompass multiple niches.  In addition to the macro-
niche of the population, organizations have their own micro-niches as well (McKelvey, 
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1982).  There is an obvious complementarity between these two perspectives.  Although 
a variety of theories have been developed to explain how firms compete within macro-
niches or micro-niches, none has combined these two levels of analysis in order to 
understand how different organizational populations compete within the same 
organizational niches.  This research attempts to do so by studying the dynamics of 
competition between two different organizational populations within an industry 
characterized by the presence of well-established organizational niches. 
B. Niche Overlap Theory 
Niche overlap theory focuses on the micro-niches occupied by firms within a 
population possessing the same organizational form.  According to the theory, every 
organization in a population occupies an organizational niche characterized by a location 
in resource space (Baum & Singh, 1994a, 1994b).  These scarce resources can take many 
different forms but, within the context of this theory, typically refer to the consumers that 
a firm seeks to attract.  Depending on the organizational niches they target, organizations 
face different competitive landscapes.  Organizations that operate in the same 
organizational niche experience competitive effects since they compete directly for scarce 
resources.  Organizations that occupy non-overlapping organizational niches experience 
mutualistic effects by, for example, cooperating directly or providing services that create 
complementary demand.  Organizations occupy partially overlapped organizational niche 
yield both competitive and mutualistic effects, because these organizations, while 
attempting to acquire some of the same resources, also have different niches that result in 
direct cooperation or complementary demand enhancement. 
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Baum and Singh (1994b) suggested that firm exit is a function of the 
concentration of organizations with overlapping and non-overlapping niches (Baum & 
Singh, 1994b).  To measure the potential competition faced by all organizations in an 
organizational niche, they defined niche overlap density to be the total number of firms 
with overlapping niches.  They studied the effects of overlap density on firm exit rates 
and argued that greater overlap density implies greater competition between a focal 
organization and all other organizations in the population.  Since higher levels of 
competition tend to increase the likelihood of firm exit, they hypothesized the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Overlap density is positively related to the exit rate. 
 
Likewise, they defined niche non-overlap density to be the total number of firms 
with non-overlapping niches (Baum & Singh, 1994b).  They argued that differentiation 
among firms with non-overlapping niches reduces the level of competition between them 
and may create mutualistic interdependencies among them.  For example, these 
organizations may offer products or services that create complementary demand or they 
can cooperate directly by referring potential customers to each other.  Firms with non-
overlapping niches may also confer legitimacy benefits upon one another.  Given a lack 
of competition for underlying resources, the potential beneficial effects of demand 
enhancement and greater legitimacy of the organizational form, they hypothesized that 
non-overlap density would have mutualistic effects on the exit rate: 
Hypothesis 2: Non-overlap density is negatively related to the exit rate. 
 
Not only do organizations occupying different organizational niches endure 
different survival fates after founding, they have different likelihoods of being established 
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at all.  In a related paper, Baum and Singh (1994) argued that the degree of organizational 
niche overlap and non-overlap influences the organizational niches in which 
entrepreneurs choose to create organizations (Baum & Singh, 1994a).  Regarding the 
impact of overlap density, organizations targeted at parts of the multidimensional 
resource space that are more crowded have a much lower likelihood of being founded 
than organizations in a less densely populated part of the resource space.  More precisely, 
the higher the overlap density, the greater is the intensity of competition, and the lower 
the entry rate: 
Hypothesis 3: Overlap density is negatively related to the entry rate. 
 
They went on to argue that non-overlap density has the opposite effect upon 
founding rates (Baum & Singh, 1994a).  Non-overlap density captures information about 
differentiation of organizational niches.  This differentiation leads to complementary 
functional differences between organizations that create mutualistic interdependencies 
among them.  For example, organizations benefit from the broader social acceptance and 
greater institutional support posed by non-overlapping firms with the same organizational 
form.  Likewise, there exist opportunities for demand enhancement and other cooperative 
endeavors among non-overlapping organizations.  The confluence of these factors 
suggests that non-overlap density will have a positive effect on the firm entry rate. 
Hypothesis 4: Non-overlap density is positively related to the entry rate. 
 
Taken together, our hypotheses suggest that niche overlap and non-overlap 
density have competing effects on market entry and exit rates.  If we imagine one firm in 
a market providing one specific product, that firm experiences low overlap and non-
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overlap density since there are no competitive or mutualistic effects present.  If, on the 
other hand, that firm operated within a market with many overlapping and non-
overlapping firms, then it experiences high overlap and non-overlap density with strong 
competitive and mutualistic effects.  Since competitive and mutualistic forces tend to 
balance each other out within markets in which there is high overlap and non-overlap or 
low overlap and non-overlap, we are primarily concerned with markets in which there is: 
(1) high overlap and low non-overlap; and (2) low overlap and high non-overlap.  In 
order to visualize these scenarios, let us imagine a plane with a uniform distribution of 
resources.  Firms select their position within this resource space and then compete with 
one another to varying degrees depending on their overlap and non-overlap with other 
firms.  Figure 7 displays these two scenarios: 
Figure 7: Overlap and Non-Overlap Density 
 
The first figure displays a relatively crowded market in which there is high overlap and 
low non-overlap.  We expect this market configuration to produce high exit rates and low 
entry rates.  The second figure displays a relatively uncrowded market in which there is 
Environment (a) 
High overlap and low non-overlap 
Environment (b) 
Low overlap and high non-overlap 
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low overlap and high non-overlap.  We predict that this market will yield low exit rates 
and high entry rates.  Table 1 displays the hypothesized interaction of these effects on 
firm entry and exit rates. 
Table 1: Interaction of Niche Overlap and Non-Overlap Density 
 Firm Exit  Firm Entry 
  Overlap Density   Overlap Density 
  Low High   Low High 
Low  + Low  – Non-Overlap 
Density High –  
Non-Overlap 
Density High +  
 
There is an obvious symmetry to these ideas.  Niche overlap and non-overlap density are 
hypothesized to have opposite effects on firm vital rates.  Moreover, the effect of overlap 
and non-overlap on firm exit is the exact opposite of their predicted effects on firm entry. 
Baum and Singh confirmed these theories by studying how niche overlap and 
non-overlap (e.g., serving children of the same/different ages) affected the founding and 
mortality rates of Toronto day care centers from 1971 to 1989 (Baum & Singh, 1994a, 
1994b).  They found that day care centers have high exit rates and low entry rates in 
markets with high overlap density while they display low exit rates and high entry rates 
in markets with high non-overlap density.  They also found that this competition is 
generally asymmetric in that organizations occupying niche i have a different impact on 
organizations occupying niche j than vice versa.  For example, depending on the extent of 
overlap in the ages of children that they are licensed to enroll, day care centers compete 
with each other at different levels of intensity.  Day care centers licensed to enroll only 
infant or toddlers do not compete with each other, while both compete with day care 
centers licensed to enroll infant and toddlers.  Thus, infant-toddler day care centers 
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represent a greater competitive threat to infant-only and toddler-only day care centers 
than vice versa. 
Subsequent work has found additional support for these findings regarding the 
impact of niche overlap and non-overlap on firm entry and exit rates within a variety of 
other settings.  Baum and Oliver (1996) studied how the ecological and institutional 
characteristics of organizational niches affect the likelihood of organizational foundings 
among for-profit and non-profit day care centers (Baum & Oliver, 1996).  Once again, 
they found that day care center founding rates were negatively related to overlap density 
and positively related to non-overlap density.  Sorensen (2004) extended this line of work 
with data on 84 industries in Denmark during the period 1980 to 1991 (Sorensen, 2004).  
He found that new firms were less likely to appear in industries located in labor markets 
with large overlaps with other industries than were firms located in labor markets with 
less overlap.  Dobrev, Kim, and Hannan (2001) studied the effects of market crowding on 
organizational mortality and changes in organizational niche within the automobile 
industries in France, Germany, and Great Britain from 1885 to 1981 (Dobrev, Kim, & 
Hannan, 2001b).  They found that overlap density has a significant positive effect on the 
hazard of firm exit in all three countries and found additional support for these findings in 
a subsequent study (Dobrev, Kim, & Carroll, 2002). 
Some additional work has extended this line of research by exploring the impact 
of niche overlap and non-overlap upon a firm’s propensity to change its niche, either by 
expanding into new niches or contracting from existing niches.  Although these studies 
do not relate directly to our hypotheses, they do provide some additional support for 
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niche overlap theory more broadly.  In subsequent work, McPherson and collaborators 
have shown that the degree of an organization’s niche overlap influences the likelihood 
that an organization will change its position in sociodemography space (McPherson, 
Popielarz, & Drobnic, 1992; McPherson & Ranger-Moore, 1991; McPherson & Rotolo, 
1996).  Dobrev, Kim, and Hannan’s (2001) work on the European automobile industry 
also found that overlap density has a positive effect on manufacturers’ propensity to 
change organizational niches in two of the three countries studied (Dobrev et al., 2001b).  
Baum and Singh (1996) complemented their previous work on market entry and exit by 
studying how day care centers alter their organizational niches in response to competition 
and how these changes influence their survival chances (Baum & Singh, 1996).  They 
found that day care centers modified their organizational niches in response to changing 
competitive conditions, often without any harmful effects. 
Some related research has gone on to investigate the impact of niche overlap 
density on organizational growth.  Baum and Mezias (1992) test density-dependent, 
mass-dependent, and size-localized models of organizational growth within the child day 
care industry while controlling for the extent to which the similarity of client domains 
(e.g., licensed age ranges) influences patterns of competition (Baum & Mezias, 1992). 
They find that population density is negatively related to organizational growth among 
day care centers with overlapping client domains within the same constituent city but 
found no effect for diffuse competitive density.  Their results suggest that competition for 
clients among day care centers is geographically bounded. 
C. Macro- and Micro-Niches 
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Niche overlap theory focuses on the micro-niches of organizations and explains 
entry and exit by firms with the same organizational form as a function of density within 
these niches.  However, studies of niche overlap theory have not explored the effect of 
niche overlap and non-overlap between organizational populations occupying different 
macro-niches – for example, specialist and generalist organizational forms.  To date, 
there is no research that synthesizes these viewpoints by examining the competitive 
dynamics of firm entry or exit at the level of both the population macro-niche and the 
organizational micro-niche.  An industry characterized by the presence of well-defined 
organizational niches as well as the growth of a specialized organizational form poses an 
opportunity to extend niche overlap theory in this way. 
Baum and Singh’s (1994) theories on niche overlap and non-overlap form the 
core hypotheses that we hope to test in this paper (Baum & Singh, 1994a, 1994b).  
However, Baum and Singh (1994) only describe the behavior of organizations within a 
mature organizational population and possessing the same organizational form.  We 
know that there are certain characteristics of industries characterized by the rapid growth 
of a specialized organizational form that may diverge from these predictions.  For 
example, specialists and generalists may compete with one another in fundamentally 
different ways, particularly when these new specialists possess a competitive advantage 
over existing generalists.  Meanwhile, density dependence suggests that firms within a 
growing population behave differently than organizations in a relatively stable 
population.  Although there is no theory that describes how these two forms compete 
within these organizational niches, we can draw from existing theory to pose some 
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hypotheses regarding the effects of competition between these two organizational forms 
at different stages of industry evolution. 
D. Organizational Form 
Since the different macro-niches occupied by organizational populations are 
predicated upon the notion that they constitute different organizational forms, we begin 
by defining an organizational form.  There are several different methods of defining 
organizational forms that are premised on different approaches to classification 
(McKelvey, 1982).  One common approach distinguishes between the core and peripheral 
properties of organizational forms.  It suggests that new organizational forms are novel 
recombinations of core organizational features involving goals, authority relations 
(including organization structure and governance arrangements), technologies, and client 
markets (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Scott, 1995).  Peripheral features refer to all other 
organizational attributes.  One organizational form differs from another primarily 
according to the core characteristics of the form, which are defined by the four-
dimensional space that was described previously. 
This definition of organizational form is typically used to identify instances of 
organizational speciation in which a new organizational form is created (Lumsden & 
Singh, 1990).  In this sense, it is the analog to the biological phenomenon of speciation.  
Much like its biological counterpart, organizational speciation plays an important role in 
the evolution of organizational diversity.  A key premise of organizational speciation is 
that the existence of unfilled ecological niches – places unoccupied by other 
organizational forms – is an important precondition for the birth of new organizational 
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forms (Rao & Singh, 2001).  These unoccupied niches may emerge as a result of 
technological innovations that create new resource spaces or interrelations among 
existing organizations that influence the branching of new resource spaces (Astley, 1985; 
Carroll, 1985; Romanelli, 1991; Tushman & Anderson, 1986).   
Depending on the environmental conditions that lead to the creation of new 
organizational forms, there are several different types of organizational recombination.  
Rao and Singh (2001) developed a taxonomy for classifying organizational 
recombination along the lines of whether the organizational form involves: (1) the 
addition of new organizational attributes and/or (2) the deletion of organizational 
attributes.  This matrix has been reproduced below in Table 2: 
Table 2: A Recombination Typology of New Organizational Forms 
 No addition of attributes Addition of new attributes 
No deletion of attributes Imitative entrepreneurship (entry by general hospitals)
Partial enlargement 
(hospitals entering managed care) 
Deletion of attributes Partial contraction (specialty hospitals) 
Radical recombination 
(health maintenance organizations)
Source: Rao & Singh (2001) 
Each cell in the matrix represents a different type of organizational recombination and the 
authors cite several real-world examples for each one.  They point out that organizational 
forms that emerge by means of recombination through partial contraction often represent 
leaner versions of existing forms so financial markets and consumers may welcome them 
as low-cost options (Rao & Singh, 2001). 
As an example of this organizational form, scholars have cited Southwest Airlines 
since it was the first of the no frills, cut-rate, point-to-point airlines that compete 
primarily on price and do not have the additional perks that are typically part of a regular, 
full-service airline (Lumsden & Singh, 1990).  In fact, there are obvious parallels 
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between Southwest Airlines and the emergence of more specialized organizations like 
surgery centers and specialty hospitals within the healthcare industry (Altman et al., 
2006).  These organizational forms are frequently referred to as “focused factories” since 
scholars have argued that such firms become exceptional in their area of expertise and are 
able to operate more efficiently and effectively than generalist forms (Herzlinger, 1997; 
Skinner, 1974).  There are other examples of these organizations present in 
manufacturing settings (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1984; Hill, 2000) and service 
environments (Herzlinger, 1997; Heskett, 1986; Huckman & Zinner, 2005). 
Although these two organizational forms compete for the same resources, 
specialists considered to be focused factories may not be adversely affected by the 
presence of generalists because their lower cost structure poses a competitive advantage.  
Organizations focusing on a narrow product mix for a particular market niche can operate 
more efficiently than the conventional plant, which attempts a broader mission (Skinner, 
1974).  As a result, these efficiencies may produce lower operating costs that specialists 
pass on to consumers in the form of lower prices.  Although generalists may have already 
created the market, these advantages permit specialists to attract consumers more easily 
and to enjoy higher profit margins.  For these reasons, specialists may be relatively 
unaffected by generalists, and they may enter or exit markets without regard to the 
presence of competing generalists.  Meanwhile, generalists are almost certainly hurt by 
competition for scarce resources with these specialists. 
In fact, Ruef (2000) goes one step further and argues that there are several reasons 
why new organizational forms might actually benefit from existing forms.  His arguments 
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take on particular significance when the new organizational form is a specialist.  Meyer 
and Rowan (1977) argue that organizations seek legitimacy in the eyes of consumers and 
government entities by incorporating structures and procedures that match widely 
accepted cultural models and common beliefs (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  To that end, new 
organizational forms enjoy legitimacy benefits from existing organizations in the form of: 
(1) residual socio-political legitimation due to prior collective action by the predecessor; 
and (2) residual cognitive legitimation as a result of the more highly crystallized identity 
of the predecessor (Ruef, 2000).  In other words, the fact that some organizations already 
serve a market for goods or services makes it more likely that new organizational forms 
serving this market will be considered legitimate.  This is particularly true of 
organizations that emerge by means of recombination through partial contraction since 
the new form simply eliminates some elements from preexisting blue-prints (Rao & 
Singh, 2001). 
New organizational forms also benefit from resource spillovers since prior 
organizational forms also provide a set of structures, strategies, and routines that can be 
adopted by forms with related identities (Ingram & Inman, 1996; Ruef, 2000).  A variety 
of studies have demonstrated that organizations are successful when they learn from the 
experiences of other organizations and then embed this knowledge within organizational 
routines (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Levitt & March, 1988).  Thus, entrants can learn 
from the experiences of incumbents and may adopt successful organizational innovations 
while discarding unsuccessful ones.  While this is true of any new organizational form, 
specialists in particular may learn from generalists since they represent pared down 
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versions of the original organizational form; they can observe which niches are the least 
and most profitable as well as which organizational elements should be retained or 
eliminated.  In other words, they need not adopt any structures, strategies, and routines 
that have not already been vetted by generalists. 
Since these organizations compete for the same resources, existing organizational 
forms may be hurt by the emergence of new organizational forms.  Meanwhile, we have 
already established several reasons why emergent specialists may benefit from the 
presence of existing generalists or, at the very least, may be unaffected by them.  In this 
way, competition between these two organizational forms may be considered asymmetric 
in that one organizational form may benefit from competition while the other is hurt.  In 
the parlance of population ecology, this would be considered a parasitic relationship.  We 
hypothesize that asymmetric competition exists between these two organizational forms. 
Hypothesis 5: Overlap density among specialists is positively related to the exit 
rate among generalists. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Overlap density among generalists is negatively related to 
the exit rate among specialists. 
 
Table 3 summarizes all of our hypotheses by displaying the predicted effect of 
competition from specialists and generalists upon market exit by each type of 
organizational form. 
Table 3: Predicted Coefficients for Exit Models 
 Niche Overlap Density   Niche Non-Overlap Density 
  Specialist Generalist    Specialist Generalist
Specialist + –  Specialist –  Exit by Generalist + +  Exit by Generalist  – 
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Our definition asymmetric competition is illustrated within the left table that describes 
the effects of niche overlap density.  The upper-right and lower-left hand cells predict 
coefficients with opposite signs. 
E. Density Dependence 
The emergence of new organizational forms is said to be governed by a process 
called density dependence.  The density dependence model hypothesizes that population 
density influences two forces, legitimacy and competition, and that these two forces drive 
vital rates (i.e., founding and mortality) (Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Hannan & Freeman, 
1989).  Suchman (1995: 574) defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995).  
The density dependence model suggests that initial increases in population density 
produce mutualism by raising the institutional legitimacy of an organizational population.  
But organizations possess a fundamental niche and when these niches overlap, 
organizations compete with one another for resources.  Growing density within these 
niches intensifies competition at an increasing rate since the number of competitive 
relations possible increases as a function of the square of the count of organizations in the 
niche.  As the number of population members grows, the number of competitive 
interactions grows and the effect of population density reverses. 
As a result, the evolutionary trajectories of diverse organizational populations 
appear to follow a common path.  The number of organizations grows slowly at first, and 
then increases rapidly as initial increases in population density increase organizational 
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legitimacy.  In truth, the term “legitimacy” is essentially a blanket term that is consistent 
with any sort of positive externality that yields mutualistic effects between organizations.  
As the population continues to grow, the competitive effects of increasing density begin 
to overcome the mutualistic effects of initial increases in density.  The organizational 
population reaches a peak and then declines during a period called the “shakeout” as the 
organizational population eventually equilibrates at the environmental carrying capacity, 
which is the number of firms that the environment can support in the long term.  
Populations of newspaper publishers, labor unions, breweries, and banks have all been 
demonstrated to follow this basic pattern (Hannan & Carroll, 1992). 
Brittain and Freeman (1980) point out that organizations frequently pursue 
different strategies, depending on the stage of industry evolution (Brittain & Freeman, 
1980).  In order to justify their theories, they draw from models used by biologists to 
model the growth of populations in finite environments: 
(1.1.) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
K
XKrX
dt
dX  
where the rate of change of a population with size X is a function of some rate of nature 
increase r, and carrying capacity K.  Ecologists sometimes describe alternative modes of 
selection – or strategies for survival – in terms of the parameters of this equation: r and K 
(MacArthur & Wilson, 1967). 
Pure r-strategists are organizations that move quickly to exploit resources as they 
first become available (Brittain & Freeman, 1980).  Their structure makes them relatively 
inexpensive to set up since they concentrate on activities that require low levels of capital 
investment and simple structures.  Their success depends heavily on first-mover 
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advantages, which makes them high-risk and high payoff organizations that gain 
maximally from temporarily rich environments.  K-strategists, on the other hand, are 
organizations that are structured to compete successfully in densely settled environments 
(Brittain & Freeman, 1980).  K-strategist organizations generally expand more slowly 
into new resource spaces than r-strategists because the structures generating competitive 
efficiency frequently preclude the rapid adjustments necessary to capture first-mover 
advantages.  Competition on the basis of efficiency generally involves higher levels of 
investment in plant and equipment and more elaborate organizational structures. 
In industries with changing products, developing technologies, or rapidly 
increasing market munificence, the availability of resources may permit the 
organizational population to flourish (Brittain & Freeman, 1980).  Within this emerging 
population, competition is dominated by r-selection which favors organizations capable 
of moving quickly to exploit new resource opportunities in the resource rich but uncertain 
environments that characterize low-density conditions.  As the population continues to 
grow, its markets become connected and environmental uncertainty is reduced as demand 
becomes more predictable.  As an industry stabilizes and the organizational population 
reaches its carrying capacity, the resources available to its members are exploited fully 
and competitive pressures shift to K-selection, which favors organizations competing on 
the basis of efficiency. 
These two selection processes, coupled with the strength of the legitimacy effects 
accompanying different phases of industry evolution, may produce different patterns of 
firm entry into organizational niches.  In the case of mature populations characterized by 
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K-selection processes, organizations compete on the basis of efficiency and these 
competitive pressures increase within markets that are more crowded since the 
organizational population has grown beyond the point where additional density provides 
any legitimacy benefits.  Thus, firms avoid direct competition with other firms and tend 
to enter uncrowded niches.  Yet there are reasons to believe that entry patterns differ 
within a growing population of a new organizational form.  Density dependence suggests 
that entry rates will be higher in markets with high levels of firm density since entrants 
enjoy legitimacy benefits posed by the presence of similar organizations.  They may 
choose to enter relatively crowded niches in spite of this crowding since these legitimacy 
benefits outweigh the strength of the competitive effects within a growing population. 
However, there is an alternative explanation for this phenomenon.  Growing 
industries are characterized by r-selection processes in which competition is based upon 
market position.  As firms jockey for position within the most desirable market segments, 
entrants may choose to enter these crowded niches in spite of the fact that they are 
already crowded.  They may accept a higher likelihood of exit as a trade-off for the 
possibility of occupying these highly desirable market segments once the dust settles and 
the industry shakeout has occurred.  These industries are also characterized by the 
presence of technological uncertainty, information asymmetry, and an absence of rules 
(Anderson & Tushman, 2001; Porter, 1980).  Firms may alternatively actively seek out 
these niches because of their crowding since the presence of uncertainty and information 
asymmetries prevents them from accurately evaluating which markets are the most 
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desirable.  Within these industries, firms observe similar organizations occupying certain 
niches and may believe that they should do the same. 
Both of these arguments predict that we will observe high entry rates among 
organizational niches with high levels of overlap density.  However, they offer different 
predictions for the effect of niche non-overlap density on entry rates.  On the one hand, 
density dependence predicts that niche non-overlap density should also maintain a 
positive relationship with firm entry rates since the presence of firms with overlapping 
and non-overlapping niches confer legitimacy benefits upon potential entrants.  On the 
other hand, our theory of r-selection processes suggests that entry rates should be 
relatively low in markets with high niche non-overlap density since the presence of firms 
within a market that do not serve a given niche indicates that the niche is relatively 
undesirable.  Depending upon the sign of the coefficient for non-overlap density, we may 
be able to ascertain the causal mechanism that produces the hypothesized effect of 
overlap density.  We based our non-overlap hypothesis on our second line of reasoning 
and test several hypotheses that relate organizational density to firm entry rates within a 
growing organizational population.2 
Hypothesis 7: Overlap density is positively related to entry rates within a 
growing organizational population. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Non-overlap density is negatively related to entry rates 
within a growing organizational population. 
 
Table 4 summarizes all of our hypotheses by displaying the predicted effect of specialist 
and generalist density upon market entry by each type of organizational form. 
                                                 
2 If we were to also test the density dependence prediction, the hypothesis would instead be phrased as 
follows: Non-overlap density is positively related to entry rates within a growing organizational population. 
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Table 4: Predicted Coefficients for Entry Models 
 Niche Overlap Density   Niche Non-Overlap Density 
  Specialist Generalist    Specialist Generalist
Specialist + –  Specialist –  Entry by Generalist – –  Entry by Generalist  + 
 
The different entry patterns exhibited by growing and mature organizational populations 
are displayed by the left table that describes the effect of niche overlap density on firm 
entry rates.  The upper-left and lower-right hand cells predict coefficients with opposite 
signs. 
Our hypotheses yield opposite predictions for the effect of niche overlap and non-
overlap density on firm entry rates within organizational populations experiencing 
different phases of industry evolution.  Testing these hypotheses among two 
organizational forms that simultaneously participate in the same markets but are 
experiencing different phases of evolution poses an excellent opportunity to study how 
entry patterns differ across growing and mature organizational populations.  We can 
study entry patterns within a mature population of generalists, which serves as a control 
group, to validate the existing theory within this setting and to compare how they differ 
from the entry patterns of a growing population of specialists, which serves as our 
experimental group. 
IV. APPLICATIONS TO AMBULATORY SURGERY 
The fact that there are no studies that reconcile these two views of niche 
competition by simultaneously examining the dynamics of population macro-niches and 
organizational micro-niches may stem in part from the fact that these theories have 
traditionally been applied to very different settings.  Resource partitioning theory has 
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traditionally been applied to industries in which there is rapid growth among firms with a 
specialized organizational form.   For example, the brewing industry experienced rapid 
growth amongst microbreweries and brewpubs while the wine industry witnessed the 
birth of the farm winery (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Delacroix & Solt, 1988; 
Swaminathan, 1995, 1998).  Meanwhile, niche overlap theory has been tested in a 
relatively mature industry in which specialists and generalists possess the same 
organizational form but occupy different niches (Baum & Singh, 1994a, 1994b).  While 
day care centers may be licensed to enroll children of different ages, their other 
organizational characteristics are essentially the same. 
The market for outpatient surgery represents a unique setting in which to 
synthesize these ideas.  There are obvious applications of niche overlap theory to the 
market for outpatient surgery because surgical specialties can be considered niches and 
outpatient facilities compete with one another insofar as they serve overlapping niches.  
In fact, this view of surgical specialties as the relevant organizational niche reflects a 
broader shift to service line competition within health care (Berenson et al., 2006; 
Berliner, 2008).  Yet this setting also presents an opportunity to study competition 
between organizational populations occupying different macro-niches since surgery 
centers represent a specialized organizational form that has emerged within a mature 
industry previously concentrated by generalists.  The rapid increase in the number of 
surgery centers suggests it is a growing organizational population, most likely 
characterized by r-selection processes, and this growth mirrors the growth of other 
specialized organizations like microbreweries and brewpubs (Carroll & Swaminathan, 
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2000; Swaminathan, 1998).  Much like these other new organizational forms, surgery 
centers must achieve organizational legitimacy in the minds of both patients and 
physicians. 
A. Organizational Niche 
The surgical specialties served by outpatient facilities can be considered the 
micro-niches within which they compete since they correspond with distinct 
organizational capabilities and assets.  Outpatient facilities compete with each other at 
different levels of intensity depending on the extent of the overlap in the surgical 
specialties that they serve.  Likewise, outpatient facilities serving different entirely 
specialties do not compete with one another at all, which is a reasonable assumption since 
we know that outpatient facilities that handle gastroenterological procedures do not 
compete with outpatient facilities that provide opthamological procedures.  Although 
surgery centers can change specialties by purchasing capital and equipment, we are able 
to capture these specialty changes as long they do not occur instantaneously.  This 
dimension does not exhaust all organizational niche characteristics for outpatient 
facilities, this characterization of their organizational niches provides a useful way to 
separate the competitive and mutualistic processes affecting facility entry and exit. 
In fact, this view of competition within surgical specialties reflects a broader 
transition to service line competition within health care.  In the mid-1990s, hospitals 
competed primarily on price by negotiating payment rates with managed care plans. 
However, by 2000, non-price competition became increasingly important, and hospitals 
pursued strategies targeted directly at physicians and consumers.  The development of 
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specialty-service lines are a recent step in the evolution of hospital business strategies as 
hospitals that previously marketed their entire organization are increasingly marketing 
branded specialty-service lines (Berenson et al., 2006).  The recent growth of specialty 
hospitals and surgery centers is yet another phenomenon that reflects this transition to 
service-line competition.  Although public policy attention has focused on the effect of 
this growth – particularly among specialty hospitals – upon general hospitals’ hegemony 
over a number of service lines, this shift to specialty competition is a much more 
pervasive development (Iglehart, 2005). 
B. Organizational Form 
Surgery centers represent significantly different organizational forms than general 
hospitals in terms of their: (1) client markets; (2) technologies; (3) governance; and (4) 
goals.  First, they participate in different clients markets since there are clear limits on the 
type of markets that they can participate in; they cannot perform a surgical procedure 
when, prior to surgery, an overnight hospital stay is anticipated (Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2006a).  Second, they utilize different technologies than general 
hospitals; surgery centers require less capital and equipment because outpatient 
procedures are typically less technology intensive than inpatient procedures and do not 
require the same extent of emergency services (Balicki, Kelly, & Miller, 1995).  Third, 
they have a different governance structure as evidenced by the fact that there are 
relatively few physician-owned general hospitals while approximately 83% of surgery 
centers are wholly- or partly-owned by physicians (Gabel et al., 2008; Lynk & Longley, 
2002; Mitchell, 2007; Strope et al., 2009).  Fourth, they possess different goals since the 
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vast majority of surgery centers are for-profit entities whereas the majority of hospitals 
are non-profit organizations (Verispan, 2006).  For this same reason, hospitals experience 
certain capital constraints that surgery centers generally do not (Pauly, 1987). 
In fact, several papers have explicitly identified ASCs as being an organizational 
form distinct from general hospitals.  Carey, Burgess and Young (2009) study the impact 
of ASC entry on hospital financial performance and state the following: 
Over the past three decades, the U.S. hospital industry has been 
experiencing growing competitive forces in an environment of wide-
ranging organizational change.  A key development during this period has 
been a dramatic shift in service provision from the inpatient to the 
outpatient setting, a transition reflecting both new technologies that have 
made more procedures feasible on an ambulatory basis, and effort of 
public and private insurers to control the growth of hospital costs.  
Emphasis on cost containment realized through greater reliance on 
outpatient care also has provided a stimulus to the entry of a new 
healthcare organizational form, the freestanding ambulatory surgery 
center (ASC), a limited-service alternative for treating surgery patients not 
requiring an overnight stay (Carey et al., 2009). 
 
Likewise, Ruef (2000) identifies 48 different organizational forms within the health care 
sector and distinguishes between surgicenters (ASCs) and community hospitals.  He 
argues that “the complex morass of organizational arrangements makes the health care 
sector a particularly challenging and intriguing case for the analysis of form emergence” 
(Ruef, 2000).  Referring back to Rao and Singh (2001) in order to classify the nature of 
the differences between ASCs and hospitals, surgery centers represent the deletion of 
some elements but no addition of new elements, which they refer to as the partial 
contraction mode of recombination (Rao & Singh, 2001). 
Recall that organizations falling within this category of organizational speciation 
are considered to be specialists since they resemble leaner versions of existing forms 
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(Rao & Singh, 2001).  Surgery centers represent one example of these specialized 
organizational forms since they perform only outpatient procedures but may participate in 
multiple specialties.  Specialty hospitals represent yet another example since they provide 
a wide array of inpatient and outpatient services but within only one specialty.  These 
specialists often emerge as low-cost alternatives because they behave like focused 
factories and operate more efficiently than generalists.  In fact, proponents of surgery 
centers and specialty hospitals have claimed for some time that they represent focused 
factories (Herzlinger, 1997). 
C. Focused Factories 
The notion of surgery centers behaving as focused factories is no different than 
suggesting that there are diseconomies of scope present within this market.  In other 
words, it is more costly to combine two or more product lines in one firm than to produce 
them separately (Panzar & Willig, 1981).  Specialization poses a variety of benefits for 
surgery centers.  Highly specialized facilities can enter markets more easily because they 
may enjoy lower fixed costs than less specialized facilities; capital and equipment can be 
tailored to the services that will be provided.  For example, an operating room need not 
be equipped to handle a variety of different procedures; it can be customized to support a 
relatively narrow range of procedures.  This is critical because the cost of building a 
general surgical suite is considerably higher than the cost of setting up a single purpose 
operating room.  The cost of applying for accreditation also favors more specialized 
facilities because there are several different classes of accreditation available to surgery 
centers.  The classes range from A to C in increasing order of procedure complexity and 
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the range of anesthetics that can be utilized.  Not surprisingly, obtaining a class C 
accreditation requires considerably more time, money, and effort than a class A 
accreditation. 
More specialized facilities may also enjoy lower marginal costs because they 
operate more efficiently.  Allowing the same surgical team to perform the same 
procedure repeatedly within the same operating room reduces the amount of preparation 
time needed prior to each procedure.  There is also evidence to suggest that group 
membership stability predicts improvement rates for these procedures themselves 
(Edmondson, Winslow, Bohmer, & Pisano, 2003).  Edmondson, et al. (2003) studied a 
new technology for coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery at 15 different hospitals 
and found that team stability was a significant predictor of the rate with which hospitals 
improved procedure time.  Increasing procedure volume while utilizing fixed levels of 
capital and labor yields lower marginal costs. 
Additionally, one of the key tenets of operations research is that variation reduces 
production output.  Under normal circumstances, pooling demand by combining 
resources and customer streams allows more customers to be handled by a given service 
process within a fixed unit of time (Cachon & Terwiesch, 2006).  However, introducing 
variation to the workflow by utilizing different surgical teams and/or scheduling a variety 
of different procedures reduces the overall number of procedures that can be performed.  
Pooling demand among procedures with different means and variances makes the service 
process more variable and decreases the overall number of procedures that can be 
performed (Cachon & Terwiesch, 2006).  This explains why more specialized facilities 
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are considerably more efficient at scheduling surgical procedures than less specialized 
facilities. 
Additionally, specialization poses a number of other ancillary benefits to surgery 
centers.  It has been suggested that specialization not only increases volume but also 
improves the quality of surgical procedures.  There is some evidence to support the 
notion that certain procedures have lower rates of subsequent hospitalization and 
mortality when performed within the context of surgery centers rather than general 
hospitals (Chukmaitov et al., 2006).  More specialized facilities also possess a number of 
governance advantages since surgery centers are considerably more sympathetic to the 
scheduling needs of their surgeons than general hospitals.  Additionally, one business 
partner in a nationwide chain of endoscopy centers pointed out that single-specialty 
surgery centers tend to run better than multi-specialty surgery centers because surgeons 
can relate better to surgeons within the same specialty and have more closely aligned 
incentives, which is a significant advantage when physician ownership plays a role in 
organizational governance. 
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D. Asymmetric Competition 
Just as we suggested that competition between specialist and generalist 
organizations may be asymmetric, there are several reasons to believe that surgery 
centers benefit from the presence of nearby hospitals with overlapping niches.  As 
focused factories, surgery centers maintain lower costs and therefore have a competitive 
advantage when competing with hospitals for various resources (Baker, 2002).  Surgery 
centers can learn from the experiences of general hospitals, and may then choose to serve 
the most profitable specialties with a given market.  Hospitals also provide surgery 
centers with an opportunity to segment the market by “cherry-picking” the healthiest 
patients (Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003).  Surgeons can send their healthiest 
patients to surgery centers while sending their sickest patients to nearby hospitals.  In 
fact, research has demonstrated that ASCs treat patients of lower complexity than 
hospital outpatient departments (Winter, 2003).  For these same reasons, hospitals don’t 
necessarily benefit from the presence of competing surgery centers (Berenson et al., 
2006). 
Yet surgery centers possess another competitive advantage over general hospitals.  
Competition for outpatient procedures is essentially competition for physician referrals; 
patients rarely elect to have their procedure performed in a facility other than the one 
recommended by their physician (Kouri, Parsons, & Alpert, 2002; Lynk & Longley, 
2002).  Thus, physicians are ultimately the critical resource within this market.  Surgery 
centers possess a competitive advantage when competing with hospitals for physician 
referrals because 83% of surgery centers are wholly- or partly-owned by physicians 
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(Gabel et al., 2008; Lynk & Longley, 2002; Mitchell, 2007; Strope et al., 2009).  
Surgeons also report that surgery centers are considerably more sympathetic to their 
scheduling needs than general hospitals (Verispan, 2006).  As a result, surgery centers 
have been relatively successful in their efforts to recruit surgeons from hospital in spite of 
the fact that hospitals have begun to pursue many different strategies to stem this tide 
(Berenson et al., 2006). 
Yet there are other reasons that surgery centers would tend to locate near general 
hospitals in spite of the potentially detrimental effects of competition.  For example, 
surgery centers may locate near general hospitals in order to accommodate the 
preferences of surgeons who wish to practice simultaneously in both settings.  Yet 
another reason for this phenomenon stems from the inherently uncertain nature of 
medicine; while most outpatient surgical procedures occur without any complications, 
there is always the possibility that something can go wrong (Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, 
& Anderson, 2004; Fleisher, Pasternak, & Lyles, 2007).  In the case of general hospitals, 
this is not a serious issue because a wide variety of services are available to the patient 
and he or she can be transported quickly to that hospital’s emergency room if need be.  
For surgery centers, however, this is not the case because emergency departments do not 
exist.  The patient must be sent in an ambulance to a nearby general hospital that can treat 
the patient in its emergency room.  As a result, surgery centers must be cognizant of these 
issues when choosing their location.  Excessive distance to a general hospital may lead to 
patient injury and possibly even death, which might put the surgery center at significant 
risk of a lawsuit. 
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E. Population Growth 
Much like the evolution of any new organizational form, the growth trajectory of 
surgery centers has followed a familiar pattern.  The first ASC appeared in 1970 when a 
group of anesthesiologists opened a surgical center in Phoenix, Arizona (Baker, 2002; 
Carey et al., 2009).  However, development of surgery centers didn’t take off until 
surgery centers were certified to provide services to Medicare beneficiaries in 1982.  
Between the establishment of the first ASC in 1970 and 1982, when Medicare began 
reimbursing ASC services, the growth of the ASC industry was modest, averaging less 
than 30 facilities per year.  Following Medicare certification, the rate of ASC 
establishment grew to several hundred facilities per year.  Coupled with technological 
advances and cost control efforts, their growth accelerated rapidly during the 1990s and 
2000s (Carey et al., 2009).  From 1992 to 2002, the number of surgery centers more than 
doubled from 1,530 to an estimated 3,570 facilities (Baker, 2002).  This number is 
projected to double once again by 2010 and this growth will most likely accelerate as a 
result of CMS’s recent expansion to the list of procedures eligible for reimbursement in 
surgery centers (Verispan, 2006). 
In this sense, surgery centers represent an excellent example of a growing 
organizational population.  The rapid increase in the number of facilities indicates that it 
is characterized by r-selection processes.  Meanwhile, the hospital sector has existed for 
centuries.  The fact that the number of U.S. hospitals is declining would suggest that the 
organizational population is relatively mature and characterized by K-selection processes.  
The market for outpatient surgery presents a unique opportunity to study firm entry and 
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exit patterns simultaneously within growing and mature organizational populations since 
the market is served simultaneously by two organizational forms at different stages of 
evolution. 
The fact that the growth of surgery centers is governed by r-selection processes 
suggests that the industry is characterized by the presence of uncertainty and information 
asymmetries.  This is closely corroborated by what we know about the industry.  Demand 
for outpatient surgeries shifts in both predictable and unpredictable ways as medical 
technology advances.  These technological changes allow more procedures to migrate 
from inpatient to outpatient settings.  For example, the 64-slice computed tomography 
(CT) scan imaging that performs the equivalent of a coronary angiogram is increasingly 
being offered by cardiologists in their offices (Leber et al., 2005).  Though it is still too 
early to tell, this technology has the potential to shift an entire class of procedures to 
outpatient settings. 
Meanwhile, as technology advances permit these procedures to be performed 
exclusively on an outpatient basis, they begin to move away from surgery centers and 
into even less intensive office-based settings.  In fact, improvements in medical 
technology may even render old procedures obsolete as they are replaced with newer 
procedures.  For example, an interview with one Ohio gastroenterologist revealed some 
concern about the recent emergence of a less invasive technique called virtual 
colonoscopy that utilizes computed tomography (CT) or magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) to identify the polyps associated with colorectal cancer.  His endoscopy center’s 
administration is trying to monitor these technological developments very closely 
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because they have the potential to radically alter demand for procedures utilizing 
endoscopic instruments.  As technology permits the market to grow, it also creates a great 
deal of uncertainty as to which market segments will end up being the most profitable. 
F. Legitimacy 
Much like the growth of any new organizational form, surgery centers are faced 
with the challenge of establishing legitimacy in the eyes of both government and 
consumers.  Rao and Singh (2001) suggest that this may be somewhat less of an issue for 
organizations that emerge as a result of recombination through partial contraction since 
the new form eliminates some elements from preexisting blue-prints (Rao & Singh, 
2001).  This is certainly true of specialty hospitals since they closely resemble the 
hospital – in name and physical structure – and therefore benefit from the long-standing 
legitimacy of the general hospital.  However, it is slightly less clear whether surgery 
centers enjoy these same legitimacy spillovers since they differ from general hospitals in 
a number of ways that have been described. 
Ruef (2000) points out that the initial emergence of new organizational forms 
tends to correspond with regulatory, legislative, or judicial events that legitimate the new 
form.  In the case of surgery centers, these legitimating regulatory events consisted of 
external reviews of several surgicenters that were conducted by the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO) in the early 1970s (Henderson, 1984; Hill, 1973).  However, 
the real impetus for the growth of surgery centers was Medicare’s decision to reimburse 
surgery centers for services provided to Medicare beneficiaries (Gregg, Wholey, & 
Moscovice, 2008).  The fact that this event marked a dramatic shift in the growth of 
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surgery centers is not at all surprising since it made a new source of reimbursement 
available to surgery centers.  However, this shift is at least somewhat attributable to the 
fact that Medicare certification lent a great deal of legitimacy to this new organizational 
form. 
Although surgery centers have a long history, this does not necessarily mean that 
they do not struggle with organizational legitimacy.  Moreover, 27 states have some form 
of certificate of need (CON) regulation that regulates the construction of new surgery 
centers (American Hospital Association, 2006; Berliner, 2008). State policy action has 
also been mixed with some states attempting to restrict surgery center entry under their 
CON programs (e.g., Maine and Mississippi) while others have relaxed barriers to their 
establishment (e.g., New York and Ohio) (Gregg et al., 2008).  For some states (e.g., 
Georgia), the promulgation of new regulations has not ended the debate but elevated it to 
the courts as opponents have sued to invalidate the new rules (Gregg et al., 2008).  Still 
other states remain undecided, looking to public hearings and policy studies for the best 
course of action.  The ongoing debate over these CON restrictions is an indication that 
the government has not completely endorsed ASCs.  This constitutes a critical 
impediment to their organizational legitimacy. 
These typical legitimacy issues are compounded by the fact that surgery centers 
handle complex outpatient procedures that bear some risk of injury.  While most 
outpatient surgical procedures occur without any complications, there is always the 
possibility that something can go wrong (Fleisher et al., 2004; Fleisher et al., 2007).  In 
the case of general hospitals, this is not a serious issue because a wide variety of 
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emergency services are available to the patient.  For surgery centers, however, this is not 
the case because there are not intensive care units (ICUs) or other providers available to 
handle emergencies.  The patient must be sent in an ambulance to a nearby general 
hospital that can treat the patient in its emergency room.  These concerns over patient 
safety have led some researchers to study the quality of care provided by surgery centers.  
These studies have found that surgery centers are better than hospitals at some procedures 
and worse at others (Chukmaitov et al., 2006).  Nevertheless, these patient safety 
concerns must inevitably weigh on the minds of patients when deciding on the 
appropriate outpatient treatment setting and this influences the extent to which patients 
view the surgery center as a legitimate provider of complex surgical procedures. 
Surgery centers not only struggle to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of patients, 
they also struggle to be considered a legitimate practice location by physicians.  Hospitals 
have been an integral part of medical education for some time since surgeons train in 
hospitals during their residency.  As a result, surgeons have grown accustomed to 
operating in hospitals and view hospitals as the default location in which to perform 
surgical procedures (Pandit, 1999).  Physician ownership of health care facilities is also a 
very new phenomenon that is viewed by many parties with some skepticism (Gabel et al., 
2008; Lynk & Longley, 2002; Mitchell, 2007; Strope et al., 2009).  Although 48.4% of 
outpatient procedures currently occur in surgery centers, approximately 36.6% of 
outpatient surgeons currently practice within a surgery center.3  This suggests that a small 
proportion of high-volume surgeons are driving the growth of surgery centers since the 
                                                 
3 These figures emerge from a quick analysis of physician identifiers in the Florida ambulatory surgery data 
(2006). 
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vast majority of physicians have not yet migrated their practice over to this new 
organizational form.  Over time, this transition to surgery centers will continue as 
physicians view these facilities as more legitimate setting for surgical procedures and 
others view them as legitimate source of revenues for physicians. 
V. DATA 
A. Study Site 
We chose the state of Florida as our study site for several reasons.  Within the 
past decade, surgery centers within the state of Florida have experienced tremendous 
growth.  In fact, the number of surgery centers in Florida grew from just 110 in 1993 to 
379 in 2006.   Its current total makes it the state with the second highest number of 
surgery centers in the US.4  Figure 8 displays this recent growth. 
Figure 8: Number of Freestanding Ambulatory Surgery Centers in Florida 
(1993 – 2006) 
 
                                                 
4 Only California has more surgery centers with a total of 620. 
Source: Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA)
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This rapid growth is partially attributable to the fact that Florida has no certificate of need 
(CON) legislation regulating surgery centers.  It may also be attributable to the fact that 
the state does indeed have CON requirements for acute care hospitals, which began in 
July of 1973.  Surgery centers may therefore have emerged as a convenient way to 
increase capacity for outpatient procedures. 
 In spite of the unique circumstances surrounding its CON legislation, surgery 
center trends in Florida are indeed representative of those being observed throughout the 
US.  Although it is home to 7.9% of the nation’s surgery centers, this figure is much more 
reasonable when viewed in light of the fact that 6.0% of the country’s population resides 
there.  In Florida, there are approximately 42,000 residents per surgery center, which 
means that it ranks 14th among all US states in terms of population per surgery center.  If 
we consider only those states with no CON laws regulating surgery centers, Florida ranks 
9th among 24 states, which puts it fairly close to the middle of the pack. 
Although it is broadly representative of the national market for surgery centers, 
there are a number of characteristics about the state of Florida that make it particularly 
well-suited for this study.  It is a state undergoing major demographic changes as a result 
of its rapid population increase within the past few decades.  From 1990 to 2006, its 
population increased from approximately 13 million to 18 million residents.  Of all U.S. 
states, it had the 3rd greatest population increase (5 million) and the 7th greatest percent 
increase (40%) during that time period (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007).  Its population also 
has a unique age distribution with large numbers of elderly individuals – typically high 
users of medical care – highly concentrated in certain geographic regions.  Of its 18 
 60 
million residents, approximately 3 million are over the age of 65.   This makes it the U.S. 
state with the largest proportion (17%) of elderly individuals and the second-highest 
number (3 million) of elderly residents (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). 
Moreover, the size of this elderly population fluctuates seasonally along with 
changes in the weather.  “Snowbirds” and “sunbirds,” as they are frequently termed, are 
elderly individuals who temporarily migrate to Florida during the winter months or away 
from Florida during the summer months.  This phenomenon causes significant and 
predictable demographic shifts as Florida’s elderly population increases by as much as 
20% in the winter and declines by as much as 8% in the summer (Smith & House, 2006).  
This shift is even greater in communities with more snowbirds and sunbirds, for example 
in south and central Florida (Smith & House, 2006).  This seasonal variation in 
population size serves as a natural source of volatility in the demand for outpatient 
procedures. 
B. Patient Data 
The state of Florida requires that health care facilities report data on all inpatient 
admissions and outpatient surgical procedures that they perform.  This data is reported on 
a quarterly basis.  Appendices 1 and 2 present a complete listing of the codes and 
definitions for all fields included in the inpatient and outpatient data files, respectively.  
Only hospitals are required to report inpatient data but the facilities that report outpatient 
data include short-term acute care hospitals, freestanding ambulatory surgery centers, 
radiation therapy centers, lithotripsy centers, and cardiac catheterization laboratories.  In 
fact, Florida is one of only seven U.S. states that requires its surgery centers to report data 
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on outpatient procedures, which makes it an even more logical candidate as a study site.5  
It is also worth noting that ambulatory facilities are exempt from reporting in any quarter 
if they perform fewer than 200 outpatient procedures, which is a limitation that will be 
addressed later in the paper. 
For the purpose of clarity, we should be very explicit about the type of facilities 
with which we are concerned.  The state of Florida defines an “ambulatory surgery 
center” as follows: 
An ambulatory surgery center (ASC) is a licensed facility that is not part 
of a hospital and that may also be Medicaid/Medicare certified. The 
primary purpose of this type of facility is to provide elective surgical care. 
The patient is admitted to and discharged from the facility within the same 
working day. Overnight stays are not permitted.6 
 
This definition does not include physician offices, which are therefore exempt from 
AHCA’s data reporting requirements.  Although physician offices tend to focus on less 
invasive procedures, their exclusion from the Florida patient datasets is a limitation of 
this study to the extent that they compete with hospitals and surgery centers for outpatient 
procedures.  Unfortunately, physician offices are relatively unregulated in the U.S. and 
the state of Florida does not maintain any record of physician offices that perform 
outpatient procedures or the procedures that they perform. 
Inpatient and outpatient data reported by Florida health care facilities is compiled 
by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) and represents a complete census 
of all inpatient admissions and outpatient surgeries that have occurred within the state.  
The inpatient data has been collected since 1988 but AHCA only began collecting the 
                                                 
5 The other states that collect outpatient data from surgery centers are Kentucky, New York, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin. 
6 Source: Kim Stewart, Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) 
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outpatient data in 1997.  Given that it takes approximately one year to compile patient 
data from health care facilities, 2006 represents the most current year of data available for 
the inpatient and outpatient datasets.  The fact that both inpatient and outpatient datasets 
are necessary in order to model total procedure demand means that our time period of 
interest was 1997 to 2006, which spans exactly 10 years. 
The availability of this patient-level data is an interesting facet of this study 
because previous empirical work in population ecology has utilized data at the level of 
the firm but not at the level of the individual consumer.  These studies infer demand from 
population demographics and industry velocity but cannot directly assess the relationship 
between product demand and firm entry and exit.  This study’s methodology represents a 
step forward insofar as it permits us to measure competition, market demand, and firm 
entry and exit with exact precision and directly model the relationship between them. 
C. Surgical Specialties 
In order to transform these patient datasets into procedure counts at the facility- 
and county-level, we had to code the procedures and categorize them within surgical 
specialties.  Both datasets include a field that accounts for the principal procedure that a 
patient received as well as additional fields representing any other procedures that the 
patient underwent during the same stay.  However, one major difference between the 
inpatient and outpatient datasets is that they utilize two completely different sets of 
procedure codes.  For the inpatient data, surgical procedures are represented by ICD-9-
CM or ICD-10-CM procedure codes.  In the case of the outpatient data, surgical 
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procedures are represented by CPT or HCPCS procedure codes, which are developed and 
maintained by the American Medical Association (AMA). 
Single-level clinical classification software (CCS) from the Health Care 
Utilization Project (HCUP) allows us to classify both ICD-9-CM/ICD-10-CM and 
CPT/HCPCS codes among 244 different procedure types.  Appendix 3 lists all 244 
procedure types included within the single-level CCS software.  We applied the single-
level CCS software to the inpatient and outpatient datasets in order to generate quarterly 
counts of these procedures7.  By applying the single-level CCS software to the procedure 
codes in our patient data, we were able to successfully code 99.9997% of the procedures 
in the inpatient dataset and 99.9898% of the procedures in the outpatient dataset from 
1997 to 2006, which represent very high match percentages. 
However, AHCA made slight changes to the procedure codes within the inpatient 
and outpatient datasets over time (most notably in 2005 and 2006).  As a result, these 
datasets needed to be made internally consistent across all years of our study.  In the case 
of the outpatient dataset, there was originally one principal procedure and up to fourteen 
other procedures available.  Within the inpatient dataset, there was one principal 
procedure and up to nine other procedures.  However, AHCA revised the outpatient 
dataset in 2005 by reducing the number of other procedure codes to nine.   In 2006, 
AHCA also modified the inpatient dataset by increasing the number of other procedure 
codes to thirty. 
                                                 
7 The 2007 version of the CCS software had some difficulties handling CPT codes in the 2005 and 2006 
outpatient data while the 2008 version of the CCS software failed to recognize a number of CPT codes in 
the 1997 through 2004 datasets.  In order to address this problem, we ran both versions of the software on 
our outpatient datasets and used the 2008 code when no 2007 code was produced. 
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Although it is unclear why AHCA made these changes, it is important to use the 
same number of procedure codes across all years of the outpatient and inpatient datasets 
in order to avoid any bias.  For example, when AHCA expanded the number of inpatient 
procedure codes to thirty-one, it captured an additional 75,791 procedures in codes ten 
through thirty, which suggests that approximately 2% of all surgical procedures were 
most likely censored in the 1997 to 2005 data.  When it reduced the number of outpatient 
procedures codes from fifteen to ten in 2005 and 2006, it failed to capture approximately 
5% of all procedures that were recorded from 1997 to 2004.  If we used all available 
procedure codes in the patient data, inclusion of the censored procedures resulting from 
these inconsistencies creates a bias in our dataset.  As a result, we used the same number 
of other procedure codes (9) across all years of our outpatient and inpatient data, which 
did not create any systematic problems because these additional codes were used 
primarily by hospitals for relatively minor procedures. 
For the sake of completeness, we did generate two different sets of procedure 
counts by facility and county code.  The first set included only the principal procedure 
codes and the second set treated all procedure codes (principal and other) as equivalent.  
Other research utilizing this data has already documented the fact there are a variety of 
inconsistencies recording other procedure codes that exist across facilities (ASC vs. 
hospital) and persist over time (Chukmaitov et al., 2006).  As a result, we only ran our 
analyses from the procedure volume datasets that emerge from principal codes, but we 
can run them relatively easily on the other procedure codes as a check on the validity of 
our primary results. 
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Having used the CCS software to code these procedure codes, we tabulated the 
frequency of each procedure type by facility and county codes.  In order to model facility 
procedure volume, we used the ID codes that AHCA assigns to all of its outpatient 
facilities.  Generating these quarterly procedure counts by facility code produced an 
unbalanced panel dataset in which the unit of observation is the facility-quarter and each 
column represents that facility’s procedure count within each of the 244 single-level CCS 
procedure types.  To calculate county procedure volume, we used the codes representing 
the patient’s county of residence and recoded out of state residents with the county for the 
facility in which they were treated8.  Generating these quarterly procedure counts by 
patient county code produced a balanced panel dataset in which the unit of observation is 
a county-quarter and each column represents that county’s procedure count within each 
of the single-level CCS procedure types.  Our dependent and independent variables were 
calculated from these facility- and county-level datasets. 
In order to classify these procedures by surgical specialty, each of the 244 single-
level CCS procedure types was assigned to one of 16 procedure chapters established by 
the hierarchical multi-level CCS software through the use of a crosswalk that is available 
in the CCS User Guide and has been reproduced in Table 5: 
                                                 
8 This was deemed to be a reasonable assumption because the vast majority of these patients were 
snowbirds or sunbirds who most likely maintained secondary residence in Florida.  Of the patients in our 
sample for which the county of residence was available, approximately 81% visited an outpatient facility in 
their home county. 
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Table 5: Crosswalk Between Single- and Multi-Level CCS Procedures 
CCS Procedure Numbers ICD-9-CM Procedure Chapters 
1-9 1 - Operations on the nervous system 
10-12 2 - Operations on the endocrine system 
13-21 3 - Operations on the eye 
22-26 4 - Operations on the ear 
27-33 5 - Operations on the nose, mouth, and pharynx 
34-42 6 - Operations on the respiratory system 
43-63 7 - Operations on the cardiovascular system 
64-67 8 - Operations on the hemic and lymphatic system 
68-99 9 - Operations on the digestive system 
100-112 10 - Operations on the urinary system 
113-118 11 - Operations on the male genital organs 
119-121, 123-132 12 - Operations on the female genital organs 
122, 133-141 13 - Obstetrical procedures 
142-164 14 - Operations on the musculoskeletal system 
165-175 15 - Operations on the integumentary system 
176-231 16 - Miscellaneous diagnostic and therapeutic procedures
Source: HCUP User Guide (2007) 
 
However, only 15 of these 16 chapters describe outpatient surgical procedures.  The 16th 
chapter groups together a wide variety of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures that 
cannot be assigned to any other chapter.  For the sake of comparability, we only took into 
account the first 15 chapters and ignored the 16th chapter.  In our preliminary analyses, 
we utilized all 16 chapters and found that the results were not substantively different. 
Admittedly, several of these procedure chapters may typically fall within a single 
surgical specialty and some surgical specialties may cross procedure chapters.  For 
example, category 4 (operations on the ear) and category 5 (operations on the nose, 
mouth, and pharynx) both relate to procedures that would normally be performed by an 
ear, nose, and throat (ENT) surgeon.  We explored the possibility of modifying this 
crosswalk to reflect the ways in which these procedures are typically divided across 
physician specialties but found that there were many grey areas; procedures like hand and 
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thyroid surgery can be performed by a variety of different specialties.  We ultimately 
arrived at the conclusion that it was not necessary to ensure that our surgical specialties 
closely approximated physician patterns of specialization as long as our approach 
constituted a reasonable method of classifying organizational niches and these niches 
remained consistent.  For the purposes of this paper, we consider these procedure 
chapters and surgical specialties to be the same thing and use the terms interchangeably. 
D. Specialty Participation 
The quarterly procedure counts that were generated by facility code not only 
permitted us to examine facility entry and exit, they also allowed us to observe how a 
facility’s procedure volume within each surgical specialty changes over time.  Based 
upon these changes in facility procedure volume, we developed several heuristic 
assumptions in order to determine the surgical specialties in which a facility participates 
since we calculated measures of competition and procedure demand for each facility 
based upon their surgical specialties.  Not only did this definition of specialty 
participation permit us to assemble various constructs for our model, it also allowed us to 
determine the number of surgical specialties in which a facility participates.  In fact, we 
were also able to identify when that facility entered surgical specialties it had not 
previously served or exited surgical specialties that it had served in the past. 
We were initially tempted to assume that a facility participates in a given surgical 
specialty when it performs one or more outpatient procedures within that specialty.  
However, procedure volume within certain surgical specialties (e.g., operations of the 
respiratory or cardiovascular system) was often relatively low.  It was misleading to 
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suggest that facilities had entered or exited these specialties when, in fact, procedure 
volume had simply dropped off or picked up for a single quarter.  Instead, we attempted 
to identify deliberate and permanent changes in the mix of procedures that a surgery 
center provides and established several heuristic assumptions in order to do so.  
By seeking to eliminate patterns of surgical volume that suggested a brief change 
in procedure demand, we ruled out facilities that entered or exited specialties for one or 
two quarters.  Instead, we looked for three consecutive quarters of consistent procedure 
volume.  If a facility had positive procedure volume within a specialty for three 
consecutive quarters, it served that specialty.  If a facility had no procedure volume 
within a specialty for three consecutive quarters, it did not serve that specialty.  Its 
participation status within that specialty would persist until there were three consecutive 
quarters of the opposite status.  When we calculated specialty entries and exits in this 
manner and then visually inspected trends in procedure volume, we found that this 
method was the most accurate method of capturing specialty participation. 
E. Market Boundaries 
In order to measure constructs representing competition and procedure demand, it 
was necessary to establish some reasonable definition of a health care market.  We turned 
to the National Center for Health Statistics for assistance with this task since several of its 
researchers already identified health service areas (HSAs) on the basis of travel patterns 
between counties by Medicare beneficiaries for routine hospital care (Makuc, Haglund, 
Ingram, Kleinman, & Feldman, 1991).  They used agglomerative cluster analysis and the 
average linkage method to group counties into service areas and defined an HSA to be 
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one or more counties that are relatively self-contained with respect to the provision of 
routine hospital care.  Each of Florida’s 67 counties was subsequently assigned to one of 
17 HSAs and the breakdown of these health service areas is presented in Table 6: 
Table 6: Crosswalk from Florida Counties to Health Service Areas (HSAs) 
HSA COUNTIES 
142 Orange, Seminole, Volusia, Flagler, Lake, Sumter 
155 Bay, Gulf, Washington, Holmes, Jackson, Calhoun 
158 Duval, Clay, Nassau, Baker, Glynn, Camden, Brantley, McIntosh, Charlton 
159 Alachua, Levy, Bradford, Union, Dixie, Gilchrist, Lafayette, Columbia, 
Suwannee, Hamilton 
163 Escambia, Santa Rosa, Okaloosa, Walton, Escambia, Conechuh 
165 Lee, Hendry, Glades, Collier 
183 Leon, Gadsden, Taylor, Wakulla, Jefferson, Franklin, Liberty, Madison 
200 Dade, Monroe, Broward 
202 Polk, Highlands, Hardee 
213 Sarasota, Charlotte, De Soto 
221 St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach, Okeechobee 
227 Pasco, Hernando, Pinellas, Hillsborough 
233 Marion, Citrus 
237 Brevard, Indian River 
251 Putnam, St. Johns 
257 Osceola 
266 Manatee 
Source: Makuc, Haglund, Ingram, Kleinman, & Feldman (1991) 
 
Although health service areas provide a convenient starting point from which we 
can define markets, they span very large geographic areas.  Following the example of 
previous research in population ecology, we also know that firm entry and exit is likely to 
be affected in different ways by local and diffuse market conditions.  Thus, we sought out 
a way of elaborating upon our measures of competition and procedure demand that 
distinguished between local and diffuse factors since travel distances clearly play a role 
in the market for outpatient services.  We considered several different options but 
ultimately settled on calculating our local measures from the county within which each 
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facility resides and our diffuse measures from all other counties within that facility’s 
health service area.  We pursued this approach because it retains the use of the health 
service area as a market boundary. 
In the same way that we know local and diffuse factors have a different impact 
upon firm entry and exit, it seems reasonable to assume that surgery centers and hospitals 
compete in different ways with each other.  By the same token, it is likely that procedures 
occurring within a surgery center are fundamentally different than procedures that are 
performed within a hospital outpatient department.  Thus, our measures of competition 
and procedure demand were calculated separately by facility type in order to account for 
this fact.  For each variable in our model representing competition and market demand, 
we calculated the measure separately for surgery centers and hospitals in the same 
manner that we divided these constructs into their local and diffuse components.  In other 
words, we calculated niche overlap and non-overlap density separately for ASCs and 
hospitals in order to account for the discompetitive effect of each. 
As we continued to divide our measures of competitive intensity into more and 
more detailed components, we were cognizant of the effect that this had on our model.  
Adding too many of these distinctions could have either reduced the statistical power of 
the model itself or diluted the effect of the factors that influence surgery center entry and 
exit.  Dividing each explanatory variable by its local and diffuse components yields two 
explanatory variables, and calculating those variables separately for surgery centers and 
hospitals produces a total of four different variables. 
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We approached this problem in an incremental manner by first producing a model 
with all variables measured at the highest level.  In our next two models, we divided up 
each measure first by facility type (surgery center vs. hospital) and second by geographic 
location (local vs. diffuse).  In our fourth model, we combined all these divisions into a 
single model with four explanatory variables for each construct.  The end goal was to 
elaborate upon our measures of competition so that we did not confound different effects 
in the event that market conditions do not vary by facility type or geographic location.  
However, the number of explanatory variables in our model quickly escalated with these 
different formulations so we introduced these distinctions in a gradual manner in order to 
observe any significant effects that were washed away as we added more variables to the 
model. 
VI. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
A. Facility Exit 
As a starting point for our analysis of facility entry and exit, we began with the 
dataset of quarterly procedure counts that we generated from the state ambulatory surgery 
data.  Recall that we generated these quarterly procedure counts by facility and county 
code.  Unlike the county-level procedure counts, the facility-level dataset did not 
comprise a balanced panel.  Facilities enter and exit the panel dataset as they enter and 
exit the market for outpatient services over time.  This panel allowed us to observe 
facility entry and exit over time.  We validated facility entries and exits that emerged 
from the outpatient dataset with additional data from the state of Florida which maintains 
information on all licensed and accredited outpatient facilities in the state.  This dataset 
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extends back to the early-1990’s and provides the exact dates of opening and closing for 
all such entities as well as the reason for termination of that facility’s ID number.9  
Outpatient facilities must apply for a new license from the state every two years in order 
to continue operating.  This requirement allows us to be confident that facility entries and 
exits can be closely tracked and are reasonably accurate. 
This licensure dataset was merged with our outpatient dataset through AHCA ID 
numbers in order to compare the state’s official entry and exit dates to the dates produced 
by our outpatient procedure volume dataset.  For hospitals, we also merged these datasets 
with the panel dataset produced from Florida inpatient data in order to provide additional 
validation for the patterns of activity produced by the outpatient dataset.  When there was 
a close match between entry and exit dates, we used the exact date provided by the state 
of Florida since the outpatient dataset was accurate only to the nearest quarter.  When 
there was not a close match, we contacted AHCA for more information on the facility in 
question or simply permitted the facility to enter or exit the dataset without counting it as 
an event in our entry or exit models. 
Since the state also keeps track of the reasons for facility exit, we checked these 
records for facilities that exited from 1997 to 2006 in order to ensure that we only 
attributed an exit to each facility when it went bankrupt/defunct, closed due to litigation 
activity, or voluntarily terminated its license.  We did not consider merger and acquisition 
activity to be a valid exit.  Conveniently, any surgery center mergers or acquisitions are 
recorded as a change of ownership rather than the termination of a facility license, which 
                                                 
9 The state also maintains data on a number of other facility characteristics, including the size (number of 
operating rooms and recovery beds), ownership type, and profit status of all outpatient facilities. 
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ensures that they aren’t mistakenly coded as a facility closure.  Of course, liquidity events 
like mergers and acquisitions could alternatively be viewed as good events and examined 
separately but we’ve chosen instead to focus on the bad events represented by market exit 
for the purposes of this study (Burns, Housman, & Robinson, 2009).  Only when there 
was concordance between the SASD outpatient procedure dataset and AHCA licensure 
data over exit timing and the facility had a valid reason for exit was a facility exit 
recorded in our empirical models.  From these datasets, we identified a total of 51 exits 
among 406 ASCs and 9 exits among 222 hospitals from 1997 to 2006.  Admittedly, these 
figures represent fairly modest sample sizes in that we are estimating the probability of 
exit for a small number of facilities on a small base, but this issue is true of virtually any 
entry/exit study since these are relatively rare events.  Our models may still yield 
significant coefficients, depending on the strength of the effects that we observe. 
In the case of facilities that exited and re-entered the dataset, we simply assumed 
that their procedure volume had fallen below the 200 procedure reporting threshold 
established by the state of Florida.  An inspection of the panel dataset indicated that these 
facilities were indeed low-volume facilities whose quarterly procedure volume hovered 
around 200 procedures.  During the gaps in which these facilities disappeared from the 
dataset, we simply used figures from the last quarter in which they were available by 
adjusting the end dates of quarterly records.  If we wished to take this method of 
imputation one step further, we could create quarterly records that replaced these gaps 
and recalculate all our measures of competition and procedure demand with these 
additional records.  However, this method produces a large number of outpatient 
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procedures while making many assumptions about procedures that occurred but were not 
reported.  In order to avoid manipulating the raw data itself, we opted not to pursue this 
avenue.  Instead, we simply made the aforementioned changes to several of the end dates 
in our empirical models. 
B. Facility Entry 
Having validated the facility entries produced by our panel dataset with the entry 
dates in the Florida licensure data, we used these events as a starting point from which to 
assess the factors that contribute to facility entry.  Only when there was concordance 
between the SASD outpatient dataset and AHCA licensure data did we record a facility 
entry in our entry models.  From these datasets, we identified a total of 193 entries among 
406 ASCs and 10 entries among 222 hospitals from 1997 to 2006.  Once again, these 
figures are fairly modest sample sizes in that they represent a small number of entry 
events on a relatively small base, which is a typical limitation for entry/exit studies that 
frequently attempt to predict a relatively small amount of variation.  It might ordinarily 
have been a problem for this study if we were concerned solely with accounting for the 
number of firms that enter a geographic market without distinguishing between different 
organizational niches. 
Previous research on firm entry has defined the population as the unit of analysis 
and treated foundings as events in a point process (Amburgey, 1986; Amburgey & 
Carroll, 1984; Cox & Isham, 1980).  Subsequent work on niche overlap theory classified 
organizational foundings by organizational niche and geographic location, and defined 
the annual number of entries within these niches and locations as the dependent variable 
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(Baum & Oliver, 1996; Baum & Singh, 1994a).  Following this line of research, we 
explained firm entry into geographic locations and organizational niches as a function of 
organizational density.  Since our geographic markets consist of counties and we define 
organizational niches as surgical specialties, we utilized the county-specialty as our unit 
of analysis. 
Since the unit of observation in our facility entry models is the county-specialty, 
we generated our counts of facility entry by county and specialty.  Facility entry timing 
was established on the basis of our panel dataset that had been validated by AHCA 
licensure data while we used our definition of specialty participation in order to ascertain 
which specialties a facility entered at the point of market entry.  Tabulating these figures 
by the county codes associated with each facility produced a dataset in which each 
datapoint represented the number of facilities that had entered a county-specialty during 
each quarter.  From our original sample consisting of 193 ASC entries and 10 hospital 
entries, our ASCs entered a total of 952 county-specialties and our hospitals entered a 
total of 122 county-specialties.  These figures represent much larger sample sizes that 
may potentially yield some significant effects. 
The county-specialty remained the unit of observation for the dependent variable 
in our empirical models while our independent variables were initially measured at the 
HSA level and were subsequently broken down by facility type (ASC vs. hospital) and 
geographic location (local vs. diffuse).  In order to assess whether dependent and 
independent variables should be calculated from the same geographic area, we ran 
separate analyses with all variables measured at the county and HSA level to check the 
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robustness of our results.  We found that none of our results changed substantively when 
we utilized these alternative market definitions. 
VII. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
This study attempts to elucidate the factors that contribute to facility entry and 
exit.   Many of the same explanatory variables (e.g., competition, procedure demand) 
contribute in different ways to each of these competitive actions so each is discussed 
within its own heading.  However, these explanatory variables must also be measured at 
different levels of observation for the purposes of testing our models of facility exit 
(facility level) and entry (county-specialty level).  Each sub-heading establishes which 
model is being described and how we measured these variables for the model in question.  
Tables presented along with our description of the empirical models should help by 
simplifying the variables names and descriptions as well as outlining the models they 
appear in. 
A. Competition 
1. Facility Exit 
Several of our hypotheses (A4, B4, A5, B5) relate the likelihood of facility entry 
and exit to the level of competition within local health care markets.  This piece of the 
analysis requires that we measure the density of surgery centers and general hospitals 
with overlapping and non-overlapping niches.  In order to do so, we borrowed heavily 
from Baum and Singh, who dealt with similar issues in their study of Toronto day care 
centers (Baum & Singh, 1994a, 1994b).  Their study constructed a matrix of niche 
overlap weights that depended on the extent to which specified age ranges tended to 
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overlap with one another.  A similar formula guided the construction of the weights 
employed here: 
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where sij and sji represent the number of procedures they perform within the same 
surgical specialties while si represents the number of procedures performed by firm i in 
specialties that firm j does not participate in and vice versa.10  The weights calculate the 
extent to which their procedure volumes overlap. 
Baum and Singh (1994) measured the fundamental niches of child day centers by 
constructing these weights based on the ages of children that day care centers were 
eligible to enroll and so a different weight was applied to each class of day care centers.  
Their implicit assumption was that each age group constitutes an equivalent proportion of 
each day care center’s business.  An identical approach here would have involved 
constructing weights based simply on the surgical specialties that each facility 
participates in.  However, we know that there may be significant differences between 
these organizations’ realized niches and their intended niches since each specialty that a 
facility participates in does not contribute an equal amount to its total procedure volume.  
Although we would have ideally based these weights upon revenues, we were able to 
construct far more detailed weights based upon each facility’s procedure volume in each 
specialty with the availability of more detailed patient data. 
                                                 
10 For the purposes of calculating niche overlap and non-overlap density, we use the method of evaluating 
specialty participation that was outlined earlier in this paper. 
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From our niche overlap weights, we calculated the overlap and non-overlap 
density for each outpatient facility from the following formulas: 
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where wji represents the weights that were described previously and n represents the 
number of outpatient facilities in the health service area occupied by firm i.  To calculate 
overlap and non-overlap density for firm i, we counted up the number of facilities in its 
health service area at time t and then assigned them all fractional weights based on the 
extent to which their procedure volume overlaps with that of firm i at time t.  Overlap 
density is the sum of all these weights and it is intended to represent the aggregate 
proportion of all facilities in firm i’s health service area with overlapping niches.  Non-
overlap density was calculated by subtracting the sum of these weights from the total 
number of outpatient facilities in firm i’s health service area and it represents the 
aggregate proportion of all outpatient facilities in a market with non-overlapping niches. 
As we have previously described, we broke down our measures of competitive 
intensity into their constituent components.  We began by measuring these overlap and 
non-overlap density at the highest possible level and then calculated each measure 
separately for ASCs and hospitals to account for differences in facility type.  We 
subsequently divided overlap and non-overlap density into their local and diffuse 
components in order to observe the effect of geographic location.  Finally, we utilized 
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both of these distinctions – facility type and geographic location – simultaneously in 
order to observe their combined effect. 
2. Facility Entry 
In contrast with our facility exit models, the unit of observation for our facility 
entry models is the county-specialty.  In the case of facility entry, the facility does not yet 
exist and so we modeled facility entry as a function of each specialty’s characteristics 
within each county.  Although competition has opposite effects upon facility entry and 
exit, our method of calculating competition at the county-specialty level was derived 
closely from our method of representing competition at the facility level.  As with our 
facility-level niche overlap weights, we divided each facility up by the proportion of its 
procedure volume that it devoted to each surgical specialty.  Following the example of 
Baum and Singh (1994), we constructed niche overlap weights from the proportion of 
each facility i’s procedure volume that was devoted to specialty j within county k: 
 (1.1) 
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where sj represents the number of procedures that facility i performs within specialty j.11  
Given these weights, the overlap and non-overlap density within each county-specialty 
was calculated from the following formulas: 
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11 For the purposes of calculating niche overlap and non-overlap density, we use the method of evaluating 
specialty participation that was outlined earlier in this paper. 
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where wij represents the weights that were described previously and n represents the 
number of outpatient facilities within county k.  Adding up our niche overlap weights by 
county produced the niche overlap density, which represents the fractional number of 
facilities that served a specialty within each county.  Adding up niche overlap density 
across all surgical specialties yielded the total number of outpatient facilities within each 
county.  By subtracting niche overlap density from the total number of outpatient 
facilities in each county, we were able to calculate niche non-overlap density. 
These density measures were computed differently for our facility entry and exit 
models because these models utilize different units of observation.  The unit of 
observation for our exit models was the facility-quarter and so we calculated niche 
overlap and non-overlap for all facilities competing with the focal facility within a given 
quarter.  The unit of observation for our facility entry models was the county-specialty 
and so we calculated niche overlap and non-overlap for all facilities operating in the focal 
county-specialty within a given quarter.  Admittedly, these measures are somewhat 
sensitive to market size, so we experimented with alternative measures of competition 
and calculated a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) by facility and county-specialty.  We 
inserted HHI into our facility entry and exit models instead of our measures of overlap 
and non-overlap density.  However, we found that HHI produced no consistently 
significant effects for either ASCs or hospitals.12  We even included these HHI measures 
along with overlap and non-overlap density order to observe whether our observed effects 
                                                 
12 We found that HHI has no consistent effect on ASC entry/exit – the coefficients switch signs – and has 
no significant effect upon HOSP entry/exit. 
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disappeared but found that they were robust to the inclusion of these additional 
independent variables. 
We included county-specialty level measures of niche overlap and non-overlap 
density within our facility entry models.  As with the competition variables that we 
included in our models of facility exit, we gradually broke these variables down into 
smaller components.  Initially, we calculated these figures at the level of the HSA for our 
first model.  Then, we broke them down by facility type in the second model.  In the third 
model, we assumed that the county-level variables represented local competition and that 
diffuse competition was represented by all other counties within the HSA.  Finally, we 
introduced both distinctions – facility type and geographic location – simultaneously in 
the fourth model to examine their combined effect. 
B. Procedure Demand 
1. Facility Exit 
Having established our measures of niche overlap and non-overlap density, we 
included a number of additional variables in our models in order to control for a number 
of other factors that might affect a facility’s likelihood of exit.  First and foremost was the 
size of demand within the surgical specialties that a facility serves, which represents the 
environmental carrying capacity.  In order to measure market demand, we generated 
quarterly procedure counts by patient county code instead of by facility code.13  We then 
aggregated these procedure counts across each specialty that a facility participates in 
                                                 
13 We recoded out of state residents with the county for the facility in which they were treated, which was 
deemed to be a reasonable assumption in light of the fact that the vast majority of patients (81%) visited an 
outpatient facility in their home county. 
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based upon our definition of specialty participation.  This procedure generated two 
separate sets of procedure counts; we included outpatient procedure counts within our 
exit models for ASCs and hospitals while we included the inpatient counts for hospitals 
only.  These procedure counts were deemed to be a reasonable proxy for the level of 
demand within the markets that a facility serves.  As with our measures of competition, 
each of these demand statistics was broken down by facility type (ASC vs. hospital) and 
geographic location (local vs. diffuse). 
2. Facility Entry 
Levels of procedure demand are likely to affect the likelihood of facility entry and 
so we included in our entry models a variable representing the size of demand within 
each county-specialty, which represents the environmental carrying capacity.  Once 
again, we generated quarterly procedure counts at the county-specialty level from patient 
county codes, and these procedure counts were deemed to be a reasonable proxy for the 
level of demand within each market.  We generated these quarterly procedure counts 
from both the inpatient and outpatient datasets, which produced two separate sets of 
procedure counts; we included outpatient procedure counts within our entry models for 
ASCs and hospitals while we included the inpatient counts for hospitals only.  As with 
our measures of competition, each of these demand statistics was broken down by facility 
type (ASC vs. hospital) and geographic location (local vs. diffuse). 
C. Physician Statistics 
1. Facility Exit 
The setting for this study is unique in that outpatient facilities not only compete 
for procedures but also for physician referrals.  It is typically surgeons that refer patients 
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to a given outpatient facility and patients rarely disagree with their choice of facility 
(Kouri et al., 2002; Lynk & Longley, 2002).  These relationships that exist between 
surgery centers and their physicians may affect exit probabilities such that a facility’s 
likelihood of exit depends on the extent to which the facility depends upon its surgeons 
and vice versa.  To that end, we included some measures that control for these 
relationships. 
Conveniently, there is an ID code representing the operating physician in each 
record of the outpatient dataset.  These physician IDs were cross-tabulated with facility 
IDs in order to determine where these surgeons are performing their procedures.  By 
generating these quarterly procedure counts, we were able to ascertain how facilities 
divide procedure volume across surgeons and how surgeons divide procedure volume 
among facilities, which allowed us to produce a variety of control variables that depict 
the multi-dimensional relationships that exist between facilities and their physicians.  We 
also experimented with weighting these measures by each surgeon’s contribution to 
facility procedure volume in order to give more weight to high volume surgeons.  
However, this approach had no discernable impact on our results and so we included the 
unweighted measures in our models. 
To begin, we produced a simple count of the number of surgeons operating within 
a facility in any given quarter.  We also included a control that represents the average 
number of facilities that the facility’s surgeons are utilizing for their outpatient 
procedures.  Taking into account procedure volume to represent facility and physician 
dependence on one another, we also produced a measure of physician-facility inter-
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dependence (PFI) (Feldman & Wholey, 1999; Marsh & Feinstein, 1997; Wholey & 
Burns, 2000).  It was calculated according to the following formula: 
 
ifacility   toadmitted jphysician for  surgeries ofPercent 
jphysician  from coming ifacility in  surgeries ofPercent FIP =  
jphysician by  performed surgeries ofnumber  Total
ifacility in  jphysician by  performed surgeries ofNumber 
ifacility in  performed surgeries ofnumber  Total
ifacility in  jphysician by  performed surgeries ofNumber 
FIP =  
Higher values of the PFI indicate that the physician has relatively more leverage over the 
facility while lower values indicate that the facility has more leverage.  We included 
within our model the average PFI across all physicians operating within a facility. 
2. Facility Entry 
The availability of surgeons is likely to contribute significantly to facility entry 
and so we experimented with the inclusion of a measure representing the supply of 
practicing surgeons within our entry models.  Our method of calculating the supply of 
physicians within each county-specialty proceeded in same manner that we employed 
when calculating facility niche overlap density at the county-specialty level.  We began 
by dividing up each surgeon’s total procedure volume by county and surgical specialty.  
Using the dataset that we cross-tabulated by facility and physician IDs, we attributed 
surgeons to the county in which their outpatient facility resided and calculated separate 
overlap weights for each county in which a surgeon practiced.14  We then added these 
niche overlap weights in order to produce the fractional number of surgeons that operated 
within each county-specialty. 
                                                 
14 We made this assumption because Florida did not provide data on each surgeon’s county of residence. 
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We considered including these measures of physician supply in our entry models 
and we also considered weighting them by procedure volume in order to distinguish 
between high- and low-volume surgeons.  However, we ultimately determined that both 
the weighted and unweighted measures were highly collinear with our measures of 
procedure demand and so we excluded them entirely from our entry models.  As an 
alternative, we considered modeling facility entry and exit as a function of surgeon entry 
and exit but were unable to do so.  The quarterly number of procedures at the facility-
physician level was so low that our method of calculating physician entry and exit 
produced a large number of false-positives and false-negatives; without physician 
licensure data, was no way of validating these entries and exits like we did with 
outpatient facilities.  We opted not to pursue this approach rather than including such 
erroneous measures of physician supply. 
D. Control Variables 
1. Facility Exit 
We also included a number of facility-level control variables in our model that 
emerged from our panel dataset as well as the Florida licensure data.  For example, we 
previously mentioned the “liability of newness,” which suggests that relatively 
inexperienced firms are more likely to exit than firms that have more experience 
(Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983).  To control for this effect, we added a covariate 
representing firm age to our model.  Firm age was calculated from the entry dates 
provided by the Florida licensure dataset, which we validated with the dates produced by 
our outpatient procedure volume dataset. 
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Although surgery centers and hospitals occupy different macro-niches, there are 
relative specialists and generalists among each type of organizational form.  For example, 
some multi-specialty ASCs perform every imaginable surgical procedure while there are 
specialty hospitals that participate in only one surgical specialty.  To that end, we 
included a variable to control for the possibility that specialists or generalists among 
either organizational form may have a higher likelihood of exit.  We calculated the 
number of surgical specialties in which each facility participates – based upon our 
definition of specialty participation – and we included this variable in our model to 
control for this effect.  Alternatively, we experimented with dividing our sample of 
surgery centers and hospitals in half based upon the median number of specialties in 
which they participated and including dummy variables representing the specialists and 
generalists among each type of facility.  However, we ultimately decided to include our 
continuous measure of organizational specialization because it offered much more detail 
than these dummy variables and maintained a closer correlation with our measures of 
competition and market demand that were based upon the specialties in which a facility 
participates. 
We controlled for the fact that some procedures are more generously reimbursed – 
and are therefore more profitable – than others and that this characteristic is likely to 
affect a facility’s likelihood of exit, depending on the specialties that the facility serves.  
Although we would have ideally measured reimbursement-cost ratios directly, we were 
unable to generate data representing either reimbursement rates or average facility costs 
by procedure type.  Instead, we included variables representing payer type under the 
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presumption that certain types of payers reimburse providers more generously than 
others.  The Florida outpatient dataset also includes a field that describes the payer for 
each procedure in the dataset.  Using the payer field, we cross-tabulated facility 
procedure counts by payer in the same way that we did to generate physician statistics.  
These procedure counts can be divided by a facility’s total procedure volume in each 
quarter in order to calculate the proportion of a facility’s procedure volume that is 
reimbursed by each type of payer.  Although there are a total of 16 different payer codes 
in the Florida outpatient dataset, we collapsed these codes into three categories: public, 
private, and other.15  Variables representing the proportion of a facility’s business that is 
reimbursed by public and private payers were included in our models while other payers 
were omitted from our model as a comparison group. 
We also included several other control variables that emerged from facility 
licensure data provided by the state of Florida.  For example, the state provided data on 
the size of the facilities in our sample.  For surgery centers, size was represented by the 
number of operating rooms; for hospitals, it was represented by the total number of beds.  
The state maintains a record of the profit status of its outpatient facilities and so we 
included a dummy variable in our model representing whether each facility is a for-profit 
or non-profit entity.  The state also provided data on each facility’s ownership type, 
which we assigned to the following categories: corporation, partnership, government, and 
                                                 
15 Public payers include Medicare, Medicare HMO, Medicaid, Medicaid HMO, VA, other state/local 
government, and Kidcare.  Private payers include commercial insurance, commerical HMO/PPO, and self 
pay.  Other payers include workers’ compensation, CHAMPUS, other, charity, and unknown. 
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other.16  In our surgery center exit models, we included dummies representing 
corporation and partnership ownership while omitting all other ownership types.  In our 
hospital exit models, we included dummies representing corporation and government 
ownership.  The state of Florida also provided data on each facility’s administrator and 
owner names as well as the owner file number and FEIN number for hospitals.  By cross-
referencing these identifiers, we were able to determine whether each facility was owned 
by an ASC or hospital chain, which we included as a dummy variable in our models.   
2. Facility Entry 
We also included a variety of control variables at the county and county-specialty 
level in order to control for characteristics that would make a facility more likely to enter 
a given market.  Beginning first with our county-specialty controls, we accounted for the 
possibility that certain specialties are reimbursed more generously than others, and that 
this characteristic is likely to influence facility entry patterns.  Since we could not 
assemble reimbursement-cost ratios representing the contribution margin of surgical 
procedures, we included measures representing payer participation rates instead.  In order 
to do so, we cross-tabulated our county-specialty procedure counts by payer in the same 
way that we cross-tabulated the facility procedure counts by payer for our facility exit 
models.  Dividing each of these procedure counts by total procedure volume allowed us 
to calculate the proportion of each specialty’s procedure volume within each county that 
                                                 
16 Corporate owned facilities include any incorporated entity including S corporations.  Partnerships include 
LTD, LLC, and similar joint ventures between multiple entities or individuals.  Government owned 
facilities include ownership by a county, city/county, state, or hospital district.  Other ownership types 
included individual and church ownership. 
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was reimbursed by each type of payer.17  Once again, we grouped together private, 
public, and other payers while including only the variables representing private and 
public payers in our entry models.  We broke these variables down in order to observe 
whether they were dependent upon facility type (ASC vs. hospital) or geographic location 
(local vs. diffuse). 
We also obtained figures representing the number of each county’s residents that 
were enrolled in Medicaid.  These data emerged from reports of Medicaid eligibles that 
were generated on a monthly basis by Florida’s Agency for Health Care Administration.  
The figures also included children under the age of 18 that had been enrolled in Florida’s 
S-CHIP program, KidCare.  Although these figures were provided on a monthly basis, we 
averaged them across the three months within each quarter in order to generate quarterly 
estimates of total Medicaid beneficiaries.  From these estimates, we calculated the 
proportion of Medicaid enrollees within each HSA and then broke these figures down by 
geographic location (local vs. diffuse). 
We also included a number of demographic and economic variables in order to 
model facility entry as a function of general environmental munificence; these measures 
represent exogenous determinants of market demand that are not directly related to 
facility and physician supply.  These variables were measured only at the county level 
and did not distinguish between specialties.  Moreover, the statistics themselves were 
collected annually and were not available on a quarterly basis like the other variables 
included in our empirical models.  We obtained data from the U.S. Census Bureau on the 
                                                 
17 For observations at the county-specialty-quarter level in which there was no procedure volume, the 
proportion of procedures reimbursed by each type of payer sometimes could not be calculated because it 
required division by zero.  Instead, we replaced each of these values with zeros. 
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population size within each county and divided these variables by age (0-64 and 65+).  
We also experimented with including measures of population density instead of 
population size but found that they did not affect the impact of overlap and non-overlap 
density.18  Census data also permitted us to calculate the proportion of minority residents 
(e.g., Hispanic, Black, Indian, Asian) within each county.  Additionally, we included 
variables representing the per capita income for the residents within each county; these 
estimates were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis Local Area Personal 
Income files.  Finally, we included estimates of the proportion each county’s population 
living below the federal poverty line and these figures came from the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates.  Once again, we calculated these 
variables initially at the HSA level and then divided them up by geographic location 
(local vs. diffuse) in order to account for their geographic effects. 
VIII. EMPIRICAL MODELS 
Our empirical models estimate a firm’s likelihood of entering and exiting markets 
as a function of market and firm characteristics, respectively.  For our exit models, the 
unit of observation is the individual firm.  In the case of our entry models, the firm does 
not yet exist so our unit of observation is the market and niche, which is represented by 
the county-specialty.  Since firm entry and exit occur simultaneously, there is no explicit 
equilibrium within this market.  There is a great deal of turnover as firms continuously 
enter and exit the market for outpatient procedures.  In order to address this issue, we ran 
our empirical models with an alternative specification.  Rather than studying entry and 
                                                 
18 Comparing the population size and density results, we found that the coefficients for population density 
(0-64) remained significantly positive but the negative coefficients for population density (65+) became 
significant across the board. 
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exit separately, we calculated the net change in the number of firms by subtracting the 
quarterly number of exits from entries and modeling these dependent variables as a 
function of market characteristics.19  Since the results from these two approaches did not 
differ substantively from each other, we modeled market entry and exit separately in 
order to follow the example of previous research in this arena. 
A. Facility Exit 
 The first component of this study assesses a facility’s likelihood of exit as a 
function of market competition, demand conditions, physician practice patterns, and 
facility controls.  The appropriate unit of observation here is an individual firm and so the 
unit of observation in our exit dataset is the facility-quarter.  The mathematical 
representation of this model was presented earlier in this paper by the following equation: 
(4.1) Pr(Exitit) = β0 + β1OverlapDensityjt-1 + β2NonoverlapDensityjt-1 + 
β3DemandSizejt-1 + β4PhysicianStatisticsit-1 + β5FirmControlsit-1 + εit 
where OverlapDensityjt-1 is a variable representing the overlap density for specialties 
within market j that are served by facility i, NonoverlapDensityjt-1  is a variable 
representing the non-overlap density for specialties within market j that are served by 
facility i, DemandSizejt-1 is a variable representing the size of demand for specialties 
within market j that are being served by facility i, PhysicianStatisticsit-1 is a vector of 
facility-level physician statistics that we described (e.g., KBR, etc.), and FirmControlsit-1 
is a vector of facility-level control variables (e.g., age, etc.). 
                                                 
19 We found that the factors that contributed to an increase in the number of firms were essentially the same 
factors that contributed to market entry.  Not surprisingly, these variables displayed opposite coefficients in 
our models of market exit. 
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Recall that we validated the entry and exit dates produced by our panel dataset 
with more precise dates provided by the AHCA licensure database and coded a separate 
variable to represent an exit event when the facility’s reason for exit was deemed to be 
valid.  However, there is a shortcoming to the way we dealt with exit timing in our 
model.  We model a facility’s probability of exit at time t as a function of overlap and 
non-overlap density at time t.  The difference between these two explanatory variables is 
the number of firms at time t, which is a mechanical function of firm exit.  In order to 
avoid this problem, we lagged all of our right-hand side variables by one quarter.  
Including these lags made even more sense in light of the fact that the last quarter in 
which a surgery center appears in the dataset is frequently an anomalous quarter for the 
facility.  As volume drops off in the last quarter of operation, its patient case mix may 
change in unusual ways, which may produce similar changes among our measures of 
competition and procedure demand.  This characteristic of the data corroborated the 
decision to lag our explanatory variables by one quarter.20 
Given that we are analyzing exit rates over a short period of time, there is a large 
proportion of left- and right-censored observations.  Thus, an event history model was 
deemed to be the most appropriate specification (Allison, 1995).  In particular, a Cox 
proportional hazard model can be utilized here because it avoids the need to choose a 
                                                 
20 Lagging all the time-varying variables in our model by one quarter this reduced the number of exits in 
our model because facilities that only operated for one quarter (e.g., facilities that closed in 1997Q1 or 
opened 2006Q4) were automatically excluded from our sample. 
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functional form and accommodates time-varying covariates (Cox, 1972).21  Recall that 
the Cox model estimates a hazard rate of the following form: 
(3.2) ( ) ( ) ix0i etth βλ=  
which has been reformulated slightly to fit our exit model: 
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This proportional hazard is estimated through maximum likelihood, which adjusts the β 
coefficients to maximize the probability that the next event occurred to the observation(s) 
that actually did experience an event.  Thus, only the order of events affects the partial 
likelihood and so there is some efficiency loss as a result of the fact that the timing of exit 
is ignored.  We considered the possibility of including a continuous time variable in our 
exit models and then interacting that variable with measures of legitimacy and 
competition in order to assess whether the timing of exit was a product of changing 
market conditions.  But we found that preliminary analyses along these lines produced no 
significant results and so we quickly abandoned this approach. 
 Although the unit of observation in our dataset is the facility-quarter, we assigned 
each of these quarters start and end dates because we had more specific data on the 
                                                 
21 We validated the robustness of our results by running accelerated failure time models with an exponential 
distribution. 
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timing of market entry and exit.  Additionally, Cox proportional hazard models are easier 
to implement with days than with quarters.  For example, the first quarter of 1997 begins 
on January 1, 1997 and ends just before April 1, 1997.  We replaced these dates with 
more precise dates from the AHCA licensure database when facilities entered or exited 
the market.  A separate variable was also coded to represent an exit event where there 
was concordance between these datasets and the reason for exit was deemed to be valid.  
When the Cox model encountered an exit, it assumed that the facility remained in the 
dataset up until the end date listed for that quarter and estimated each facility’s 
probability of exit as a function of the covariate values at that point in time. 
As we have already discussed, we broke down our explanatory variables by 
facility type (surgery center vs. hospital) and geographic location (local vs. diffuse), and 
introduced these distinctions in a relatively gradual manner in order to demonstrate how 
the results compare to one another.  The first model included every set of variables at the 
highest possible level, the second model broke them down by facility type (ASC vs. 
hospital), the third model broke them down by geographic location (local vs. diffuse), and 
the fourth model broke them down both by facility type and geographic location.  We 
introduced these distinctions in a relatively gradual manner because the number of 
explanatory variables in our model increased rapidly as we divided them into smaller 
components.  Table 7 simplifies this breakdown by summarizing each of our independent 
variables and the models that they appear in.  The fact that our facility exit dates emerged 
from AHCA licensure data meant that we rarely encountered ties in our data.  
Nevertheless, we used the Efron approximation method for handling ties because it is 
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regarded as more accurate than the Breslow method (Allison, 1995).  As with our facility 
exit models, we estimated our Cox proportional hazard models of facility exit with 
STATA version 10 and reported coefficient estimates instead of hazard ratios. 
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Table 7: Summary of Independent Variables Included in Facility Exit Models 
Category Facility Type Location Variable Model Description 
Firm Controls   Facility ageit 1,2,3,4 Amount of time (in days) that has elapsed since facility i was founded 
   Number of ORsi 1,2,3,4 Number of operating rooms in surgery center i 
   Number of bedsi 1,2,3,4 Number of beds in hospital i 
   For-profit facilityi 1,2,3,4 Dummy variable indicating whether facility i is a for-profit entity 
   Ownership chaini 1,2,3,4 Dummy variable indicating whether facility i is owned by a chain 
   Corporation ownedi 1,2,3,4 Dummy variable indicating whether facility i is owned by an incorporated entity 
 
  Partnership ownedi 1,2,3,4 Dummy variable indicating whether surgery center i is owned by an LTD, LLC or 
similar joint venture 
   Government ownedi 1,2,3,4 Dummy variable indicating whether hospital i is owned by a government entity 
 
  Other ownedi 1,2,3,4 Dummy variable indicating whether facility i is owned by a single individual or 
government entity 
   Pct public payit 1,2,3,4 Percent of facility i’s procedure volume that is reimbursed by public payers 
   Pct private payit 1,2,3,4 Percent of facility i’s procedure volume that is reimbursed by private payers 
   Pct other payit 1,2,3,4 Percent of facility i’s procedure volume that is reimbursed by other payers 
   Nbr of specialtiesit 1,2,3,4 Dummy variable representing surgery centers that participate in five or more 
specialties or hospitals that participate in fifteen specialties 
Physician Statistics   Total nbr of MDsit 1,2,3,4 Number of physicians operating within facility i 
   Avg nbr of facilitiesit 1,2,3,4 Average number of facilities utilized by the surgeons practicing in facility i 
   Avg kick-butt ratioit 1,2,3,4 Average kick-butt ratio (KBR) for the surgeons practicing in facility i 
Competition   Overlapkt 1 Overlap density for all outpatient facilities operating within facility i’s health 
service area 
   Nonoverlapkt 1 Non-overlap density for all outpatient facilities operating within facility i’s health 
service area 
 ASC  Overlapkt 2,4 Overlap density for ASCs operating within facility i’s health service area 
 ASC  Nonoverlapkt 2,4 Non-overlap density for ASCs operating within facility i’s health service area 
 HOSP  Overlapkt 2,4 Overlap density for hospitals operating within facility i’s health service area 
 HOSP  Nonoverlapkt 2,4 Non-overlap density for hospitals operating within facility i’s health service area 
  Local Overlapkt 3,4 Overlap density for all outpatient facilities operating within facility i’s county 
  Local Nonoverlapkt 3,4 Non-overlap density for all outpatient facilities operating within facility i’s county
  Diffuse Overlapkt 3,4 Overlap density for all outpatient facilities operating within facility i’s health 
service area but not its county 
  Diffuse Nonoverlapkt 3,4 Non-overlap density for all outpatient facilities operating within facility i’s health 
service area but not its county 
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Category Facility Type Location Variable Model Description 
Outpatient Demand   Nbr of procedureskt 1 Quarterly number of outpatient procedures within the specialties served by facility 
i in its health service area 
 ASC  Nbr of procedureskt 2,4 Quarterly number of ASC outpatient procedures within the specialties served by 
facility i in its health service area 
 HOSP  Nbr of procedureskt 2,4 Quarterly number of hospital outpatient procedures within the specialties served 
by facility i in its health service area 
  Local Nbr of procedureskt 3,4 Quarterly number of outpatient procedures within the specialties served by facility 
i in its county 
  Diffuse Nbr of procedureskt 3,4 Quarterly number of outpatient procedures within the specialties served by facility 
i in its health service area but not its county 
Inpatient Demand   Nbr of procedureskt 1 Quarterly number of outpatient procedures within the specialties served by facility 
i in its health service area 
  Local Nbr of procedureskt 3,4 Quarterly number of outpatient procedures within the specialties served by facility 
i in its county 
  Diffuse Nbr of procedureskt 3,4 Quarterly number of outpatient procedures within the specialties served by facility 
i in its health service area but not its county 
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B. Facility Entry 
Modeling market entry is somewhat more difficult than modeling firm exit 
because the unit of observation is the local market and niche rather than an individual 
firm.  Recall that our dependent variable is the number of facilities that entered a county-
specialty during each quarter, which we modeled as a function of each specialty’s 
characteristics within each county.  This is expressed mathematically by the following 
equation: 
(2.1) Pr(Entryjkt) = β0 + β1OverlapDensityjkt-1 + β2NonoverlapDensityjkt-1 + 
β3DemandSizejkt-1 + β4MarketControlsjkt-1 + εjkt 
where OverlapDensityjkt-1 is a variable representing the overlap density within specialty j 
and county k, NonoverlapDensityjkt-1 is a variable representing the non-overlap density 
within specialty j and county k, DemandSizejkt-1 is a variable representing the size of 
demand within specialty j and county k, and MarketControlsjkt-1 is a vector of market-
level control variables (e.g., payer breakdown, population demographics, etc.) within 
specialty j and county k. 
 Although we validated the entry timing produced by our panel dataset with the 
entry dates available from the AHCA licensure data, we aggregated these entries by 
quarter since our dependent variable was the quarterly number of entries within a county-
specialty.  Once again, we found that calculating a facility’s probability of entry at time t 
as a function of overlap and non-overlap density at time t was problematic.  Overlap and 
non-overlap density are separated by the number of firms at time t, which is a function of 
firm entry by definition.  To counter this issue, we lagged all of our right-hand side 
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variables by one quarter much like we did with our facility exit models.  This modeled 
our dependent variable, the quarterly number of entries within a county-specialty in 
quarter t, as a function of our independent variables in quarter t-1. 
Given that our dependent variable is a count of the number of facility entries 
within each county-specialty-quarter, the most appropriate estimation technique is a 
count regression model.  Equation (2.2) displays the Poisson regression model: 
 (2.2) ( ) ( ) ixi etth βλ0=  and nxxx
x
eee
eL βββ
β
+++= K21
1
1  
However, one disadvantage of the Poisson model is that it imposes an assumption on the 
variance of the conditional expectation of the dependent variable.  If this assumption is 
violated, overdispersion will result and the standard errors will be biased downwards so 
the null hypothesis will be rejected too infrequently.  For count data on organizational 
founding, the variance may often exceed the main since prior research shows that 
founding rates depend on the number of recent foundings (Delacroix & Carroll, 1983; 
Ranger-Moore, Banaszak-Holl, & Hannan, 1991).  Equation (2.3) displays the negative 
binomial regression model that may instead be used to counter issues relating to 
overdispersion: 
(2.3) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]
!
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xyE−=  for y = 0, 1,…, n 
We utilized negative binomial regression to estimate our model but we also validated the 
robustness of our results by running a Poisson regression model as well.  One of the 
assumptions of the negative binomial model is that all the observations be independent.  
However, we know that facility entries within a county-specialty may not be independent 
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since multi-specialty facilities enter more than one specialty at a given point in time.  So 
we clustered our standard errors by county in order to allow for intragroup correlation, 
which relaxed the requirement that the observations be independent.  We also included 
year and quarter dummy variables in order to control for any time trends present in the 
data.  We experimented with the notion of interacting a continuous time variable with 
other explanatory variables in order to test whether the order of entry was sequential as a 
result of changing legitimacy and competitive conditions.  However, we opted not to 
pursue this avenue when we found that none of these interactions was significant. 
Once again, we broke down each category of explanatory variables by facility 
type (surgery center vs. hospital) and geographic location (local vs. diffuse) in four 
separate models.  The first model included every set of variables at the highest possible 
level, the second model broke them down by facility type (ASC vs. hospital), the third 
model broke them down by geographic location (local vs. diffuse), and the fourth model 
broke them down both by facility type and geographic location.  Table 8 summarizes 
each of our independent variables and the models in which they appear.  We estimated 
our negative binomial models of facility entry with STATA version 10 and ran the 
models separately for ASCs and hospitals.
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Table 8: Summary of Independent Variables Included in Facility Entry Models 
Category Facility Type Location Variable Model Description 
Competition   Overlapjkt 1 Overlap density within specialty j for outpatient facilities operating within county 
k’s health service area 
   Nonoverlapjkt 1 Non-overlap density within specialty j for outpatient facilities operating within 
county k’s health service area 
 ASC  Overlapjkt 2,4 Overlap density within specialty j for ASCs operating within county k’s health 
service area 
 ASC  Nonoverlapjkt 2,4 Non-overlap density within specialty j for ASCs operating within county k’s health 
service area 
 HOSP  Overlapjkt 2,4 Overlap density within specialty j for hospitals operating within county k’s health 
service area 
 HOSP  Nonoverlapjkt 2,4 Non-overlap density within specialty j for hospitals operating within county k’s 
health service area 
  Local Overlapjkt 3,4 Overlap density within specialty j for all outpatient facilities operating within 
county k 
  Local Nonoverlapjkt 3,4 Non-overlap density within specialty j for all outpatient facilities operating within 
county k 
  Diffuse Overlapjkt 3,4 Overlap density within specialty j for all outpatient facilities operating within all 
other counties in county k’s health service area 
  Diffuse Nonoverlapjkt 3,4 Non-overlap density within specialty j for all outpatient facilities operating within 
all other counties in county k’s health service area 
Outpatient Demand   Nbr of proceduresjkt 1 Quarterly number of outpatient procedures for specialty j within county k’s health 
service area 
 ASC  Nbr of proceduresjkt 2,4 Quarterly number of ASC outpatient procedures for specialty j within county k’s 
health service area 
 HOSP  Nbr of proceduresjkt 2,4 Quarterly number of hospital outpatient procedures for specialty j within county k’s 
health service area 
  Local Nbr of proceduresjkt 3,4 Quarterly number of outpatient procedures for specialty j within county k 
  Diffuse Nbr of proceduresjkt 3,4 Quarterly number of outpatient procedures for specialty j within all other counties 
in county k’s health service area 
Inpatient Demand   Nbr of proceduresjkt 1 Quarterly number of inpatient procedures for specialty j within county k’s health 
service area 
  Local Nbr of proceduresjkt 3,4 Quarterly number of inpatient procedures for specialty j within county k 
  Diffuse Nbr of proceduresjkt 3,4 Quarterly number of inpatient procedures for specialty j within all other counties in 
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Category Facility Type Location Variable Model Description 
county k’s health service area 
Payer Type   Pct public payjkt 1,2 Percent of procedure volume within specialty j that is reimbursed by public payers 
in county k’s health service area 
   Pct public payjkt 3,4 Percent of procedure volume within specialty j that is reimbursed by public payers 
within county k 
   Pct public payjkt 3,4 Percent of procedure volume within specialty j that is reimbursed by public payers 
within all other counties in county k’s health service area 
   Pct private payjkt 1,2 Percent of procedure volume within specialty j that is reimbursed by private payers 
in county k’s health service area 
   Pct private payjkt 3,4 Percent of procedure volume within specialty j that is reimbursed by private payers 
within county k 
   Pct private payjkt 3,4 Percent of procedure volume within specialty j that is reimbursed by private payers 
within all other counties in county k’s health service area 
   Pct other paykt 1,2 Percent of procedure volume within specialty j that is reimbursed by other payers in 
county k’s health service area 
   Pct other payjkt 3,4 Percent of procedure volume within specialty j that is reimbursed by other payers 
within county k 
   Pct public payjkt 3,4 Percent of procedure volume within specialty j that is reimbursed by other payers 
within all other counties in county k’s health service area 
County Controls   Population (0-64) 1,2 Size of the population age 0-64 within county k’s health service area 
  Local Population (0-64) 3,4 Size of the population age 0-64 within county k 
  Diffuse Population (0-64) 3,4 Size of the population age 0-64 within all other counties in county k’s health service 
area 
   Population (65+) 1,2 Size of the population age 65+ within county k’s health service area 
  Local Population (65+) 3,4 Size of the population age 65+ within county k 
  Diffuse Population (65+) 3,4 Size of the population age 65+ within all other counties in county k’s health service 
area 
   Pct minority 1,2 Percent of the population that is a racial minority within county k’s health service 
area 
  Local Pct minority 3,4 Percent of the population that is a racial minority within county k 
  Diffuse Pct minority 3,4 Percent of the population that is a racial minority within all other counties in county 
k’s health service area 
   Per capita income 1,2 Per capita income within county k’s health service area 
  Local Per capita income 3,4 Per capita income within county k 
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Category Facility Type Location Variable Model Description 
  Diffuse Per capita income 3,4 Per capita income within all other counties in county k’s health service area 
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IX. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
A. Procedure Volume 
The descriptive statistics generated from the inpatient and outpatient datasets 
reveal several trends that confirm our expectations.  While the number of inpatient 
procedures has remained relatively constant over the past ten years, the number of 
outpatient procedures has nearly doubled.  Not surprisingly, a growing proportion of 
these procedures is being performed in surgery centers.  Meanwhile, procedure volume 
within general hospitals has increased only slightly during this time period.  Figure 9 
presents this breakdown by procedure and facility type. 
Figure 9: Number of Surgical Procedures in Florida (1997-2006), by Setting 
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Some procedures categories have benefited from this technological innovation more than 
others.  For example, we see a tremendous increased in the number of gastroenterological 
procedures performed on an outpatient basis.  Figure 10 presents the breakdown by multi-
level CCS chapter in order to illustrate this trend and the key below this figure outlines 
the type of procedures that each CCS chapter relates to. 
Figure 10: Number of Surgical Procedures in Florida (1997-2006), by CCS Chapter 
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 CCS 1 – Nervous system 
CCS 2 – Endocrine system 
CCS 3 – Eye 
CCS 4 – Ear 
CCS 5 – Nose, mouth, and pharynx 
CCS 6 – Respiratory system 
CCS 7 – Cardiovascular system 
CCS 8 – Hemic and lymphatic system 
 CCS 9 – Digestive system 
CCS 10 – Urinary system 
CCS 11 – Male genital organs 
CCS 12 – Female genital organs 
CCS 13 – Obstetrical procedures 
CCS 14 – Musculoskeletal system 
CCS 15 – Integumentary system 
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Figures like this can easily be assembled at the level of the health service area, county, or 
each individual facility in order to study the competitive dynamics of local health care 
markets.  This is illustrated with the case study that appears at the end of this section of 
the paper. 
As mentioned previously, Florida is a convenient study site because of its unique 
age distribution.  Although elderly individuals constitute approximately 17% of its 
population, they undergo roughly half of all outpatient surgical procedures within the 
state.  Even more notable is the fact that there is a strong seasonal trend in elderly 
utilization of outpatient procedures that appears to mirror demographic trends in the state.  
Outpatient procedure volume spikes in the winter when elderly individuals travel to 
Florida from colder climates and then drops significantly in the summer when many 
elderly residents leave Florida to escape the humid weather.  Figure 11 presents these 
seasonal trends in utilization by age group. 
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Figure 11: Number of Outpatient Surgeries in Florida (1997-2006), by Age Group 
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The lighter lines represent older age groups and demonstrate more seasonal volatility than 
the darker lines; this is particularly true of the 70-79 age group, which has the highest 
level of utilization for outpatient procedures.  There is also a counter-cyclical trend 
among non-elderly residents, as procedure volume for the youngest age groups tends to 
spike in the summer months.  This most likely stems from the fact that surgery centers 
respond to the seasonal variation among elderly populations by substituting procedures 
for younger patients in order to smooth demand and reduce unused capacity.  This 
seasonal variation in outpatient procedure volume varies significantly by geographic 
location and exhibits more volatility in communities with more snowbirds and sunbirds, 
for example in south and central Florida (Smith & House, 2006). 
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B. Facility Entry and Exit 
Not surprisingly, the number of surgery centers has increased significantly during 
the time period of interest.  From 1997 to 2006, a total of 193 surgery centers entered the 
market for outpatient surgery in Florida and a total of 51 surgery centers exited, yielding 
a net increase of 142 surgery centers.22  Figure 12 presents the number of surgery center 
entries and exits within the state of Florida from 1997 to 2006. 
Figure 12: Number of Surgery Center Entries and Exits (1997-2006) 
 
 
The number of surgery center entries exceeds the number of exits in most years, although 
there is somewhat of a counter-cyclical relationship between the two.  Years in which 
                                                 
22 Four facilities in the Florida outpatient dataset were assigned pro code of “99”, indicating that their 
facility type was “unknown”.  Although the facility names and patient case mixes suggested that they were 
surgery centers, we excluded these facilities from our analysis because they did not have corresponding 
records in the AHCA database. 
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there are an especially large number of entries tend to be characterized by relatively few 
exits and vice versa. 
 There was also a slight increase in the number of general hospitals from 1997 to 
2006.  During this time period, a total of 10 hospitals entered the market for outpatient 
procedures and 9 hospitals exited the market, yielding a net increase of 1 hospital.  
Although the total number does not change very much during this time period, the fact 
that hospitals are entering and exiting does suggest that these markets are relatively 
competitive.  Figure 13 presents the number of hospital entries and exits within the state 
of Florida from 1997 to 2006. 
Figure 13: Number of Hospital Entries and Exits (1997-2006) 
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Like the market for surgery centers, there appears to be a counter-cyclical relationship 
between the number of hospital entries and exits.  We find that most hospital exits occur 
relatively early in our sample period and most hospital entries occur relatively late in the 
study period. 
C. Surgical Specialty 
Having collapsed the 244 procedure types from the single-level CCS software to 
the 15 procedure chapters in the multi-level CCS software, we were able to calculate the 
number of surgical specialties in which each facility participates, which was based upon 
our definition of specialty participation.  Figure 14 presents a histogram representing this 
measure of specialty participation for both general hospitals and surgery centers. 
Figure 14: Histogram of Specialty Participation (2006Q4), by Facility Type 
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There are predictable differences between them in that surgery centers participate in 
fewer surgical specialties than general hospitals.  However, there are also some clear 
areas of overlap between them as we see specialists and generalists among both types of 
facilities.  Surgery centers, in particular, appear to have a bimodal distribution that peaks 
once for single-specialty surgery centers and then again around 11 or 12 surgical 
specialties for generalists.  Hospitals, on the other hand, are comprised primarily of 
general hospitals that participate in all 15 surgical specialties and specialty hospitals that 
participate in fewer specialties. 
Examining these trends more closely, we find that surgery centers have become 
more specialized as general hospitals have become slightly less specialized over time.  
Figure 15 illustrates this trend by graphing the average specialty participation of both 
surgery centers and general hospitals over time. 
 112 
Figure 15: Average Specialty Participation (1997-2006), by Facility Type 
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From 1997 to 2006, the average specialty participation for surgery centers in Florida 
decreased from 6.16 to 5.50 surgical specialties.  Meanwhile, the average specialty 
participation for general hospitals in Florida jumped up in 1999 and then declined 
gradually through 2006.  The net result of these changes was a slight increase in average 
specialty participation from 12.46 to 12.97 surgical specialties.  This bifurcation within 
our sample is what one might predict to occur as procedure demand increases, local 
markets become more crowded, and each type of firm seeks a niche that seeks to mitigate 
the impact of direct competition with other firms.  Surgery centers significantly narrowed 
their niches in order to capitalize on the advantages of specialization while general 
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hospitals broadened their niches slightly in order to benefit from the advantages of 
diversification. 
 Of course, these changes in organizational niche may not be a deliberate strategy 
on the part of surgery centers and hospitals.  They may instead reflect the niches of 
facilities that enter and exit the market.  As it turns out, expansion and contraction 
account for a very small proportion of these aggregate changes and generally tend to 
cancel each other out in each quarter.  Surgery centers entering and exiting the market for 
outpatient procedures have a smaller niche than surgery centers remaining in the market, 
which would suggest that more specialized surgery centers were both entering and exiting 
the market more frequently than generalists.  However, the average specialty 
participation for surgery centers declined over time because entries occurred at roughly 
twice the rate of exits, which caused the pool of surgery centers to become more 
specialized over time.  This is interesting because it demonstrates that the observed 
market trends were driven primarily by more specialized surgery centers, which exhibited 
considerably more turnover than the generalists. 
D. Summary Statistics 
1. Facility Exit 
In order to summarize the constructs that we have previously described, we 
generated descriptive statistics for the independent variables in our exit models.  Each 
facility in our sample was associated with a different number of observations since 
facilities were included within our panel dataset for different lengths of time and varying 
numbers of quarters.  In order to weigh each facility equally and avoid biasing these 
summary statistics in favor of facilities that had been operating longest, we took the 
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average value of each variable across all quarters in which each facility operated.  Once 
each facility was represented as a single observation, we averaged these figures across all 
the facilities in our sample.  Tables 9 and 10 display summary statistics for the 
independent variables in our surgery center and hospital exit models, respectively. 
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Table 9: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables in ASC Exit Models 
Category Facility Type Location Variable Model Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Firm Controls   Facility age 1,2,3,4 406 1827.103 1078.069 75.000 3768.840
   Number of ORs 1,2,3,4 406 2.732 1.552 1.000 12.000
   For-profit facility 1,2,3,4 406 0.963 0.189 0.000 1.000
   Ownership chain 1,2,3,4 406 0.212 0.409 0.000 1.000
   Corporation owned 1,2,3,4 406 0.584 0.494 0.000 1.000
   Partnership owned 1,2,3,4 406 0.340 0.474 0.000 1.000
   Other owned 1,2,3,4 406 0.076 0.266 0.000 1.000
   Pct public pay 1,2,3,4 406 0.506 0.227 0.000 1.000
   Pct private pay 1,2,3,4 406 0.436 0.208 0.000 1.000
   Pct other pay 1,2,3,4 406 0.058 0.085 0.000 0.724
   Nbr of specialties 1,2,3,4 406 5.628 4.442 1.000 14.125
Physician Statistics   Total nbr of MDs 1,2,3,4 406 18.657 21.421 1.000 112.550
   Avg nbr of facilities 1,2,3,4 406 2.839 0.949 1.000 7.875
   Avg PFI 1,2,3,4 406 0.533 2.250 0.018 43.399
Competition   Overlap 1 406 22.012 19.278 0.343 75.719
   Nonoverlap 1 406 18.812 18.443 0.109 72.923
 ASC  Overlap 2 406 14.327 11.263 0.112 52.251
 ASC  Nonoverlap 2 406 10.155 10.264 0.000 43.670
 HOSP  Overlap 2 406 9.690 9.972 0.022 43.684
 HOSP  Nonoverlap 2 406 8.656 9.120 0.075 41.453
  Local Overlap 3 406 9.761 8.920 0.031 43.172
  Local Nonoverlap 3 406 8.166 8.304 0.000 33.008
  Diffuse Overlap 3 406 14.256 14.302 0.000 64.726
  Diffuse Nonoverlap 3 406 10.645 12.066 0.000 63.497
 ASC Local Overlap 4 406 5.878 4.951 0.000 22.387
 ASC Local Nonoverlap 4 406 4.529 4.644 0.000 18.893
 ASC Diffuse Overlap 4 406 8.449 8.441 0.000 42.242
 ASC Diffuse Nonoverlap 4 406 5.626 6.831 0.000 36.940
 HOSP Local Overlap 4 406 3.883 4.514 0.003 23.832
 HOSP Local Nonoverlap 4 406 3.637 4.263 0.000 22.489
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 HOSP Diffuse Overlap 4 406 5.807 6.493 0.000 26.705
 HOSP Diffuse Nonoverlap 4 406 5.019 5.691 0.000 26.557
Outpatient Demand   Nbr of procedures 1 406 30704.100 27301.750 1049.909 118852.800
 ASC  Nbr of procedures 2 406 14759.160 11751.710 681.925 55415.550
 HOSP  Nbr of procedures 2 406 15944.930 16829.030 138.714 74810.530
  Local Nbr of procedures 3 406 13251.350 13242.970 206.719 64919.580
  Diffuse Nbr of procedures 3 406 17452.740 18157.750 0.000 78589.830
 ASC Local Nbr of procedures 4 406 6361.651 5404.305 110.000 28113.330
 ASC Diffuse Nbr of procedures 4 406 8397.512 8325.038 0.000 43731.000
 HOSP Local Nbr of procedures 4 406 6889.701 8378.182 15.969 42218.950
 HOSP Diffuse Nbr of procedures 4 406 9055.233 10658.160 0.000 44960.300
 
Table 10: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables in Hospital Exit Models 
Category Facility Type Location Variable Model Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Firm Controls   Facility age 1,2,3,4 222 3589.622 790.991 31.000 4641.750
   Number of beds 1,2,3,4 222 285.793 289.731 15.000 2139.000
   For-profit facility 1,2,3,4 222 0.401 0.491 0.000 1.000
   Ownership chain 1,2,3,4 222 0.455 0.499 0.000 1.000
   Corporation owned 1,2,3,4 222 0.730 0.445 0.000 1.000
   Government owned 1,2,3,4 222 0.131 0.338 0.000 1.000
   Other owned 1,2,3,4 222 0.140 0.347 0.000 1.000
   Pct public pay 1,2,3,4 222 0.474 0.142 0.000 0.856
   Pct private pay 1,2,3,4 222 0.475 0.137 0.129 1.000
   Pct other pay 1,2,3,4 222 0.051 0.054 0.000 0.520
   Nbr of specialties 1,2,3,4 222 12.803 3.371 0.000 15.000
Physician Statistics   Total nbr of MDs 1,2,3,4 222 111.592 90.110 1.625 518.525
   Avg nbr of facilities 1,2,3,4 222 2.525 0.765 0.143 4.557
   Avg PFI 1,2,3,4 222 0.249 0.521 0.018 3.845
Competition   Overlap 1 222 36.974 24.281 0.000 78.000
   Nonoverlap 1 222 3.038 5.419 0.000 33.876
 ASC  Overlap 2 222 21.532 12.480 0.000 42.405
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 ASC  Nonoverlap 2 222 1.826 3.394 0.000 22.511
 HOSP  Overlap 2 222 19.528 14.423 0.000 45.167
 HOSP  Nonoverlap 2 222 1.213 2.454 0.000 18.999
  Local Overlap 3 222 16.449 12.523 0.000 40.385
  Local Nonoverlap 3 222 0.963 2.331 0.000 16.595
  Diffuse Overlap 3 222 24.611 17.757 0.000 70.456
  Diffuse Nonoverlap 3 222 2.076 3.719 0.000 24.396
 ASC Local Overlap 4 222 8.940 6.110 0.000 19.600
 ASC Local Nonoverlap 4 222 0.585 1.399 0.000 8.242
 ASC Diffuse Overlap 4 222 12.591 9.444 0.000 38.287
 ASC Diffuse Nonoverlap 4 222 1.241 2.392 0.000 16.334
 HOSP Local Overlap 4 222 7.509 7.184 0.000 23.615
 HOSP Local Nonoverlap 4 222 0.378 1.124 0.000 10.752
 HOSP Diffuse Overlap 4 222 12.019 9.315 0.000 41.081
 HOSP Diffuse Nonoverlap 4 222 0.835 1.603 0.000 8.340
Outpatient Demand   Nbr of procedures 1 222 55531.130 35798.190 0.000 122344.800
 ASC  Nbr of procedures 2 222 21373.760 12602.090 0.000 46294.000
 HOSP  Nbr of procedures 2 222 34157.370 24890.450 0.000 77204.640
  Local Nbr of procedures 3 222 23544.860 18744.800 0.000 59976.770
  Diffuse Nbr of procedures 3 222 31986.280 24045.560 0.000 106566.800
 ASC Local Nbr of procedures 4 222 8743.538 6110.781 0.000 20860.880
 ASC Diffuse Nbr of procedures 4 222 12630.220 9222.056 0.000 38074.450
 HOSP Local Nbr of procedures 4 222 14801.320 13352.680 0.000 44281.410
 HOSP Diffuse Nbr of procedures 4 222 19356.060 15870.720 0.000 74918.000
Inpatient Demand   Nbr of procedures 1,2 222 27154.840 19133.660 0.000 64632.880
  Local Nbr of procedures 3,4 222 11575.800 9902.556 0.000 34958.590
  Diffuse Nbr of procedures 3,4 222 15579.040 12440.650 0.000 60253.820
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Breaking down these summary statistics by facility type allows us to compare 
surgery centers to hospitals.  For example, our facility controls indicate that the hospitals 
in our sample are considerably older (3,590 vs. 1,827 days) and participate in more 
surgical specialties (12.8 vs. 5.6 specialties) than our surgery centers, which isn’t 
surprising.  However, the surgery centers are much more likely to be for-profit facilities 
(96.3% vs. 40.1%) and less likely to be owned by a chain (21.2% vs. 45.5%).  Our 
physician statistics suggest that hospitals utilize more surgeons than surgery centers 
(111.6 vs. 18.6 surgeons) and that these surgeons have more leverage over surgery 
centers than hospitals as evidenced by their higher PFI values (0.533 vs. 0.249). 
Although our competition variables initially appear to suggest that surgery centers 
encounter lower niche overlap density and higher niche non-overlap density than 
hospitals, this is primarily a function of the fact that they participate in fewer specialties 
than hospitals.  In fact, surgery centers and hospitals generally compete with an 
equivalent number of outpatient facilities when we ignore the distinction between niche 
overlap and non-overlap.  Likewise, it might be tempting to suggest that surgery centers 
participate in specialty markets with lower levels of procedure volume but this also 
results from the fact that they participate in fewer specialties than hospitals. 
2. Facility Entry 
We present similar statistics for the independent variables in our entry models.  
Rather than including each facility as an observation, we calculated our summary 
statistics from all of the observations since it was a balanced panel dataset.  There are a 
total of 40,200 observations in our entry models because the unit of observation is the 
county-specialty-quarter: 67 counties × 15 specialties × 40 quarters = 40,200 
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observations.  We presented these summary statistics for all observations and did not 
distinguish between hospitals and surgery centers since these figures did not vary by 
facility type; we simply calculated each facility’s probability of entry as a function of 
these county-specialty-quarter characteristics.  Table 11 displays summary statistics for 
the independent variables in our entry models. 
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Table 11: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables in Facility Entry Models 
Category Facility Type Location Variable Model Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Competition   Overlap 1 40200 1.799 3.302 0.000 27.663
   Nonoverlap 1 40200 25.184 20.123 1.548 89.766
 ASC  Overlap 2 40200 1.012 2.190 0.000 18.290
 ASC  Nonoverlap 2 40200 14.165 11.624 0.000 59.000
 HOSP  Overlap 2 40200 0.787 1.464 0.000 16.934
 HOSP  Nonoverlap 2 40200 11.019 9.672 0.407 46.904
  Local Overlap 3 40200 0.446 1.164 0.000 16.155
  Local Nonoverlap 3 40200 6.244 8.467 0.000 44.894
  Diffuse Overlap 3 40200 1.353 2.599 0.000 26.211
  Diffuse Nonoverlap 3 40200 18.940 16.388 0.000 82.782
 ASC Local Overlap 4 40200 0.251 0.792 0.000 10.009
 ASC Local Nonoverlap 4 40200 3.520 4.950 0.000 24.997
 ASC Diffuse Overlap 4 40200 0.760 1.747 0.000 16.636
 ASC Diffuse Nonoverlap 4 40200 10.646 9.752 0.000 55.000
 HOSP Local Overlap 4 40200 0.195 0.514 0.000 9.146
 HOSP Local Nonoverlap 4 40200 2.725 3.992 0.000 25.953
 HOSP Diffuse Overlap 4 40200 0.592 1.125 0.000 15.520
 HOSP Diffuse Nonoverlap 4 40200 8.294 7.489 0.000 43.904
Outpatient Demand   Nbr of procedures 1 40200 2225.093 4213.847 1.000 47304.000
 ASC  Nbr of procedures 2 40200 956.348 2252.075 0.000 24954.000
 HOSP  Nbr of procedures 2 40200 1268.745 2389.245 1.000 26110.000
  Local Nbr of procedures 3 40200 565.234 1525.518 0.000 26345.000
  Diffuse Nbr of procedures 3 40200 1659.859 3280.609 0.000 46448.000
 ASC Local Nbr of procedures 4 40200 242.719 779.355 0.000 14934.000
 ASC Diffuse Nbr of procedures 4 40200 713.629 1762.360 0.000 24551.000
 HOSP Local Nbr of procedures 4 40200 322.515 903.378 0.000 15672.000
 HOSP Diffuse Nbr of procedures 4 40200 946.230 1850.197 0.000 25320.000
Inpatient Demand   Nbr of procedures 1,2 40200 1102.304 1989.015 0.000 15135.000
  Local Nbr of procedures 3,4 40200 278.277 726.329 0.000 8906.000
  Diffuse Nbr of procedures 3,4 40200 824.027 1546.030 0.000 14941.000
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Payer Type   Pct public pay 1 40200 0.438 0.163 0.000 0.899
 ASC  Pct public pay 2 40200 0.350 0.236 0.000 1.000
 HOSP  Pct public pay 2 40200 0.452 0.154 0.000 0.880
  Local Pct public pay 3 40200 0.460 0.220 0.000 1.000
  Diffuse Pct public pay 3 40200 0.431 0.183 0.000 1.000
 ASC Local Pct public pay 4 40200 0.324 0.294 0.000 1.000
 ASC Diffuse Pct public pay 4 40200 0.340 0.249 0.000 1.000
 HOSP Local Pct public pay 4 40200 0.468 0.226 0.000 1.000
 HOSP Diffuse Pct public pay 4 40200 0.445 0.177 0.000 1.000
   Pct private pay 1 40200 0.508 0.157 0.064 1.000
 ASC  Pct private pay 2 40200 0.529 0.264 0.000 1.000
 HOSP  Pct private pay 2 40200 0.498 0.149 0.083 1.000
  Local Pct private pay 3 40200 0.466 0.214 0.000 1.000
  Diffuse Pct private pay 3 40200 0.487 0.182 0.000 1.000
 ASC Local Pct private pay 4 40200 0.422 0.325 0.000 1.000
 ASC Diffuse Pct private pay 4 40200 0.499 0.284 0.000 1.000
 HOSP Local Pct private pay 4 40200 0.457 0.220 0.000 1.000
 HOSP Diffuse Pct private pay 4 40200 0.477 0.175 0.000 1.000
   Pct other pay 1 40200 0.054 0.063 0.000 0.540
 ASC  Pct other pay 2 40200 0.060 0.106 0.000 1.000
 HOSP  Pct other pay 2 40200 0.050 0.058 0.000 0.471
  Local Pct other pay 3 40200 0.050 0.081 0.000 1.000
  Diffuse Pct other pay 3 40200 0.051 0.064 0.000 1.000
 ASC Local Pct other pay 4 40200 0.055 0.124 0.000 1.000
 ASC Diffuse Pct other pay 4 40200 0.056 0.106 0.000 1.000
 HOSP Local Pct other pay 4 40200 0.046 0.082 0.000 1.000
 HOSP Diffuse Pct other pay 4 40200 0.048 0.059 0.000 1.000
Market Controls   Population (0-64) 1,2 40200 813800.000 795476.700 121779.000 3660695.000
  Local Population (0-64) 3,4 40200 202184.900 340859.600 5550.000 2060359.000
  Diffuse Population (0-64) 3,4 40200 611615.100 625181.800 0.000 3597333.000
   Population (65+) 1,2 40200 163395.100 155885.900 19129.000 603917.000
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  Local Population (65+) 3,4 40200 42600.350 64447.820 675.000 341849.000
  Diffuse Population (65+) 3,4 40200 120794.800 123492.600 0.000 592505.000
   Pct minority 1,2 40200 0.276 0.104 0.100 0.677
  Local Pct minority 3,4 40200 0.254 0.137 0.064 0.815
  Diffuse Pct minority 3,4 40200 0.264 0.118 0.000 0.798
   Per capita income 1,2 40200 27764.660 6393.681 17301.900 50549.290
  Local Per capita income 3,4 40200 24887.300 8238.906 12032.590 57445.930
  Diffuse Per capita income 3,4 40200 26679.030 8298.582 0.000 54535.170
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Breaking down these variables by facility type and geographic location in the 
manner described means that many of these variables add up to one another.  For 
example, adding the density figures for ASCs and hospitals (model 2) or local and diffuse 
facilities (model 3) yields aggregate overlap and non-overlap density within an HSA 
(model 1).  Adding the combined breakdown of these variables (model 4) produces the 
same effect.  Similarly, we find that the variables representing total counts (e.g., 
procedure demand, population) add up when we sum them across facility type and 
geographic location.23  This phenomenon serves as an excellent check on the internal 
validity of our constructs.  Although the variables in our exit model representing 
proportions, averages, or medians do not possess this additive property, we can still 
perform a quick visual check of these figures since they consist of weighted averages. 
Examining these summary statistics more closely yields several interesting 
observations.  Among our competition variables, we find that the values of the variables 
representing niche overlap density are considerably smaller than the variables 
representing niche non-overlap density since each observation at the county-specialty 
level represents just 1 of 15 specialties within each county.  For these and most other 
variables in our model, we also find that the local figures are considerably smaller than 
the diffuse figures since the local values relate to only one county whereas the diffuse 
values usually describe several other counties within an HSA.  Looking at our payer 
controls, we find that the market is split almost evenly between public and private payers 
                                                 
23 The breakdown of our variables representing the proportion of procedure volume reimbursed by each 
type of payer frequently add up to less than one because we replaced values that couldn’t be calculated (due 
to division by zero) with zeros.  Averaging in these zeros means that the averages often don’t add up to 
one. 
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(43.8% vs. 50.8%) but that ASCs treat a lower proportion of patients covered by public 
payers (35.0% vs. 45.2%). 
X. RESULTS 
A. Facility Exit 
Our Cox proportional hazard models yielded log likelihood statistics that were 
highly significant (p ≤ 0.0001).  They produced a pseudo R-squared of 0.152 for our ASC 
exit model (Model 4) and 0.199 for our hospital exit model (Model 4), which represents 
the explanatory power of the independent variables (Allison, 1995; Magee, 1990).  Our 
models generally produced coefficients with the expected signs but we ran accelerated 
failure time models with an exponential distribution to check the robustness of our results 
and found that none was substantively different.  Tables 12 and 13 present the results 
from our Cox proportional hazard models. 
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Table 12: Surgery Center Exit – Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
Category Facility Location Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
      Breakdown(s) 
  Facility Geography Facility 
Geography 
  Observations 9695 9695 9695 9695 
  Number of subjects 396 396 396 396 
  Number of failures 50 50 50 50 
  Log likelihood -260.4859 -253.6074 -258.5369 -251.0884 
  Likelihood Ratio Chi2 32.24 46 36.14 51.04 
  Prob > Chi2 0.0060 0.0003 0.0068 0.0010 
Model 
Statistics 
  Generalized R2 0.0782 0.1097 0.0872 0.1209 
Controls     Facility age 0.000146 0.000129 0.000171 0.000142 
   Number of ORs -0.0569 -0.0903 -0.125 -0.136 
   For-profit facility -1.208*** -1.290*** -1.309*** -1.365*** 
   Ownership chain 0.111 0.212 0.145 0.212 
   Corporation owned -0.356 -0.478 -0.247 -0.331 
   Partnership owned -0.727 -0.839 -0.583 -0.746 
   Pct public pay 0.33 0.9 0.627 1.536 
   Pct private pay 1.062 1.484 1.203 1.928 
     Nbr of specialties 0.0798 0.0771 0.092 0.083 
  Total nbr of MDs -0.0221* -0.0218* -0.0248** -0.0233* 
  Avg nbr of facilities 0.0197 0.136 0.00468 0.13 
Physician 
Statistics 
  Avg PFI 0.00475 0.00458 0.00451 0.00434 
Overlap 0.0517 0.158*** 0.116* 0.286*** Local 
Nonoverlap -0.0291* -0.0959** -0.0223 -0.0868 
Overlap   0.0246 0.105 
ASC 
Diffuse 
Nonoverlap   -0.0304 -0.0973 
Overlap  0.0312  -0.0325 Local 
Nonoverlap  0.032  0.022 
Overlap    0.0623 
Competition 
HOSP 
Diffuse 
Nonoverlap       0.0331 
Local Nbr of procedures -3.47E-05 -0.00019*** -5.49E-05 -0.00030***ASC 
Diffuse Nbr of procedures   -2.36E-05 -0.000135* 
Local Nbr of procedures  1.28E-06  5.45E-05 
Outpatient 
Demand 
HOSP 
Diffuse Nbr of procedures       -2.13E-05 
Note: Entry/exit dates validated by licensure data. Time-varying independent variables lagged by one 
quarter. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13: Hospital Exit – Cox Proportional Hazard Model  
Category Facility Location Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
      Breakdown(s) 
  Facility Geography Facility 
Geography
  Observations 7621 7621 7621 7621 
  Number of subjects 221 221 221 221 
  Number of failures 9 9 9 9 
  Log likelihood -35.3112 -31.2408 -32.0864 -26.9391 
  Likelihood Ratio Chi2 24.46 32.6 30.91 41.21 
    Prob > Chi2 0.0799 0.0267 0.0564 0.0296 
Model 
Statistics 
  Generalized R2 0.1048 0.1371 0.1305 0.1701 
Controls     Facility age -0.000277 -0.000381 -0.000441 -0.000502 
   Number of beds -0.00101 -3.47E-06 -0.000562 0.00123 
   For-profit facility 0.352 0.13 -0.0843 -0.206 
   Ownership chain 0.0035 -0.25 0.239 -0.165 
   Corporation owned -0.998 -0.172 -1.27 0.332 
   Government owned -0.381 -0.259 -0.431 0.257 
   Pct public pay -3.023 0.00828 -2.668 0.201 
   Pct private pay -7.174** -4.988 -6.826** -4.339 
     Nbr of specialties -0.155 -0.171 -0.204 -0.354 
    Total nbr of MDs -0.0152 -0.0153 -0.0233 -0.0246 
  Avg nbr of facilities 0.739 0.912 0.548 0.671 Physician Statistics 
    Avg PFI -1.038 -1.426 -0.173 -0.716 
Overlap 0.126* 0.443** 0.152 0.41 Local 
Nonoverlap -0.05 -0.059 0.0286 -0.0289 
Overlap   0.241* 0.924** 
ASC 
Diffuse 
Nonoverlap   -0.108 -0.0248 
Overlap  0.424**  0.326 Local 
Nonoverlap  -0.134  0.247 
Overlap    0.667* 
Competition 
HOSP 
Diffuse 
Nonoverlap    -0.678 
Local Nbr of procedures -0.000154** -0.00062*** 2.19E-05 -0.000405 ASC 
Diffuse Nbr of procedures  -0.00018** -0.00038*** -0.0013** 
Local Nbr of procedures    2.73E-05 
Outpatient 
Demand 
HOSP 
Diffuse Nbr of procedures       -0.000396*
Local Nbr of procedures 0.000151** 2.83E-05 -6.99E-05 -3.86E-05 Inpatient 
Demand HOSP Diffuse Nbr of procedures     0.000337* 6.88E-05 
Note: Entry/exit dates validated by licensure data. Time-varying independent variables lagged by one 
quarter. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Higher levels of market demand for outpatient procedures from ASCs are 
associated with a lower probability of ASC exit (Models 2 and 4, p < 0.05) while higher 
levels of demand for hospital procedures are associated with a higher likelihood of exit 
(Models 4, p < 0.05).  Hospital exit also has a negative association with levels of 
outpatient demand from ASCs (Models 2 and 4, p < 0.05) and from hospitals (Models 2 
and 4, p < 0.10), though the diffuse effects appear to be much stronger than local effects.  
For both ASCs and hospitals, a higher number of practicing physicians is associated with 
a significantly lower likelihood of exit in all models (Models 1 to 4, p < 0.01).  We also 
found that for-profit surgery centers had a significantly lower likelihood of exit than non-
profit surgery centers (Models 1 to 4, p < 0.01) and that the number of specialties that 
surgery centers participated in had a negative relationship with exit rates (Models 2 and 
4,  p < 0.05) such that multi-specialty surgery centers had a higher likelihood of exit. 
Regarding our hypotheses, an encouraging sign is the fact that our predictions 
issued from niche overlap theory appear to hold true in this setting.  We find strong 
support for hypothesis 1, which suggests that niche overlap density is positively related to 
the exit rate, and more limited support for hypothesis 2, which suggests that niche non-
overlap density is negatively related to the exit rate.  Niche overlap density among ASCs 
is associated with significantly higher ASC exit rates (Models 2 and 4, p < 0.01) while 
niche non-overlap density among ASCs is associated with significantly lower ASC exit 
rates (Model 2, p < 0.05).  ASCs do not appear to be affected at all by hospital niche 
overlap or non-overlap.  We also find evidence that niche overlap among outpatient 
facilities is positively associated with hospital exit rates (Model 1, p < 0.05) and this 
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appears to be true of both ASC niche overlap (Models 2 and 4, p < 0.05) and hospital 
niche overlap (Model 2, p < 0.05).  We find no effect of niche non-overlap on hospital 
exit among either type of facility. 
We also find support for the hypotheses suggesting that asymmetric competition 
exists between different organizational forms.  Our results lend strong support to 
hypothesis 5 since we found that ASC niche overlap is positively associated with hospital 
exit rates (Models 2 and 4, p < 0.05).  Competition with overlapping ASCs is associated 
with elevated hospital exit rates. However, we find somewhat more limited support for 
hypothesis 4 since hospital overlap density appears to have no relationship surgery center 
exit rates.  Table 14 summarizes our results by presenting the predicted coefficients 
alongside the actual coefficients produced by our models. 
Table 14: Predicted and Actual Coefficients for Exit Models 
  Niche Overlap Density   Niche Non-Overlap Density
  ASC HOSP    ASC HOSP 
ASC + –  ASC –  Predicted Coefficients Exit by HOSP + +  Exit by HOSP  – 
          
  ASC HOSP    ASC HOSP 
ASC +++   ASC --  Actual Coefficients1 Exit by HOSP ++ ++  Exit by HOSP   
1 Actual results emerge from model 2, which is broken down by facility type. 
+++ p<0.01, ++ p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
Although we had suggested that ASCs would benefit from legitimacy and resource 
spillovers posed by the presence of nearby hospitals with overlapping niches, there are 
several reasons to believe that these empirical results may not necessarily disprove 
hypothesis 6.  Within the lower left-hand table, the upper right-hand cell representing the 
neutral relationship between hospital overlap density and ASC exit rate still stands in 
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stark contrast to the other cells in the that table which display significantly positive 
coefficients. 
The fact that the effects of overlap density are so striking in every other 
circumstance suggests at the very least that ASCs are not hurt by the presence of 
hospitals with overlapping niches.  Perhaps the detrimental effect of competition with 
overlapping facilities and the beneficial effects of operating in markets with nearby 
hospitals tend to cancel each other out.  Alternatively, it is possible that the competitive 
advantage enjoyed by surgery centers permits them to function autonomously without 
being affected – either positively or negatively – by hospitals.  In fact, surgery centers 
may simply be forced to locate near general hospitals in order to accommodate surgeons 
who practice in both ASCs and hospitals or because they must transport emergency cases 
to a nearby hospital. 
B. Facility Entry 
Our negative binomial models yielded log likelihood statistics that were highly 
significant (p < 0.0001).  Although our negative binomial models do not produce R-
squared statistics, the Poisson models that we ran from this same data produced a 
generalized R-squared of 0.1720 for our ASC entry model (Model 4) and 0.1466 for our 
hospital entry model (Model 4).  Tables 15 and 16 present the results from our negative 
binomial models. 
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Table 15: Surgery Center Entry – Negative Binomial Model  
Category Facility Location Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     Breakdown(s) 
  Facility Geography Facility 
Geography 
    Observations 39195 39195 39195 39195 
  Log likelihood -4080.4817 -4056.3550 -3804.9750 -3754.1365 
  Likelihood Ratio Chi2 458.23 561.52 1574.49 3820.24 
  Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Model 
Statistics 
    Pseudo R2     
Overlap 0.03 0.0267 0.00854 0.0597 Local 
Nonoverlap -0.0434 -0.0456 -0.0174 -0.0218 
Overlap   0.174*** 0.144*** 
ASC 
Diffuse 
Nonoverlap   0.0239 0.0359 
Overlap  -0.00126  -0.185 Local 
Nonoverlap  -0.137*  -0.126* 
Overlap    0.166* 
Competition 
HOSP 
Diffuse 
Nonoverlap       -0.0868 
Local Nbr of procedures -5.37E-06 -1.87E-05 4.27E-05 -1.45E-05 ASC 
Diffuse Nbr of procedures   -7.87e-05** -6.88E-05 
Local Nbr of procedures  -3.81E-05  7.21E-05 
Procedure 
Demand 
HOSP 
Diffuse Nbr of procedures    -0.000122**
Local Pct public pay -2.322*** 1.280*** -0.748* 0.852*** ASC 
Diffuse Pct public pay   0.0827 0.958*** 
Local Pct public pay  -4.502***  -1.185*** HOSP Diffuse Pct public pay    -0.389 
Local Pct private pay -2.989*** 0.912*** -0.43 0.931*** ASC Diffuse Pct private pay   -0.853 0.604** 
Local Pct private pay  -4.861***  -0.793** 
Payer Type 
HOSP Diffuse Pct private pay       -0.962 
 Local Population (0-64) 1.62e-06* 2.00e-06** 3.13e-06*** 4.14e-06***
 Diffuse    -2.25E-07 2.60E-07 
 Local Population (65+) 2.38E-06 7.49E-06 -9.91E-07 2.73E-06 
 Diffuse    -3.48E-06 9.18E-07 
 Local Pct minority -6.418** -6.755** -4.019*** -4.626*** 
 Diffuse    -1.435 -1.187 
 Local Per capita income 8.74e-05** 6.39E-05 6.28e-05*** 4.80e-05***
Market 
Controls 
 Diffuse    1.97E-05 5.26E-06 
  Quarter 2 dummy -0.232 -0.221 -0.231 -0.222 
  Quarter 3 dummy -0.146 -0.128 -0.143 -0.137 
  Quarter 4 dummy -0.297 -0.29 -0.302 -0.305 
  Year 1998 dummy 0.0222 0.0562 -0.027 -0.0373 
  Year 1999 dummy -0.319 -0.456 -0.404 -0.601 
  Year 2000 dummy -0.871 -1.038* -0.933 -1.198** 
  Year 2001 dummy -0.980* -1.103** -1.075** -1.294** 
  Year 2002 dummy -0.242 -0.363 -0.371 -0.601 
Model 
Controls 
  Year 2003 dummy -0.232 -0.337 -0.416 -0.645 
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  Year 2004 dummy -0.269 -0.363 -0.524 -0.742 
  Year 2005 dummy -1.045 -1.092 -1.358** -1.542*** 
  Year 2006 dummy -1.139 -1.187 -1.513** -1.694** 
    Constant -2.282* -0.543 -3.873*** -3.646*** 
Note: Entry/exit dates validated by licensure data. Standard errors clustered by county. Time-varying 
independent variables lagged by one quarter. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 16: Hospital Entry – Negative Binomial Model  
Category Facility Location Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
      Breakdown(s) 
  Facility Geography Facility 
Geography 
    Observations 36180 36180 36180 36180 
  Log likelihood -729.5888 -693.1557 -636.2516 -547.1926 
  Likelihood Ratio Chi2 40234.06 . 38204.60 127103.88 
  Prob > Chi2 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000 
Model 
Statistics 
    Generalized R2         
Overlap -0.230* -0.400*** -0.902*** -0.712** Local 
Nonoverlap -0.088 -0.0923 -0.421*** -0.156 
Overlap   0.104 -0.163 
ASC 
Diffuse 
Nonoverlap   0.202 0.138 
Overlap  -0.533  -2.056** Local 
Nonoverlap  -0.616**  -2.493** 
Overlap    0.384 
Competition 
HOSP 
Diffuse 
Nonoverlap    0.292 
Local Nbr of procedures 0.000114 0.000270* 0.000297** 0.000423 ASC 
Diffuse Nbr of procedures   0.000105 0.000277 
Local Nbr of procedures  -5.38E-05  -0.000396 
Outpatient 
Demand 
HOSP 
Diffuse Nbr of procedures       6.85E-06 
Local Nbr of procedures -6.07E-06 -9.45E-06 2.26E-05 0.000121* Inpatient 
Demand HOSP Diffuse Nbr of procedures   -4.49E-05 -3.15E-05 
Local Pct public pay -2.096 0.516 -0.432 0.162 ASC 
Diffuse Pct public pay   -2.712 1.642* 
Local Pct public pay  -2.628  -0.422 HOSP Diffuse Pct public pay    -5.182*** 
Local Pct private pay -3.183 -0.805* -0.633 -0.615** ASC Diffuse Pct private pay   -5.018** 1.009* 
Local Pct private pay  -2.663  0.103 
Payer  Type 
HOSP Diffuse Pct private pay       -7.166*** 
 Local Population (0-64) 3.16e-06* 6.10e-06*** 9.72e-06*** 2.09e-05***
 Diffuse    1.94E-06 2.45E-06 
 Local Population (65+) -1.62E-06 1.97E-05 1.95E-05 6.94e-05** 
 Diffuse    -3.99e-05** -4.12e-05**
 Local Pct minority -7.405 -6.008 -5.459 -2.635 
 Diffuse    -6.816 -6.903 
 Local Per capita income 5.27E-05 -4.15E-05 8.38E-05 -1.79E-05 
Market 
Controls 
 Diffuse      6.86E-05 0.000157***
  Quarter 2 dummy -0.581 -0.515 -0.644 -0.643 
  Quarter 3 dummy -0.319 -0.227 -0.466 -0.417 
  Quarter 4 dummy -0.989 -0.888 -1.151 -1.088 
  Year 1998 dummy 1.705 1.109 2.805 2.177 
  Year 1999 dummy -14.64*** -14.73*** -12.65*** -13.68*** 
  Year 2000 dummy -14.75*** -14.76*** -12.77*** -13.65*** 
Model 
Controls 
  Year 2001 dummy 1.468 1.504 2.592 2.668 
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  Year 2002 dummy 2.394* 2.291* 3.371** 3.350* 
  Year 2003 dummy 1.53 1.465 2.366 2.43 
  Year 2004 dummy 1.471 1.433 2.039 1.899 
  Year 2005 dummy 2.259* 2.314* 2.633** 2.876** 
    Constant -3.867 -1.258 -5.817 -6.095 
Note: Entry/exit dates validated by licensure data. Standard errors clustered by county. Model excludes 
observations from 1997. Time-varying independent variables lagged by one quarter. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Our models generally produced coefficients with the expected signs but we ran 
Poisson models to check the robustness of our results and found that none were 
substantively different.  Higher levels of market demand for outpatient procedures are 
associated with a higher probability of ASC entry (Models 1 to 4, p < 0.05) while 
hospital entry is only positively associated with outpatient demand from ASCs (Model 4, 
p < 0.05) and inpatient demand (Model 2, p < 0.05).  The proportion of procedures 
reimbursed by each payer type appeared to affect ASC entry rates considerably more than 
hospital entry rates.  ASC entry rates were significantly higher when ASCs are 
reimbursed predominantly by public and private payers (Models 2 and 4, p < 0.05) and 
when hospitals are reimbursed predominantly by other payers (Models 2 and 4, p < 0.05).  
Hospital entry rates were significantly higher when diffuse facilities and diffuse hospitals 
receive a low proportion of reimbursements from private payers (Models 3 and 4, p < 
0.01). 
As expected, both ASC and hospital entry rates had a positive relationship with 
the size of the population age 0-64 (Models 2 to 4, p < 0.05) but hospital entry rates had a 
negative relationship with the diffuse size of the population age 65+ (Model 3, p < 0.05).  
Across the board, ASCs tended to enter markets in which there were a relatively low 
proportion of minority residents (Models 1 to 4, p < 0.05).  Per capita income also had 
the expected positive relationship with facility entry rates, although ASC entries were 
affected more strongly by local per capita income (Models 3 and 4, p < 0.01) while 
hospital entries were affected more strongly by diffuse income levels (Models 3 and 4, p 
< 0.05). 
 135 
Regarding our hypotheses, an encouraging sign is the fact that hospital entry 
patterns correspond with what we would expect of a mature organizational population.   
We find strong support for hypothesis 1, which suggests that hospital entry rates are 
negatively related to niche overlap density among outpatient facilities (Model 3, p < 
0.01), which includes ASCs and hospitals (Model 4, p < 0.05).  We failed to find any 
support for hypothesis 2, which suggests that non-overlap density is positively related to 
the hospital entry rate.  In fact, we actually found a negative relationship between hospital 
non-overlap density and hospital entry rates (Model 2 and 4, p < 0.05), which is 
somewhat surprising.  In spite of our non-overlap findings, our findings about the effect 
of overlap density are fairly encouraging because they suggest that entry patterns within a 
mature organizational population behave as they should in this market, which indicates 
that hospitals can serve as a baseline control group to which we can compare the entry 
patterns of surgery centers. 
 To that end, we do find evidence to support the notion that surgery centers display 
entry patterns in direct opposition to those of hospitals.  We find support for hypothesis 3 
as our results indicate that surgery center entry rates are positively related to niche 
overlap density among diffuse outpatient facilities (Models 3, p < 0.01) and particularly 
among surgery centers (Model 4, p < 0.01).  However, surgery center entry rates no 
significant relationship with hospitals overlap density.  We find no support for hypothesis 
8 since surgery center entry rates appear to bear no relationship with ASC non-overlap 
density.  However, they display a weakly positive relationship with hospital non-overlap 
density (Model 2 and 4, p < 0.01).  This last finding is somewhat surprising but may be 
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an extension of hypothesis 4 in that surgery centers may seek out markets with 
overlapping ASCs and avoid markets with non-overlapping hospitals as an indication of 
how desirable these markets are. 
Taken together, these results provide support for the idea that firms within a 
growing organizational population tend to seek out crowded niches.  This is the exact 
opposite phenomenon of what we observed from hospitals.  Table 17 summarizes our 
results by presenting our predicted coefficients alongside the actual coefficients produced 
by our entry models. 
Table 17: Predicted and Actual Coefficients for Entry Models 
  Niche Overlap Density   Niche Non-Overlap Density
  ASC HOSP    ASC HOSP 
ASC + –  ASC –  Predicted Coefficients Entry by HOSP – –  Entry by HOSP  + 
          
  ASC HOSP    ASC HOSP 
ASC +++   ASC   Actual Coefficients1 Entry by HOSP -- --  Entry by HOSP  -- 
1 Actual results emerge from model 4, which is broken down by facility type and geographic location.  We 
do not distinguish between local and diffuse effects here; statistical significance associated with either 
effect is considered sufficient. 
+++ p<0.01, ++ p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
Although we did not find any significant effect of niche non-overlap for either type of 
facility, there is a plausible explanation for this fact.  In the case of surgery centers, recall 
that we had actually hypothesized that ASC non-overlap might influence firm entry in 
two different directions.  Our density dependence theory suggested that the legitimacy 
benefits of ASCs with non-overlapping niches would lead to higher levels of ASC entry.  
On the other hand, our theory of r-selection processes suggested that ASCs might avoid 
markets with high niche non-overlap density since these values indicate that the markets 
are relatively undesirable.  Although we did not find support for one theory or the other, 
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these mixed results may indicate that some combination of both forces is at play and that 
these effects tend to cancel out each other. 
C. Additional Findings 
Taken together, the results from our entry and exit models yield some interesting 
findings.  For example, our results are consistent with the notion that high levels of 
competition from ASCs with overlapping niches tend to elevate both ASC and hospital 
exit rates.  Although hospitals react to this phenomenon by avoiding these markets, 
surgery centers actually seek them out.  These market segments are characterized by high 
levels of turnover as they experience elevated rates of surgery center entry and exit.  
Meanwhile, the only ecological events influenced by hospital overlap and non-overlap 
density are hospital exit rates.  As a result, it appears that activity within this market is 
driven not by hospitals but by surgery centers.  Given the relative levels of growth 
between these two entities, this is not at all surprising. 
Our exit models indicate that ASCs appear to enjoy legitimacy benefits from the 
presence of other ASCs while hospitals do not enjoy legitimacy benefits from the 
presence of nearby hospitals.  These findings are not at all surprising since ASCs 
represent a relatively new organizational form and their numbers are still growing 
rapidly.  Meanwhile, hospitals have been around for a much longer period of time and do 
not suffer from these same legitimacy issues.  Based upon these findings, one could argue 
that organizational legitimacy plays a much more significant role in influencing the exit 
patterns of surgery centers than hospitals.  At the same time, our entry models indicate 
that neither ASCs nor hospitals enjoy legitimacy benefits from the presence of similar 
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facilities with non-overlapping niches.  So it is fairly clear that our non-overlap findings 
are considerably weaker than our overlap results, which may indicate that the legitimacy 
effects aren’t as strong as the competitive effects or that our modest sample sizes do not 
permit us to capture them fully. 
Our results also suggest that there is a geographic component to the differences 
between surgery centers and hospitals.  Our exit model results suggest that ASCs appear 
to be much more strongly affected by local competition from ASCs while hospital exit 
rates are closely associated with diffuse competition from ASCs and hospitals.  On the 
other hand, our entry models indicate that ASC and hospital entry rates are affected more 
strongly by local market conditions.  The results from our exit models are not entirely 
surprising since previous research has suggested that patients will travel greater distances 
to receive care from hospitals than surgery centers (Makuc et al., 1991; Weber, 2008).  
The results may suggest that hospitals compete within a different geographical market 
than surgery centers. 
One alternative explanation for this phenomenon emerges from a related study, 
which found that rural hospitals with an ASC located within one mile experienced higher 
operating margins and profits while those with ASCs located between one mile and fifty 
miles had lower margins (Gregg et al., 2008).  Gregg, Wholey, and Moscovice (2008) 
attributed this finding to the fact that hospitals within one mile of an ASC were 
significantly more likely to report engaging in a joint venture with an ASC and so they 
suggested that the financial benefit for hospitals in close proximity to an ASC could come 
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from the provision of services related to but not including surgical procedures (e.g., 
ancillary services, outpatient follow-up care, economies of scale) (Gregg et al., 2008). 
XI. IMPLICATIONS 
A. Asymmetric Competition 
Our exit model results indicate that there is asymmetric competition between 
surgery centers and hospitals.  Hospital exit rates are significantly higher in markets 
characterized by the presence of surgery centers with overlapping niches.  Meanwhile, 
surgery center exit rates do not appear to be affected one way or another by the presence 
of nearby hospitals with overlapping or non-overlapping niches.  Our entry models lend 
additional support to this argument since we found that hospitals tend to avoid markets 
with overlapping surgery centers.  However, there was no indication that surgery centers 
tend to enter markets that are already occupied by hospitals, which would have added 
support for this argument.  At a minimum, these results indicate that surgery centers and 
hospitals compete with one another in fundamentally different ways and that competition 
between these two organizational forms is asymmetric. 
These findings contradict conventional knowledge about how specialists compete 
with generalists.  Resource partitioning theory suggests that specialists tend to locate in 
peripheral areas of the market in order to avoid direct competition with other firms 
(Carroll, 1985).  However, the theory also imposes the assumption that no real price 
competition occurs between firms in the market.  Generalists possess a competitive 
advantage over specialists and so they are able to locate in core areas of the market while 
specialists avoid direct competition with them.  However, we know that there are a 
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variety of settings – most notably service environments – in which specialists maintain a 
lower cost structure than generalists and are able to behave like focused factories.  Under 
these circumstances, our results contradict this conventional wisdom and suggest that 
specialists are capable of competing directly with generalists in core areas of the market 
and may, in fact, be able to enter these markets without experiencing any adverse effects 
as a result of competition with these generalists.  
Given the recent evolution of the health care industry towards service line 
competition and the emergence of specialized facilities, these findings carry additional 
weight.  Further research should explore whether the results apply to specialty hospitals 
and other specialized facilities that are entering markets that have traditionally been 
served by the general hospital, which include lithotripsy, cardiac catheterization, 
diagnostic imaging, and radiation therapy.  Our results suggests that these providers may 
be relatively unaffected by competition with hospitals but that entry by these providers 
may cause hospitals to exit markets.  These findings have implications for the ability of 
hospitals to treat vulnerable populations and cross-subsidize less profitable lines of 
service since hospital closures clearly affect patient access to care. 
This begs the question: how applicable are these results to settings outside the 
health care industry?  It seems plausible that the mechanisms by which this process 
occurs are present outside the market for outpatient surgery.  Clearly, phenomena like 
physician ownership and the ability to send emergency cases to nearby hospitals are 
specific to the health care industry.  However, hospitals offer surgery centers the same 
legitimacy and resource spillovers that generalists present to emerging specialists in a 
 141 
variety of other industries.  Although we suggested that surgery centers could “cherry-
pick” from hospitals, this concept is essentially synonymous with segmenting the market, 
which is a strategy available to other specialized forms.  In fact, surgery centers have less 
of an opportunity to appeal to more price discriminating consumers than specialized 
forms in other industries since third-party reimbursement makes health care consumers 
less price sensitive (Newhouse & RAND Corporation., 1993).  This is typically 
considered to be one of the primary advantages of specialized forms that can emerge as 
low-cost alternatives within industries populated by more generalized forms.  Additional 
research should apply these methods to other settings in order to ascertain whether 
specialized and generalized organizational forms exhibit patterns of asymmetric 
competition outside the health care sector. 
B. Density Dependence 
The confluence of results from our entry models suggest that entry patterns do 
indeed differ significantly within a mature population of generalists and a growing 
population of specialists.  Our results are consistent with the notion that hospitals tend to 
avoid direct competition with surgery centers and hospitals occupying overlapping 
niches.  Meanwhile, our findings suggest that surgery centers appear to seek out markets 
in which there are local and diffuse surgery centers with overlapping niches in spite of 
the fact that exit rates tend to be higher within these markets.  These findings offer some 
evidence to suggest that organizational populations at different stages of evolution may 
display different patterns of market entry. 
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In the case of mature organizational populations characterized by K-selection 
processes, the mechanism by which this occurs is fairly straightforward since competitive 
pressures are heightened by organizational density in markets where firms compete on 
the basis of efficiency.  In the case of growing populations characterized by r-selection 
processes, the causal mechanism is less clear.  Density dependence suggests that the 
legitimacy benefits of organizations occupying crowded niches may outweigh the 
strength of their competitive effects within a growing population.  Alternatively, our 
theory of r-selection processes suggests that organizations in growing populations may 
seek out these crowded markets, either because they wish to occupy these highly 
desirable markets or because they have difficulties evaluating their attractiveness and 
simply choose to follow other firms instead. 
In the case of niche overlap density, these two different effects produce the same 
outcome.  In the case of niche non-overlap density, the effects oppose each other.  Not 
surprisingly, our results describing the relationship between niche non-overlap density 
and ASC entry rates are much more ambiguous.  We did not find a significant effect in 
either direction, which may be an indication that they cancel each other out or that neither 
is strong enough to dominate.  The fact that ASCs were slightly less likely to enter 
markets with high levels of hospital non-overlap density lends some support to our theory 
of r-selection processes.  If non-overlap density posed any legitimacy benefits, then we 
would expect to see higher rates of entry within these markets. 
Adding to this causal ambiguity is the fact that it may be an idiosyncratic 
characteristic of the market for ambulatory surgery.  We have already pointed out that 
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surgery centers do not ultimately compete on the basis of price since reimbursement rates 
are set by third-party payers.  As a result, they may seek out specialty markets in which 
these reimbursement-cost ratios are the highest.  This does not necessarily undermine our 
conclusions since it simply means that surgery centers either enter markets with high 
contribution margins in spite of their crowding or that they view crowding as an 
indication that these markets possess high contribution margins.  Unfortunately, it is still 
impossible to determine the direction in which this process occurs. 
Although these data do not permit us to test the motives behind this organizational 
behavior, we attempted to address this question by supplementing our data with 
additional sources.  We collected data on Medicare reimbursement rates but found that 
this data wasn’t particularly useful in the absence of comparable data on facility costs.  
Moreover, there was not enough variation in reimbursement rates from 1997 to 2006 to 
produce any measurable effect on facility entry or exit rates.  However, the significant 
changes to the outpatient payment system that took effect in 2008 represent an exogenous 
shock to reimbursement rates that may potentially be exploited at some point down the 
line.  More broadly, additional research could address this causality question qualitatively 
within non-health care settings by interviewing entrepreneurs within growing industries 
or quantitatively by assessing how these entry patterns are affected by different levels of 
organizational legitimacy and environmental uncertainty. 
C. Limitations 
Although the empirical techniques employed here represent a significant 
improvement over much of the existing work in this area, there are several limitations to 
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this study.  To begin, we are unable to infer causality from these methods.  For example, 
we cannot determine whether firm entry is function of organizational density within 
markets or whether markets are more densely populated when firms enter as a result of 
underlying market conditions.  Likewise, we cannot determine whether firm exit is 
caused by competitive intensity within markets or whether firms choose to crowd markets 
that experience exits, perhaps because these exits suggest that an opportunity for entry 
exists.  Lagging all of the right-hand side variables in our model by one quarter does 
address this issue somewhat.  However, in the absence of some exogenous change that 
causes a shock to facility entry or exit rates, there is no obvious solution to these 
endogeneity issues. Yet this limitation does not undermine our findings since we are 
primarily concerned with the relationship between firm density and entry/exit rates, and 
not necessarily the causal relationships that exist between them. 
Likewise, there is some causal ambiguity as to the mechanism that produces these 
results.  Although we have suggested a variety of explanations to justify our predictions, 
any number of alternative explanations could also be proposed.  For example, we have 
argued that the entry of surgery centers into crowded market segments can be explained 
by the presence of legitimacy but our findings are consistent with any kind of positive 
externality posed by the presence of non-overlapping facilities.  Alternatively, we have 
acknowledged that firms may respond to the presence of technological uncertainty or 
information asymmetry by following others in a process called mimetic isomorphism 
(Haveman, 1993).  In fact, this phenomenon might even be explained by the fact that 
entrepreneurs within these industries have limited cognition and may simply end up 
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making mistakes as they learn about industry dynamics.  Since we do not directly test any 
of these mechanisms, there is no way to definitively establish whether any one 
explanation is more attributable than another.  The presence of varying levels of 
legitimacy and uncertainty, coupled with the availability of valid constructs that measure 
them, could pose some opportunity to test these processes directly in order to ascertain 
which drive these findings. 
The empirical methods that we describe here model firm entry and exit as a 
function of both overlap and non-overlap density – which bear a direct relationship with 
firm supply – as well as procedure demand.  However, it is not surprising that there is a 
strong correlation between firm supply and procedure demand, which means that these 
independent variables are strongly collinear.  Given their inclusion in our models, it is 
unclear how much additional variation in firm entry and exit rates is left to be explained.  
When we attempted to address these collinearity issues by excluding one of those 
variables – first non-overlap density and then procedure demand – we found the 
remaining coefficients behaved in unusual ways, and so we decided to include them in 
our models.  However, we did at least address this issue in our entry models by 
deliberately excluding measures of physician supply since they would have contributed 
further to multi-collinearity. 
Yet another limitation is fact that we based our market definitions on travel 
patterns for inpatient care, which may not necessarily mirror travel patterns for outpatient 
care (Makuc et al., 1991; Weber, 2008).  Although we indirectly tested the sensitivity of 
this assumption by dividing HSAs into their local and diffuse components, our use of the 
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health service area (HSA) as the primary unit of geographic analysis may be problematic 
if patients frequently travel across HSAs for outpatient procedures.  The fact that ASCs 
and hospitals in our exit models were affected differently by local and diffuse 
competition suggests that there may be some opportunity to refine these boundaries by 
using ZIP code information available from the Florida patient data. 
Although we do control for facility ownership characteristics and physician 
practice patterns in several different ways, there are several constructs that we could not 
generate from the Florida patient data.  Namely, we could not observe how surgeons 
organize within physician groups and so we could not ascertain whether these physician 
groups – as opposed to the supply of physicians – had an impact on facility entry and exit 
rates.  Likewise, we included dummy variables representing facilities that were owned by 
an individual, partnership, corporation, or government entity, but these variables did not 
indicate whether surgery centers were physician and/or hospital owned.  We contacted 
the state of Florida about obtaining this information from corporation records or recent 
surveys of facility ownership patterns but neither proved to be a viable approach. 
Our measures of organizational niche, based upon surgical specialties, are 
somewhat imperfect.  They measure a key component of the processes affecting facility 
entry and exit but do not exhaust all possible niche characteristics for outpatient facilities.  
For example, facility size might constitute another element of organizational niche, 
though we did control for facility size in our exit models and found no effect.  Moreover, 
we based our organizational niches upon the CCS procedure chapters rather than the 
actual surgical specialties that define the ways in which physicians organize and practice.  
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Although we explored the possibility of re-categorizing the CCS procedure types by 
surgeon specialty, there were too many outpatient procedures that fell under the category 
of general surgery (e.g., hernia, laparoscopy, etc.) or could be performed by a variety of 
different specialties (e.g., hand, thyroid, etc.) to do so.  To the extent that the CCS 
procedure chapters are an externally validated method of categorizing procedures and 
these chapters remained consistent throughout, utilizing this measure of organizational 
niche should not constitute serious limitation of this study. 
We based our measures of overlap and non-overlap density upon each facility’s 
realized niche rather than its intended niche.  This makes them endogenous to each 
facility’s procedure volume since any shift in a facility’s specialty mix may have an 
impact on its contribution to overlap and non-overlap density.  In fact, instances in which 
a facility enters or exits any specialty may cause sudden changes to its own overlap and 
non-overlap density since these measures are based upon specialty participation.  
Although Baum and Singh (1994) measured the intended niche of day care centers based 
upon the ages of children that they were licensed to enroll, we opted instead to measure 
the realized niche of outpatient facilities since each specialty does not contribute an equal 
amount to each facility’s total procedure volume.  It would have wasted the unique 
opportunity presented by this detailed patient data from the state of Florida to assemble 
less fine-tuned measures of overlap and non-overlap density based upon intended niches. 
Our analysis has focused upon how firm entry and exit rates are influenced by 
several factors – competition and procedure demand – that our data permits us to measure 
with a high degree of precision.  However, we have somewhat ignored the impact of 
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price.  A variety of studies have documented the fact that the reimbursement-cost ratios 
for some procedures are considerably higher than for others (Dexter, 2006; Resnick, 
Corrigan, Mullen, & Kaiser, 2005).  Some have suggested that the relative profitability of 
these surgical specialties play a significant role in determining the markets that end up 
being served by surgery centers and specialty hospitals (Berenson et al., 2006; Casalino 
et al., 2003).  We attempted to address this issue by gathering data on Medicare 
reimbursement rates for outpatient procedures but this data isn’t particularly useful in the 
absence of comparable data on average facility costs, which would have allowed us to 
gauge whether reimbursement rates were relatively high or low.  The Medicare 
reimbursement rates did not demonstrate much variation over time so it was impossible 
to detect the impact of reimbursement rate changes on firm entry and exit.  Although firm 
density within specialties may serve as somewhat of a proxy for reimbursement-cost 
ratios, this nonetheless remains a limitation of our study that should be addressed in 
follow-up work. 
D. Future Directions 
Our study’s focus on the dynamics of firm entry and exit presents several avenues 
for future research.  For example, we used firm exit as our measure of organizational 
performance in spite of the fact that it is a limited indicator of performance.  However, as 
we have already pointed out, organizations that are successful relatively early in their 
lifespan may build up a stock of capital that buffers them from selection pressures later in 
life (Levinthal, 1991).  On the one hand, the fact that hospitals are frequently non-profit 
entities does support this decision since it is unclear whether such entities seek to 
 149 
maximize profits (Pauly, 1987).  On the other hand, other performance measures like firm 
costs, revenues, and profits are considerably more responsive to changing market 
conditions.  Although these data are notoriously difficult to retrieve and were not 
available for this study, future research could supplement our work by retrieving this 
information and validating our results by assessing the impact of firm density on the 
balance sheet of ASCs and hospitals. 
By the same token, our focus on the interaction of organizational niche and firm 
entry/exit rates makes the implicit assumption that firms do not change niches in the 
course of their lifespan.  We know this assumption to be false since we spent some time 
modeling specialty entry and exit as a function of competitive conditions and identified 
hundreds of instances in which ASCs and hospitals entered and exited specialties.  
Although this research direction did not pan out initially, it poses an interesting 
opportunity for future research as we seek to understand why firms choose to expand or 
contract their organizational niches and how these changes affect their survival.  To that 
end, it would not only complement the other elements of this research exploring the 
competitive dynamics of outpatient surgery markets, but it follows directly on the heels 
of Baum and Singh’s work exploring how day care centers alter their organizational 
niches in response to competition and how these changes influence their survival chances 
(Baum & Singh, 1996). 
XII. CONCLUSIONS 
The literature on organizational niche has evolved significantly over time.  
Population ecologists first suggested that the organizational niche was a product of 
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environmental variation and argued that specialists thrive in stable environments while 
generalists fare better when environmental variation is high (Hannan & Freeman, 1977).  
Over time, two theories emerged which held that these environmental conditions are not 
so dissimilar; they argued instead that organizational niche was dictated by market 
position and organizational concentration.  Resource partitioning theory described the 
macro-niches occupied by different organizational forms and developed a model of 
competition between specialists and generalists; it explained the fact that mature 
industries frequently experience a dramatic increase in the number of firms as a result of 
entry by specialized organizations.  Scholars tested this model within a variety of 
different settings and found empirical support for these ideas within the newspaper 
publishing, brewing, and automotive industries among others (Carroll, 1985; Carroll & 
Swaminathan, 2000; Dobrev et al., 2002; Dobrev, Kim, & Hannan, 2001a; Swaminathan, 
1998). 
However, resource partitioning theory was predicated upon several strong 
assumptions regarding the presence of economies of scale and the non-existence of price 
competition; it cannot be applied to industries in which specialists enjoy a significant cost 
advantage over generalists (Carroll, 1985).  Its focus on the macro-processes of 
competition between specialists and generalists was complemented by an alternate theory 
that explored the micro-processes of niche-localized competition among similar 
organizational forms.  Niche overlap theory filled this gap by developing our 
understanding of competitive dynamics within organizational niches (Baum & Singh, 
1994a, 1994b).  These ideas were tested empirically and validated within a mature 
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industry characterized by competition between firms with a similar organizational form.  
However, this focus on competition within organizational micro-niches has not been 
applied to markets characterized by competition between specialist and generalist 
organizations occupying different macro-niches and experiencing different stages of 
population growth. 
This work extends niche overlap theory by identifying a setting characterized by 
well-defined niches in which a specialized organizational form has emerged and grown 
rapidly.  This specialist also possesses a competitive advantage over generalists within 
this market since it behaves like a focused factory and enjoys significantly lower 
operating costs as a result.  By manipulating patient-level datasets from the state of 
Florida, we were able to measure competition, market demand, and firm entry/exit with a 
higher level of precision than previous studies in this area.  Both the characteristics of this 
market and the availability of this detailed data make this an ideal setting to test these 
theories from the literature on macro-organizational behavior.  Yet this setting is also 
interesting from the perspective of health services research because surgery centers 
represent just one example of specialized providers that have caused a variety of services 
to migrate away from the general hospital. 
In keeping with our predictions from niche overlap theory, we found that niche 
overlap density is positively related to exit rates while there was slightly weaker evidence 
to suggest that niche non-overlap is negatively related to exit rates.  Both surgery centers 
and hospitals experienced higher exit rates in markets with high niche overlap among 
surgery centers while hospitals also tended to exit markets with high hospital niche 
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overlap.  Meanwhile, surgery centers displayed lower exit rates in markets with high 
niche non-overlap among surgery centers.  Correspondingly, we also found evidence to 
suggest that high niche overlap is negatively related to entry rates but found no evidence 
to suggest that niche non-overlap is positively related to entry rates.  Hospital entry rates 
were significantly lower in markets with high niche overlap density among surgery 
centers and hospitals.  However, niche non-overlap density was not associated with 
higher entry rates among either type of facility.  Taken together, these results generally 
confirm our first two hypotheses and validate niche overlap theory in a setting other than 
the child day care industry. 
Yet there are several idiosyncratic characteristics of the market for outpatient 
surgery that permitted us to test several extensions of this theory.  For example, we 
confirmed the presence of asymmetric competition between specialist and generalist 
organizations.  Although hospitals had a higher likelihood of exit in markets with 
overlapping surgery centers, surgery centers appeared to be unaffected by competition 
with overlapping hospitals.  This asymmetric competition was hypothesized to result 
from the fact that generalists create the market initially while specialists possess a lower 
cost structure that allows them to attract consumers and steal market share.  Under these 
circumstances, specialists can compete directly with generalists and occupy core areas of 
the market.  In fact, we had hypothesized that specialists might actually benefit from the 
presence of nearby generalists due to the legitimacy and resource spillovers that they 
offer.  We did not find this to be the case, either because these effects were relatively 
weak or because we studied this industry too late in its evolution to observe them. 
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We also confirmed that entry patterns within a growing organizational population 
differ from those of a mature population.  Although hospitals display lower entry rates in 
markets with overlapping surgery centers, surgery centers display significantly higher 
entry rates within these markets.  In spite of the clarity of these findings, the causal 
mechanism for this phenomenon is more ambiguous.  It could be a function of 
organizational legitimacy, since surgery centers benefit from the presence of other 
surgery centers, although this explanation would seem more plausible if we had observed 
a similar effect for niche non-overlap.  Instead, we argue that these effects stem from the 
differences between K-selection and r-selection pressures.  We know that the presence of 
K-selection pressures within a mature organizational population drives firms to seek out 
markets that are less crowded.  But within a growing organizational population, 
characterized by r-selection processes, firms appear to seek out crowded markets in an 
attempt to compete for market position.  Yet we still cannot be certain of the mechanism 
that produces this outcome since firms may enter relatively desirable markets in spite of 
the fact that they are crowded or they may enter crowded markets because they believe 
this crowding indicates that the markets are desirable. 
Regardless of this ambiguity, it is nonetheless interesting that entry patterns 
within growing organizational populations are exactly the opposite of what we observe 
within mature populations.  Although this finding may initially appear somewhat counter-
intuitive, it actually makes sense when one considers that these different phases of 
industry evolution are often characterized by very different levels of environmental 
uncertainty and organizational legitimacy.  Although we have highlighted the 
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fundamental differences between these two in order to compare them, there is actually a 
much more fluid transition from one to the other.  Eventually, the rapid growth exhibited 
by surgery centers will slow as the industry experiences a shakeout and ultimately 
reaches maturity.  During this time, the r-selection processes we have examined will give 
way to K-selection processes.  Given 10 more years of data and further industry 
evolution, it would be fascinating to study firm entry and exit patterns during this 
transitional period since we only study them at opposite ends of the spectrum. 
These findings pose interesting implications for the emergence of specialized 
organizational forms.  Within the health care industry, the rapid growth of surgery centers 
and specialty hospitals signifies a change within the competitive landscape that 
emphasizes service line competition.  Yet these organizations represent just the tip of the 
iceberg as there has been similar growth among other specialized providers dedicated to 
gastrointestinal endoscopy, diagnostic imaging, sleep disorders, peripheral vascular 
disease, cosmetic surgery, radiation therapy, lithotripsy, cardiac catheterization, and 
cancer chemotherapy (Berenson et al., 2006).  These facilities may have a competitive 
advantage when competing with general hospitals as a result of their leaner 
organizational form.  This advantage may be particularly acute in the health care industry 
since physician ownership can strongly influence referral patterns (Kouri et al., 2002; 
Lynk & Longley, 2002). 
Health services researchers may also wish to expand upon this work and calculate 
the welfare implications of these findings since entry by these specialized facilities may 
promote competition and efficiency within health care markets but at the cost of 
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hindering non-profit hospitals in their ability to provide community benefits in the form 
of uncompensated care.  In fact, there is already work going on in this area.  Weber 
(2008) undertakes a welfare analysis of the presence of ASCs by removing these facilities 
from patients’ choice sets but does not account for their competitive effects on hospitals 
and vice versa (Weber, 2008).  Likewise, there are several studies emerging that explore 
the effect of entry by single-specialty hospitals and ASCs on the provision of uncontested 
services by general hospitals (Burns, David, & Helmchen, 2009; David, Helmchen, & 
Lindrooth, 2009). 
There are other industries – ranging from airlines to mail order computer 
manufacturers – in which specialized organizational forms are emerging as leaner, low-
cost versions of existing forms (Rao & Singh, 2001).  This research represents a critical 
first step toward understanding how these specialists compete against generalists within 
organizational niches.  The competitive advantage that these firms appear to possess, 
coupled with their success in the health care industry, may indicate that there are even 
more industries ripe for entry by specialized organizational forms.  Of course, it is 
unclear whether these results are applicable to other sectors since the health care industry 
is characterized by a number of fairly idiosyncratic characteristics.  For example, many 
firms are non-profit organizations, a large proportion of reimbursement comes from third-
party payers, and the government regulates the industry very heavily.  In spite of this fact, 
these findings pose interesting implications regarding the behavior of a growing 
population of specialists when entering a market that has been dominated by a mature 
population of generalists.  Additional research should test these ideas in other settings in 
 156 
order to determine whether the results are context dependent or readily generalizable 
extensions of niche overlap theory. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Hospital Inpatient Public Data File Layout 
Valid thru December 31, 2005 
 
ITEM FIELD NAME FREQUENCY 
1. System Record ID Number  
2. Reporting Year  
3. Reporting Quarter  
4. Hospital Number  
5. Type of Admission  
6. Source of Admission  
7. Discharge Status  
8. Patient Race  
9. Patient Sex (Gender)  
10. Patient Zip Code  
11. Principal Diagnosis Code  
12. Secondary Diagnosis Codes OCCURS 09 TIMES 
13. Principal Procedure Code    
14. Secondary Procedure Codes OCCURS 09 TIMES 
15. Principal Payer NO RELEASE WITH SSN OR PATIENT ID 
16. Charges By Revenue OCCURS 24 TIMES 
17. Total Gross Charges  
18. Attending Physician ID  
19. Attending Physician UPIN (If Available)  
20. Operating Physician ID  
21. Operating Physician UPIN (If Available)  
22. DRG Code  
23. Patient Age at Admission  
24. Length of Stay  
25. Day of Week Admitted  
26. Days To Procedure  
27. Patient County  (Florida Only)  
28. Patient State of Residence  
29. Pro Code  
30. Mod Code  
31. Facility County  
32. Facility Region  
Source: Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, 2004 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Ambulatory Patient Data Public Data File Layout 
Valid through December 31, 2004 
 
ITEM  FIELD NAME  FREQUENCY 
1. System Record ID Number  
2. Reporting Year  
3. Reporting Quarter  
4. Facility Number  
5. Pro Code  
6. Facility Region  
7. Facility County  
8. Patient Race or Ethnicity  
9. Patient Sex (Gender)  
10. Patient Age  
11. Patient Visit Weekday  
12. Patient Masked Zip Code  
13. Patient County  
14. Patient State of Residence  
15. Patient Status at End of Visit  
16. Principal Payer  
17. Principal CPT or HCPCS Procedure Code  
18. Principal Procedure Modifier Code 1  
19. Principal Procedure Modifier Code 2  
20. Other CPT or HCPCS Procedure Codes Occurs up to 14 times 
21. Other Modifier Code 1 Occurs up to 14 times 
22. Other Modifier Code 2 Occurs up to 14 times 
23. Principal ICD-9-CM Diagnosis Code  
24. Other ICD-9-CM Diagnosis Code  Occurs up to 4 times 
25. Principal ICD-9-CM Procedure Code  
26. Referring Physician ID Number  
27. Referring Physician UPIN Number  
28. Operating Physician ID Number  
29. Operating Physician UPIN Number  
30. Revenue Charges  Occurs up to 11 times 
31. Total Gross Charges  
32. Radiology Professional Fee Indicator  
33. Radiology Therapy Visits  
Source: Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, 2004 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Single-Level CCS Procedures 
 
1. Incision and excision of CNS 
2. Insertion, replacement, or removal of extracranial ventricular shunt 
3. Laminectomy, excision intervertebral disc 
4. Diagnostic spinal tap 
5. Insertion of catheter or spinal stimulator and injection into spinal canal 
6. Decompression peripheral nerve 
7. Other diagnostic nervous system procedures 
8. Other non-OR or closed therapeutic nervous system procedures 
9. Other OR therapeutic nervous system procedures 
10. Thyroidectomy, partial or complete 
11. Diagnostic endocrine procedures 
12. Other therapeutic endocrine procedures 
13. Corneal transplant 
14. Glaucoma procedures 
15. Lens and cataract procedures 
16. Repair of retinal tear, detachment 
17. Destruction of lesion of retina and choroid 
18. Diagnostic procedures on eye 
19. Other therapeutic procedures on eyelids, conjunctiva, cornea 
20. Other intraocular therapeutic procedures 
21. Other extraocular muscle and orbit therapeutic procedures 
22. Tympanoplasty 
23. Myringotomy 
24. Mastoidectomy 
25. Diagnostic procedures on ear 
26. Other therapeutic ear procedures 
27. Control of epistaxis 
28. Plastic procedures on nose 
29. Oral and Dental Services 
30. Tonsillectomy and/or adenoidectomy 
31. Diagnostic procedures on nose, mouth and pharynx 
32. Other non-OR therapeutic procedures on nose, mouth and pharynx 
33. Other OR therapeutic procedures on nose, mouth and pharynx 
34. Tracheostomy, temporary and permanent 
35. Tracheoscopy and laryngoscopy with biopsy 
36. Lobectomy or pneumonectomy 
37. Diagnostic bronchoscopy and biopsy of bronchus 
38. Other diagnostic procedures on lung and bronchus 
39. Incision of pleura, thoracentesis, chest drainage 
40. Other diagnostic procedures of respiratory tract and mediastinum 
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41. Other non-OR therapeutic procedures on respiratory system 
42. Other OR therapeutic procedures on respiratory system 
43. Heart valve procedures 
44. Coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) 
45. Percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) 
46. Coronary thrombolysis 
47. Diagnostic cardiac catheterization, coronary arteriography 
48. Insertion, revision, replacement, removal of cardiac pacemaker or 
cardioverter/defibrillator 
49. Other OR heart procedures 
50. Extracorporeal circulation auxiliary to open heart procedures 
51. Endarterectomy, vessel of head and neck 
52. Aortic resection, replacement or anastomosis 
53. Varicose vein stripping, lower limb 
54. Other vascular catheterization, not heart 
55. Peripheral vascular bypass 
56. Other vascular bypass and shunt, not heart 
57. Creation, revision and removal of arteriovenous fistula or vessel-to-vessel cannula 
for dialysis 
58. Hemodialysis 
59. Other OR procedures on vessels of head and neck 
60. Embolectomy and endarterectomy of lower limbs 
61. Other OR procedures on vessels other than head and neck 
62. Other diagnostic cardiovascular procedures 
63. Other non-OR therapeutic cardiovascular procedures 
64. Bone marrow transplant 
65. Bone marrow biopsy 
66. Procedures on spleen 
67. Other therapeutic procedures, hemic and lymphatic system 
68. Injection or ligation of esophageal varices 
69. Esophageal dilatation 
70. Upper gastrointestinal endoscopy, biopsy 
71. Gastrostomy, temporary and permanent 
72. Colostomy, temporary and permanent 
73. Ileostomy and other enterostomy 
74. Gastrectomy, partial and total 
75. Small bowel resection 
76. Colonoscopy and biopsy 
77. Proctoscopy and anorectal biopsy 
78. Colorectal resection 
79. Local excision of large intestine lesion (not endoscopic) 
80. Appendectomy 
81. Hemorrhoid procedures 
82. Endoscopic retrograde cannulation of pancreas (ERCP) 
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83. Biopsy of liver 
84. Cholecystectomy and common duct exploration 
85. Inguinal and femoral hernia repair 
86. Other hernia repair 
87. Laparoscopy 
88. Abdominal paracentesis 
89. Exploratory laparotomy 
90. Excision, lysis peritoneal adhesions 
91. Peritoneal dialysis 
92. Other bowel diagnostic procedures 
93. Other non-OR upper GI therapeutic procedures 
94. Other OR upper GI therapeutic procedures 
95. Other non-OR lower GI therapeutic procedures 
96. Other OR lower GI therapeutic procedures 
97. Other gastrointestinal diagnostic procedures 
98. Other non-OR gastrointestinal therapeutic procedures 
99. Other OR gastrointestinal therapeutic procedures 
100. Endoscopy and endoscopic biopsy of the urinary tract 
101. Transurethral excision, drainage, or removal urinary obstruction 
102. Ureteral catheterization 
103. Nephrotomy and nephrostomy 
104. Nephrectomy, partial or complete 
105. Kidney transplant 
106. Genitourinary incontinence procedures 
107. Extracorporeal lithotripsy, urinary 
108. Indwelling catheter 
109. Procedures on the urethra 
110. Other diagnostic procedures of urinary tract 
111. Other non-OR therapeutic procedures of urinary tract 
112. Other OR therapeutic procedures of urinary tract 
113. Transurethral resection of prostate (TURP) 
114. Open prostatectomy 
115. Circumcision 
116. Diagnostic procedures, male genital 
117. Other non-OR therapeutic procedures, male genital 
118. Other OR therapeutic procedures, male genital 
119. Oophorectomy, unilateral and bilateral 
120. Other operations on ovary 
121. Ligation of fallopian tubes 
122. Removal of ectopic pregnancy 
123. Other operations on fallopian tubes 
124. Hysterectomy, abdominal and vaginal 
125. Other excision of cervix and uterus 
126. Abortion (termination of pregnancy) 
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127. Dilatation and curettage (D&C), aspiration after delivery or abortion 
128. Diagnostic dilatation and curettage (D&C) 
129. Repair of cystocele and rectocele, obliteration of vaginal vault 
130. Other diagnostic procedures, female organs 
131. Other non-OR therapeutic procedures, female organs 
132. Other OR therapeutic procedures, female organs 
133. Episiotomy 
134. Cesarean section 
135. Forceps, vacuum, and breech delivery 
136. Artificial rupture of membranes to assist delivery 
137. Other procedures to assist delivery 
138. Diagnostic amniocentesis 
139. Fetal monitoring 
140. Repair of current obstetric laceration 
141. Other therapeutic obstetrical procedures 
142. Partial excision bone 
143. Bunionectomy or repair of toe deformities 
144. Treatment, facial fracture or dislocation 
145. Treatment, fracture or dislocation of radius and ulna 
146. Treatment, fracture or dislocation of hip and femur 
147. Treatment, fracture or dislocation of lower extremity (other than hip or femur) 
148. Other fracture and dislocation procedure 
149. Arthroscopy 
150. Division of joint capsule, ligament or cartilage 
151. Excision of semilunar cartilage of knee 
152. Arthroplasty knee 
153. Hip replacement, total and partial 
154. Arthroplasty other than hip or knee 
155. Arthrocentesis 
156. Injections and aspirations of muscles, tendons, bursa, joints and soft tissue 
157. Amputation of lower extremity 
158. Spinal fusion 
159. Other diagnostic procedures on musculoskeletal system 
160. Other therapeutic procedures on muscles and tendons 
161. Other OR therapeutic procedures on bone 
162. Other OR therapeutic procedures on joints 
163. Other non-OR therapeutic procedures on musculoskeletal system 
164. Other OR therapeutic procedures on musculoskeletal system 
165. Breast biopsy and other diagnostic procedures on breast 
166. Lumpectomy, quadrantectomy of breast 
167. Mastectomy 
168. Incision and drainage, skin and subcutaneous tissue 
169. Debridement of wound, infection or burn 
170. Excision of skin lesion 
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171. Suture of skin and subcutaneous tissue 
172. Skin graft 
173. Other diagnostic procedures on skin and subcutaneous tissue 
174. Other non-OR therapeutic procedures on skin and breast 
175. Other OR therapeutic procedures on skin and breast 
176. Other organ transplantation 
177. Computerized axial tomography (CT) scan head 
178. CT scan chest 
179. CT scan abdomen 
180. Other CT scan 
181. Myelogram 
182. Mammography 
183. Routine chest X-ray 
184. Intraoperative cholangiogram 
185. Upper gastrointestinal X-ray 
186. Lower gastrointestinal X-ray 
187. Intravenous pyelogram 
188. Cerebral arteriogram 
189. Contrast aortogram 
190. Contrast arteriogram of femoral and lower extremity arteries 
191. Arterio- or venogram (not heart and head) 
192. Diagnostic ultrasound of head and neck 
193. Diagnostic ultrasound of heart (echocardiogram) 
194. Diagnostic ultrasound of gastrointestinal tract 
195. Diagnostic ultrasound of urinary tract 
196. Diagnostic ultrasound of abdomen or retroperitoneum 
197. Other diagnostic ultrasound 
198. Magnetic resonance imaging 
199. Electroencephalogram (EEG) 
200. Nonoperative urinary system measurements 
201. Cardiac stress tests 
202. Electrocardiogram 
203. Electrographic cardiac monitoring 
204. Swan-Ganz catheterization for monitoring 
205. Arterial blood gases 
206. Microscopic examination (bacterial smear, culture, toxicology) 
207. Radioisotope bone scan 
208. Radioisotope pulmonary scan 
209. Radioisotope scan and function studies 
210. Other radioisotope scan 
211. Therapeutic radiology 
212. Diagnostic physical therapy 
213. Physical therapy exercises, manipulation, and other procedures 
214. Traction, splints, and other wound care 
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215. Other physical therapy and rehabilitation 
216. Respiratory intubation and mechanical ventilation 
217. Other respiratory therapy 
218. Psychological and psychiatric evaluation and therapy 
219. Alcohol and drug rehabilitation/detoxification 
220. Ophthalmologic and otologic diagnosis and treatment 
221. Nasogastric tube 
222. Blood transfusion 
223. Enteral and parenteral nutrition 
224. Cancer chemotherapy 
225. Conversion of cardiac rhythm 
226. Other diagnostic radiology and related techniques 
227. Other diagnostic procedures (interview, evaluation, consultation) 
228. Prophylactic vaccinations and inoculations 
229. Nonoperative removal of foreign body 
230. Extracorporeal shock wave, other than urinary 
231. Other therapeutic procedures 
232. Anesthesia 
233. Laboratory - Chemistry and Hematology 
234. Pathology 
235. Other Laboratory 
236. Home Health Services 
237. Ancillary Services 
238. Infertility Services 
239. Transportation - patient, provider, equipment 
240. Medications (Injections, infusions and other forms) 
241. Visual aids and other optical supplies 
242. Hearing devices and audiology supplies 
243. DME and supplies 
244. Gastric bypass and volume reduction 
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